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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

FLN-YEMENI SOCIALIST PARTY JOINT COMMUNIQUE PUBLISHED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 21 Apr 80 p 3

[Text] Algiers (APS)--Following a visit to PDRY by a delegation from the FLN Party, there was published a joint communique, whose text follows:

"At the invitation of the Central Committee of the Yemeni Socialist Party, a delegation from the Party of the National Liberation Front headed by Mr Ali Ammar Mohammed, member of the Central Committee and in charge of the committee on studies and political training made a visit to the PDRY from 3 to 10 April 1980. The delegation included Messrs Abdelkrim Abada, member of the Central Committee and National Commissar of the Wilaya of Constantine, Al-Hadi Boudraa, National Commissar of the Wilaya of Setif, Dahar Quattar, National Controller of the Party and member of the Committee on Studies and Political Training, with participation by Mr Cherif Sisbane, member of the Central Committee and Algerian ambassador to the PDRY.

"In the course of this visit the delegation met with Messrs Abdellettah Ismail, secretary general of the Central Committee of the Yemeni Socialist Party and president of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of People, Ali Nasser Mohammed, member of the Politburo and president of the Council of Ministers as well as several leaders of the party and the government. The delegation made inquiries on the current experience in the governorates of Aden and the Hadramout in the matter of doctrine and organization and paid a visit to the Advanced Institute [School] of Scientific Socialism which is under the aegis of the Central Committee of the Yemeni Socialist Party.

"In the course of these meetings the delegation took cognizance of the development and the concrete achievements of democratic Yemen and the struggle being carried on by the Yemeni people to develop their national economy, improve the people's standard of living, strengthen the position of the progress-oriented Democratic Yemen and face up to the multiplicity of maneuvers plotted against them by imperialism and reaction which try to counteract the efforts under way to achieve Yemeni unity on national and progressive foundations and in peaceful ways.

"The delegation of the Party of the National Liberation Front held a high appreciation for the experience of the revolution of democratic Yemen as well as the national gains and the democracy already achieved. It applauded the firm position of the PDRY in the face of imperialist-Zionist plots mounted against it, and for the safeguarding of Yemeni sovereignty and national independence. The Algerian delegation expressed its satisfaction with the efforts expended for the unity of the two parts of Yemen by practical measures and appreciates the role assumed by democratic Yemen in the global struggle for national liberation against imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

"The leaders of the Yemeni Socialist Party have made themselves aware of the struggles being waged by the Algerian people for the consolidation of gains of the revolution, economic development and the development of social justice, the struggle for building a socialist society and the struggle of the Algerian people and its rulers to bring to naught the imperialist-reactionary plots against the Algerian revolution.

"The leaders of the Yemeni Socialist Party express their consideration for the struggles of the Algerian people to strengthen national independence, the unremitting efforts mounted for building a socialist society sheltered from all exploitation, Algeria's role in national emancipation and the liberation of our Arab peoples and its struggles to undo imperialist-Zionist reactionary plans in the Arab region. They also express their consideration for the role of the National Liberation Front at the head of the struggle being carried on by the Algerian people.

"Both parties express their satisfaction in the development of bilateral relations between the two brother countries, the PDRY and the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria in all domains, in the common interest of the two brother countries and peoples.

"The two parties reviewed the developments that had taken place in the Arab world and formally condemned the normalization of relations and the exchange of ambassadors between the regime of Sadat and the Zionist enemy as well as the conversations under way to bring to fruition the project of local government in Cisjordan and on the Gaza Strip. They consider these attempts to be a new phase of the conspiracy in progress between the national interests of the Palestinian and Egyptian peoples and the interests of all the Arab peoples.

"The two parties express their satisfaction with the struggle against the Camp David Accords and the capitulating peace treaty inasmuch as it is one of the essential battles in the struggle of the peoples of our Arab nation in this crucial phase. The two parties condemn the different forms of conspiracy tending to weaken the struggle against the Camp David Accords.

"The two parties affirm their total support and their positions of principle with regard to the cause of the brother Palestinian people. By the same

token they condemn the imperialist-Zionist reactionary plots aimed at denying the right of the Palestinian people to return to their homeland, their right to self-determination, the establishment of their own national independent government governed by the PLO.

"Both parties rejoice in the struggles of the Palestinian Arab masses in occupied territory to frustrate the plot of the local government on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and at any other plan to stifle the national identity of the Palestinian people.

"The two parties also affirmed the necessity of applying in their totality the decisions of the 9th and 10th Arab Summits, to increase the efficiency of the Resistance and Firmness Front in order to strengthen the struggle against American imperialism, the chief enemy of the Arab nation, and also to liquidate its economic, political, military and cultural interests. The liquidation of these interests constitutes the principal precondition for strengthening the struggle against the Zionist enemy, the Camp David Accords, and against the process of capitulating before imperialism.

--To strengthen relations with the Socialist states, natural allies of the Arab peoples, with the Palestinian people at their head.

"The two parties have reaffirmed their support

--For the brother people of Syria and its nationalist and progressive forces.

--For the Syrian regime in its struggle against the internal and external conspiracies mounted against anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist Syria.

--For the struggle being carried on by the Lebanese people and its Nationalist and Progressive Movement to preserve the unity of Lebanon and its Arabism.

"The two parties have hailed the common struggle of the brother peoples of Palestine and Lebanon, their resistance in South Lebanon in the face of aggressions by the Zionist and isolationist forces as well as their struggle against all forms of occupation in South Lebanon.

"The two parties expressed their total support for the struggle being carried on by the Egyptian people and their nationalist and progressive forces to liquidate the regime of Sadat, to defend the national sovereignty of Egypt and to enable the country to recover its natural place in the liberation struggle being carried on by the Arab peoples.

"The two parties have expressed their satisfaction on the constituting of an Egyptian national front and they condemn all the conspiracies fomented against this front for the purpose of frustrating the efforts that have been mounted for the unification of the nationalist and progressive forces in Egypt.

"The two parties expressed their support for the struggle being carried on by the Omani people under the leadership of the FPLO [Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman] to liquidate the imperialist presence and to establish a nationalist progressive regime.

"The two parties also expressed their total support for the struggle being carried on by the people of the Western Sahara for their right of self-determination and they condemn the imperialist and reactionary conspiracy of the Maghreb against the Saharan people.

"The two parties hailed the diplomatic and military successes won by the Saharan people and renewed their support for the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic. The two parties invite all the forces of liberation peace and progress the world over to support the struggle of the Saharan people.

"The two parties underscored the necessity of maintaining relations with the countries in the Arab Maghreb region on a basis of respect for sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs. They have moreover underscored the necessity of making the Mediterranean Basin a lake where security and cooperation prevail to the advantage of the people living on the shore, on a basis of respect for national sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs.

"The two parties have also analyzed the developments in the situation prevailing in the Gulf region and the Arabian Peninsula, particularly the increase in the American military presence in the Gulf, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. They consider that this state of affairs constitutes a grave threat to the security and stability of the region. The two countries have insisted on the necessity of putting an end to the imperialist military presence in the region, particularly American imperialism, and to establish relations with the countries of this region based on peaceful coexistence, respect for sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs, fundamental preconditions for guaranteeing the security and stability of the region and its development safely removed from any projects of security across the region imperialism and its allies may be attempting to undertake.

"The two parties affirmed their support for the Ethiopian revolution, and for the battles being waged by the Ethiopian people for their social progress, and call for a practical solution to all the conflicts in the Horn of Africa.

"Reaffirming their support for the Iranian revolution and the anti-imperialist positions they have assumed, the two countries hailed the victory of the people of Zimbabwe and expressed their support for the struggle of all the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America in order to achieve their total liberation from all forms of dependence upon imperialism and to achieve their economic, social and cultural progress.

"The two parties have underscored their approval of the results of the Sixth Summit Conference of Nonaligned Countries at Havana and of the OAU at Monrovia. Moreover they express their support for the struggle of the developing countries for the installation of a new, equitable international economic order.

"The two countries have analyzed the development of the bilateral relations between the Yemeni Socialist Party and the FLN Party. In the course of the visit a protocol of bilateral cooperation was signed with an eye to strengthen the relations between the two Parties in struggle, to serve the supreme interests of the two brother Yemeni and Algerian peoples and to accomplish the supreme objectives of the Yemeni Revolution of 14 October and the Algerian Revolution of 1 November."

The delegation of the FLN Party expressed its deep satisfaction with the warm reception extended to it in the course of its visit to the PDRY, and extended an invitation to the Socialist Party to visit the Algerian Democratic and People's Republic. The invitation was accepted, the date to be decided later.

2750

CSO: 4400

AFGHANISTAN

POLITICAL SOLUTION FAVORED, ASSISTANCE TO IRAN OFFERED

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 9 Apr 80 pp 1, 10

[Interview with Shah Mohammad Dost by Salih Qallab: "AL-SAFIR Goes to Kabul To Talk to Officials and To Explore the Situation; Shah Mohammad Dost Says, 'We Are for the Political Solution, But With the Participation and the Approval of the Afghan People; I Do Not Expect War in the Area, Our Hands Are Stretched Out to Iran'"]

[Text] Before arriving in Kabul my imagination was crowded with numerous images about the country that suddenly emerged from historical obscurity and jumped to the front page of international events.

[I thought about] the justifications for Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and [I wondered] when would the Soviet troops be withdrawn; why did the Afghan leaders reject the proposal to neutralize their country; how do the Afghan leaders view the future of their relations with their neighbors; what are the difficulties they are facing; and what are they proclaiming as the slogan of the period?

At Kabul Airport this country with its high mountains proclaim its basic characteristic: it is a genuine observation tower in Southeast Asia.

The officials I met during the 10 days I spent in Kabul, and they included President Babrak Karmal, some staff members of the party, General 'Abd-al-Qadir, Minister of Foreign Affairs Shah Mohammad Dost, Minister of Information 'Abdolmajid Sarboland and Minister of Education and Culture Anahita Ratebzad, were all extremely enthusiastic about surmounting the current situation and pushing their country on the road to the 20th century.

On the opposite side of this enthusiasm emerges a picture of scores of bare-footed people crowding each other at the entrance to the shrine of the Arab leader Ya'qub ibn al-Layth who had conquered Kabul, in search of the late leader's blessing.

Although I conducted a large number of interviews, the 10 days [I spent in Kabul] were not enough to clarify the picture I had formed of Afghanistan, a vast country with truly major problems. Afghanistan had problems before the Soviet intervention and after it; it had major problems before the tribes in the mountains armed themselves and began to fight against the forces of the government; and it had major problems after the tribes armed themselves and began their fight.

But the picture is almost completed, and I begin [showing it] today with this interview which I had with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shah Mohammad Dost. He is expected to arrive in Beirut today on a visit during which he is to meet the leaders of the Palestinian Resistance.

Shah Mohammad Dost is described as one of the figures who played a prominent role in the modern history of Afghanistan. He took part in all the developments that were experienced by the country ever since the royal regime was overthrown in 1974 and until Karmal came to power. It is being said that he was the one who undertook to explain the international legal aspect of the request for Soviet aid.

Shah Mohammad Dost is described as the dynamo of Afghan diplomacy and the man who disposes of matters in severe crises with cool nerves.

When Shah Mohammad Dost speaks, one realizes that he selects his Persian terms, which have a rhetorical tone, with extreme care. He takes pains to explain his statements by making specific analogies which he does not want to deviate from, not even in a limited sense.

In the course of the 2-hour interview which I had with Dost in the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he spoke about the circumstances under which the Soviets were asked to interfere. He spoke about the operations carried out by the armed men on the borders with China; about Pakistan; about his opinion on advocating a political solution to the "Afghan question;" and about his country's support for the Palestinian question.

The text of the interview follows:

The Political Solution

[Question] The subject of establishing a political solution to the Afghan problem was proposed recently. Do you have a specific position on this matter? Did you have prior knowledge of what the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO Yasir 'Arafat said during his visit to India?

[Answer] We welcome any political solution that involves us and incorporates the position of the state of Afghanistan. I am affirming that we do approve of the joint Indian-Palestinian communique in principles. This communique advocated a political solution to the Afghan problem. But it must be mentioned here that we do insist on not accepting [the principle of] having our question solved or discussed in our absence.

I am reaffirming on behalf of our government and our party our hope that Brother Yasir 'Arafat succeed in his efforts because he knows the truth about the question of our people and because we consider him one of the basic supporters of the struggle of Afghanistan.

[Question] Previous news had spoken about tense relations between you and Iran. They you followed a flexible course [of action] vis a vis Tehran. What we want to know is the truth about Afghan-Iranian relations at the present time. Are attempts being made to improve relations between the two neighboring countries?

[Answer] After the new stage we did indicate many times that we were convinced it was necessary to improve relations with Iran and with the other neighboring countries. We announced our position in statements and messages that were sent by the secretary general of the party, Babrak Karmal.

On our part, we have repeatedly affirmed our support for the Iranian Islamic Revolution. We have based this support on a firm conviction that the Iranian Revolution which overthrew the Shah's regime has now embarked on a most vicious battle against U.S. imperialism.

We are also fully convinced that there is no disagreement between us and Iran. We are affirming that the relations which have bound our two countries throughout history must manifest themselves in good relations.

Although we have not yet sensed that the Iranian leaders share those feelings with us, we hope that they will stretch out their hands to us just as we are stretching our hands to them.

Arab Tour

[Question] We have noticed that Afghan diplomacy took no action towards the Arab and Islamic countries since the Islamabad Conference. Are there special reasons for this position, and do you intend to go on tour of these countries?

[Answer] After the new stage the Afghan government faced critical conditions and problems, and it has been preoccupied with the attempt to solve them. We are being careful, however, about having good and favorable relations with the progressive Islamic and Arab countries.

We had not been able to have close communications with these countries in the past. When I attended the U.N. General Assembly, I met most of the representatives of the United Nations and I explained to them the positions and the policies of our country, and especially after the new stage.

We must call attention to the fact that while the Islamabad Conference was in session, we did contact the friendly Arab and Islamic countries by means of messages and telegrams. In concluding my answer I want to affirm that we intend to tour the progressive Arab and Islamic countries to discuss with their leaders the current issues of the world and to exchange views with them on matters of mutual interest.

[Question] You are saying that you requested Soviet aid on the basis of the December 1978 agreement. What is this agreement and to what extent are its stipulations consistent with the U.N. Charter regarding the right of nations to determine their own destiny?

[Answer] The Friendship and Good Neighborliness Treaty according to which we requested Soviet aid is registered in the United Nations. It is based on Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.

The article on whose basis we requested aid from the Soviet Union stipulates that any one of two countries mentioned in an agreement can ask the other for assistance when such assistance is needed.

Article 51 of the U.N. Charter also stipulates that countries which are members of the U.N. Organization may enter into mutual defense agreements.

Therefore, in accordance with the treaty with the Soviet Union and in keeping with the spirit of the U.N. Charter, we thought that Afghanistan had the right to request assistance when it was subjected to foreign threats that threatened its security and its existence.

I am affirming that the presence of a limited Soviet force is temporary and that this force will leave Afghanistan as soon as the foreign threats cease. We know that the United States continues to send its navy to places that are thousands of miles away so it can protect its exploitation of nations, thereby disregarding world peace and posing a threat to it.

International War?

[Question] Conditions in Southeast Asia are becoming more complicated every day. Do you expect this may soon lead to the outbreak of an international war?

[Answer] I do not think it likely that there will be an outbreak of a war of this kind in spite of the expansionist movements made by the Chinese, the movements made by reactionaries and the extensive U.S. military mobilization in the area of the Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

Our conviction that the outbreak of such a war is unlikely stems from the fact that the peace loving nations, and at their forefront is the Soviet Union, will not allow U.S. imperialism and its allies to light the fuse of war in this sensitive region.

[Question] The western media have always been talking about the opposition on the borders of your country with Pakistan and China. What we want to know in this regard is the size, the power and the location of this opposition.

[Answer] After the April Revolution the party began to work through the government to put its ideas into practice. We pursued a course that conformed to the beliefs and the heritage of our people, and we accomplished positive steps in this regard.

But those elements whose interests were hurt fled the country and went to Pakistan. They took up positions there under the protection of U.S. imperialism, and they were supported by reactionary countries in the area and subsidized by Chinese chauvinism.

These elements received training in the use of arms and broad financial and media assistance. They were charged with carrying out sabotage activities in Afghanistan such as highway robbery and the destruction of mosques and schools. This led our people in the areas which were subjected to these activities to oppose them in order to defend their property and their security.

U.S. imperialists and Chinese expansionists have turned Pakistan into a center for terror against Afghanistan. What helped these forces accomplish this is the fact that during the period when terrorist activities against our country had intensified, Hafizullah Amin had our great comrade the late Nur Mohammad Taraki murdered. He wrested power from him in a mysterious and dangerous manner. Hafizullah Amin also had thousands of citizens murdered without cause and with extreme brutality.

Documents Against Amin

[Question] You are saying that Amin was working for U.S. intelligence. Do you have any specific proof of this, especially since he is being described abroad as a radical Marxist?

[Answer] I am assuring you that we have documents proving Amin's relationship with the U.S. CIA and that he had strong ties with Pakistani reactionaries.

We also have compelling evidence that Amin was working to divide our country and to bring it under the control of imperialism and reactionary forces. But our party was able to discover this treacherous conspiracy and to stop it on the 27th of December 1979.

Amin did try to deceive our people by using extremist slogans, but he did in fact deal a strong blow to the stage of changes in Afghanistan, and he did deal a blow to relations between our party and our country and the friendly people of the Soviet Union.

During the new stage we are focusing on calling the attention of our people to the fact that this stage is that of a democratic national revolution. In order to accomplish this revolution the efforts of all honorable patriots and progressive people must be united in a broad front that would lead the struggle of our people.

We have invited all those who want to work for their country and their people, regardless of their ideology, to join this front under the leadership of the Afghan Democratic People's Party.

The Palestinian Question

[Question] For progressive Arabs the Palestinian question is considered an indication of friendship and hostility. What is Afghanistan's position on this question, and do you have specific points of view on this matter?

[Answer] Ever since it was established our party has supported the struggle and the question of the people of Palestine. After we assumed power, and especially after the second stage, we adopted a serious position to defend the just question of the Palestinian people.

We have supported the heroic struggles of the Palestinian people under the leadership of the PLO, and we have always stood beside every resolution that served the struggle of the people of Palestine and against every resolution that infringed upon it.

It is on this basis that as a party and as a state we condemned from the outset the Camp David Accords. This is because we support a just and a comprehensive solution to the Palestinian question and because we consider the normalization of relations between Egypt and Israel and the recognition of Israel's usurpation of Palestine to be a conspiracy against all of humanity.

Finally, I am reaffirming that we are standing in the same bunker with the PLO and with the Palestinian people. We are facing the same enemy, and we have the same friend.

8592

CSO: 4902

ANTI-GOVERNMENT REBELS DISCUSS PROBLEMS, STRUGGLE

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 4 Apr 80 pp 70-73

/Article by Huda al-Husayni: "Afghan Holy Warriors to AL-HAWADITH: Where is the Moslems' Honey?"/

/Text/ The plan for the attack on the "citadel" was the first trap into which the military commander of the town of Kama, Mowlavi Aboshshakkur, made us fall, and he laughed to see us raging with anger and pain.

Darkness had surrounded us. Night in the revolution in Kama is so cold and dark that we could not see one another when Aboshshakkur decided to draw us a plan for our movements in liberated Kama. He said,

"It is forbidden to go about in daytime, out of fear for the Soviet military planes which bomb us every day. We will remain hidden and carry out our operations at night!"

Aboshshakkur was giving a speech and distributing his orders to us as he swung his old machine gun before him. We inside the "citadel" were too tired to get up the strength to move. The "commander" had decided that we would not sleep in the citadel but would go to the other side of Kama.

We began a journey of pain across muddy fields, sinking into mire without uttering a word; we reached a house filled with mud and slime, and the room we entered was filled with spider webs and a stack of stripped straw in a corner as high as the ceiling. We asked Aboshshakkur,

"Are we going to rest here?" He answered,

"Yes, because I am awaiting a messenger from Mowlavi Mohammad Yunus Khales."

The hands of the watch were gravitating toward 0300 hours in the morning and only a few minutes passed after we sat down in the room when the messenger brought a message. We told Aboshshakkur that we wanted to go with

the messenger to the Khugiani area, where Howlavi Khales was fighting, and he ordered us to be quiet because he alone and no one else made the decisions. So we fell quiet.

Suddenly the messenger went. Aboshshakkur brought out the gas light and scrutinized the face of each of us. Then he told me (as always, through an interpreter) "Are you tired?"

I could not answer; pain was consuming my legs and my tears flowed when I glanced at him. Most harshly, he said,

"Please, the time has come to attack the house of a "Khalqi" who we have learned is here. We will surround his house and order him to surrender, and when he is standing in front of us with his family we will set his house on fire and kill him in front of you."

I told him, "I beg of you, Aboshshakkur, great leader, we do not want you to tire your conscience with this action for our sake, because we will not go with you. I cannot see anyone being killed in front of me. I beg you. Also, I am almost dying of pain and cannot move."

He smiled in ridicule, flashed the gas light in my face and refused my request; my two colleagues backed him up on that. Aboshshakkur did not respond to my fervent pleas--in fact, he said,

"You are not here on a vacation. You must obey our orders. You are here by our authority."

"Therefore, Aboshshakkur, I will not intrude myself, in my women's veil. It is dark and I want at least to feel my way. One encounter is enough for me. I do not want to be paralyzed because of your orders. If you insist on carrying out this operation, I will start screaming and wake up all the people in Kama."

Aboshshakkur guffawed and stood whispering with his deputy. We saw the deputy bringing out a small hand grenade from his hand and pulling the pin. When the three of us leapt out of the room full of spiders, in fear that the grenade would blow up in our faces, the Mojaheds went out after us. The commander then said, "Since there is a woman with us, and she is tired of 'liberated' Afghanistan, we have decided to postpone the assault operation on the Khalqi tonight, but we will go to the Afghan army barracks and set this grenade off inside it so that our night will not be a dead one."

Thus we returned to Commander Aboshshakkur's movements. When we refused this offer and insisted on going back to the room, Aboshshakkur cried out to us that danger lay in that room and that he and his men could not stay because "the position of the room is strategic and is exposed to the

Khalqis." Thus we had to go back to a more secure place; in this situation, who could tell Aboshshakkur "that's enough story telling?"

My Arab colleague asked him,

"Where are we going?"

He replied, "South of Kama!"

"How much distance and time?"

"We will travel for just an hour."

"If staying in the room exposes you to danger, let us hide among the hills in one of the many fields; we are all worn out."

"What if the planes come?"

"There are no planes at night. The Russians are blind, sir. Let us stay in the field."

"No. We will pass through Kama. Moreover, we have decided to set off the grenade in your honor."

Nothing worked with Aboshshakkur, who flashed the machine gun before us so we would get going. At 0500 hours in the morning we saw that we had returned to the "citadel," and we asked him,

"Aboshshakkur, why have you brought us back here? Isn't this the citadel itself?"

"Not at all."

"What do you mean not at all? It's the same one. These are the same rocks blocking the entrance to it. Are you laughing at us again?"

"Lower your voices. They will hear us and a misfortune will occur. Quiet or--"

Then he added with a muted voice, "Stop here--here--look out."

Aboshshakkur approached one of the walls of the citadel. Some Mojaheds gathered around him and started to dig into the walls. We stood a few meters away from them. As they were digging into the wall, we three wondered, Why is Aboshshakkur behaving this way with us?

The French journalist said, "I believe he is a phoney leader, or has imposed himself by force on those of the inhabitants of Kama who have remained. Since we have come, let us stay with him to the end."

The Arab colleague looked in Aboshshakkur's direction and cried out "The grenade will explode." Then he directed his words to Aboshshakkur, stating,

"Listen, sir, we know you are an old-time fighter, a sincere mojahed, and because you are one, do not explode this grenade--you will thereby be wasting the money of Moslems."

Aboshshakkur replied sharply,

"Are you more Moslem than we are? And where is the Moslem's money? It is in their own pockets. This grenade is our property. We are even selling our children to buy arms, and the Moslems--especially you Arab Moslems--are selling us talk are trafficking in our cause out of fear for your lives and your money. We know that your interest in us is not to defend Islam or Moslems but fear for your money and your oil. We ask for arms and you tell us 'Who will we give them to? Unite so that we can know who we are handing arms to.' You ask us to unite in Pakistan and not in Afghanistan, so that you can acknowledge that we exist."

He continued lecturing us:

"Listen, we have no relationship with the Afghans existing in Pakistan, they have become Arabs like you. We are here, fighting domestically. Our leader, Mowlavi Mohammad Yunus Khales, is now surrounded by the Russians in the Khugiani area. I will send you to him and do not be afraid if the Russians arrest you. Tell them you are an Arab and they will release you. They know full well that the Arabs' money is for the Arabs, not the Moslems."

We fell silent; all the mojaheds joined with Aboshshakkur in talking, and each one of them started stating what he knew. One of them screamed in my face and that of the French journalist, saying,

"Do you know that the Arabs came and imposed Islam on us by force, we became true Moslems, believed in Islam, and are fighting for Islam, and now the gentleman comes and tells us 'Do not waste the Moslems' money.' We do not want money. We want arms to defend you."

The Arab colleague said,

"Are you defending us by setting off this grenade in this wall? Anyway I am from a poor country which has no oil or money."

Aboshshakkur replied with mocking calm,

"Listen, sir, we will blow up this wall so that no one from the Afghan army will dare come back here."

The Arab colleague /said/ "Are they going to be afraid of a hole in the wall?"

Aboshshakkur said, "If they themselves aren't afraid, there are others who will be. Anyway who told you we were going to set off the grenade?"

He turned his back to us and we did the same to him, believing that the matter required some calm. In the end we were the captives of Aboshshakkur. Even the mojaheds who accompanied us from Peshawar, Pakistan were no longer saying anything.

While we were staying in the dark, each of us thinking of what the others were thinking, and standing close to the citadel, Aboshshakkur jumped in front of us, his subordinates with him, and the exploding grenade shook the quiet, empty Kama night. It is true that we were afraid, but we resembled persons who were psychologically prepared for this explosion. At that point Aboshshakkur looked at us and said,

"Why don't you take pictures, sir? Did you see what we are doing with the Moslems' money? The grenades we have, sir, are noise grenades which do not hurt anyone. Come and see. We dug into the wall in front of you to put the grenade in so we could say later that this hole was a result of the explosion from our grenades--our grenades, sir, are water, they are air, like your words. Now let's continue our journey."

Aboshshakkur was laughing at us because grief had eaten deep into him. This commander was experiencing real moments in which he faced the reality which pained all mojaheds. I felt embarrassment as Aboshshakkur cursed us. He was completely in the right. Perhaps the color of the night made Aboshshakkur pure and real while the light of the day disturbed him, as did the light of the gas light--a light in which we all saw him and in which he had to wear the veil of the true military leader, the victorious leader who was not misleading us so much as he was trying to convince himself that he was fighting and winning, because he actually did want to fight and win but, deep within himself, saw that the enemy was as big as the night and that he could not swallow up the night. It seems that Aboshshakkur, who did not have the capability to dominate and suppress the truth of his feelings through bitterness, felt sorry about such scarce daily moments as these when he admitted the truth, resented us in the coming hours, and, in his resentment, was like a person who tries to forget us--we who have learned a part, however small, of his true state.

Dawn broke over us as we were standing near the citadel. Aboshshakkur put on his veil, ordered us to obey and said,

"Now we will go to a house and eat bread dipped in hot water. You will pass the day, waiting until the sun goes down."

We went into a house, the mojaheds hid their machine guns in a room, we started to take food and resumed going about in the fields. Aboshshakkur and the mojaheds were without arms--especially Aboshshakkur; at that point we felt as if we had run out of strength, and the three of us said that we needed sleep: "Don't forget, Aboshshakkur, that you have been exercising your sovereignty over our tense nerves for more than 24 hours. We just want 1 hour of sleep so that we can see your beautiful town of Kana."

His answer was terse, as he said "You will sleep tomorrow. Endure 48 hours of weariness with us."

Our voices rose: "But what will you do now? You refuse to take us to Khugiani, or close to Jalalabad, and at the same time you are making us go over fields, muddy plains and narrow dirt alleys without making us move."

We remembered and said,

"Aboshshakkur, in the camp you told us that you had captured two Afghan army tanks. Let us see them. Let us take some pictures."

Aboshshakkur said, "Your annoyance with me is annoying me."

"But we want to see the tanks. Where are they?"

We refrained from continuing the journey and decided not to move unless he took us to see the tanks. At that point Aboshshakkur picked a stick off the ground and said,

"Yesterday Mowlavi Khales' messenger informed us that the mojaheds in Sorkhrud captured a tank. Do you know where that is? The mojahed Mohammad destroyed the wall of his house, and he and his neighbors towed it off so they could bring it close to the wall and wrote on it 'This belongs to Mohammad.'"

"Nice, but where are your two tanks?"

Aboshshakkur /said/, "In brief, I was going to take you to see them near the hill, but the government burned them up in the night."

Aboshshakkur felt our dismay, wished to save us and said, "When do you want to go to Jalalabad?"

"Now, tonight. We want to see the Russians."

Aboshshakkur /said/, "Did you come here to see the Russians or to see the mojaheds?"

"Both together."

Aboshshakkur /said/: "Okay. Do you have the time, that is, roughly 40 days?"

"Why?"

Aboshshakkur /said/ "I will leave you here in Kama and go scout out the road to the Jalalabad orchards. From there I will go to Khugiani. That will take 10 days, coming and going. As far as you are concerned, 10 days means a month. If I find that things are easy and there is no danger for you, I will come back and get you."

"Every day things change, and events change. It is true that we have time, but not to wait for you."

We philosophized a great deal about Aboshshakkur, but the three of us pretended to forget that the war of the Afghan mojaheds was very difficult, not just from the standpoint of a lack of adequate arms but from all standpoints, especially learning what was going on in other areas. Radio and telephone communications were things which were first unknown to them and at the same time unauthorized. To transmit an item of news from Kama to Khugiani takes 10 days. To send food takes many long days. When the Arab colleague started to talk to Aboshshakkur about the importance of radio and telephone communications, and how easy they made things in war, Aboshshakkur became delighted with the progress taking place in the world far away from him and welcomed it but said,

"Don't the Russians have such equipment? They will hear every word we say and learn our plans." Thus Aboshshakkur continued to believe in plans but not in these modes of communication; he had confidence only in his men.

I remembered that one day while I was in Peshawar I went to spend some time in the office of the Islamic Society of Afghanistan of Prof Borhanoddin Rabbani. I wanted to observe the mojaheds and know what they were doing. I was sitting in a corner when three mojaheds arrived from the Badakhshan region. They had spent 40 days in the mountains and when they stood before Borhanoddin Rabbani, before they sat down, one of them, who seemed to be pot-bellied, started taking off a woolen belt and unwound it until many meters of cloth which had been wrapped around him fell onto the ground. Then he drew out something shaped like a small pillow and opened it in order to take a piece of paper folded many times over out of the stuffing and hand it over to Prof Rabbani, who seized the piece of paper and disappeared into a room.

To return to Aboshshakkur, who said,

"This evening we will go to a place where the Khalqis congregate, and you will see a real battle on the outskirts of Kama."

We left Aboshshakkur to continue his talk as he proceeded before us in the forefront, as we moved on slowly; then we met a mojahed coming from the opposite direction. Everyone shook hands with him and received him as if he was "coming from a holy war." The French journalist broke in saying,

"Allow me to go with him to the holy war in turn." The Frenchman's zeal stirred me and I asked him, "Do you know what holy war means?"

He replied zealously, "Yes, 'Islamic war,' by definition, but geographically a theater where Moslems confront their enemies. In this theater the fighting is going on between the Russians and the mojaheds. Therefore I want to go to the holy war."

I told him, "Listen, friend, all Afghanistan is a theater of holy war. You are standing on the holy war theater here. I implore you not to explain your notion of the theater of holy war to the mojaheds or they will be furious with you. When was war a specific theater?"

Night fell and we did not know whether we would cross Kama or go about inside or around it. The important thing was that we went into one of the houses and Aboshshakkur asked us to lie down to rest and sleep awhile until dark came and he could resume his activity. He was the first one to fall asleep; however, because of his nervousness, he woke up in an hour and woke us up with him. Some mojaheds came with the machine guns, which had been in another house. Aboshshakkur then whispered in the ear of our Arab colleague and said,

"The Khalqis have learned that we are here and we must move to another place." The colleague replied,

"I am tired and the French lady (me) is too."

Aboshshakkur said,

"We have to change, we are in danger."

We started traveling; after an hour, our Arab colleague fell into a hole full of mud, Aboshshakkur apologized for the wretched road and our colleague faced up to him, saying,

"Sir, I am tired."

The French correspondent looked at me, patted me on the shoulder and said,

"Be strong, lest you fall down; hold me firmly. Aboshshakkur is testing us and trying to torture us."

The cold was consuming everything; the high ground and hills consisted of heaps of mud; in spite of that we sat down, to make our Arab colleague

forget his mental crisis especially since he was repeating, within our hearing, that no matter how tired he was he would not fall down on the ground and would not reveal his pain "in order to save face in front of them." To make him forget that he had lost face, we started making jokes, and Abdolhayy, a friend from the streets of Peshawar, came up and started apologising for the "faults" of the "leader" Aboohshakkur. His manner of talking intrigued me and I wanted to get to know him better. I started a long conversation with him, which I record here verbatim:

"What in your opinion is Islam, Abdolhayy?"

"Islam is an outward and inner devotion to the orders of almighty God."

"How then do you envisage an Islamic government?"

"Just a republic and a president!"

"Would you prefer that the president be a religious man?"

"What is important is that he be a Moslem and be beloved by his subjects."

"Do you have sisters?"

"One. She is married, in accordance with the tradition of God and His prophet."

"Is she educated?"

"No, not at all. People in my country view girls' schools with disfavor and prevent girls from going to them."

"And you, Abdolhayy, do you agree with the people of your country on this point?"

"If the girl's education is chaste, that is all right--that is, if her husband or brother teaches her, or a lady."

He fell silent for a few moments, then continued after wrenching the question out of me,

"My daughter? As far as my daughter goes, if schools exist, religious schools in the home or the mosque, I might approve. We Moslems follow any road Islam commands. Islam rejects the education of women."

"However, Islam means individual judgment, there is renovation in Islam--'God will send someone to my nation who will renovate its religion.'"

"Renovation, not creation. Here we differ with you."

"What about work for women?"

"I am against it. Islam requires the veil and there is no veil at work. Perhaps work could be permitted if the woman's face were veiled. I am against having the face bare. Faces stir up trouble. Let women show their faces only at prayer and not in front of people. Are we fighting so that Islam can take this form?"

"What is your opinion about the Islamic Liberation Party? And the Repentance and Flight /Society?"

"I have not heard of either."

"What is your opinion of Ayatollah Khomeyni?"

"He is a Moslem man, learned and a fighter."

"Will he help you?"

"He helps us with words only, not with deeds. That is not enough. We have heard that they are helping the mojaheds a little in Mashhad (Iran), but they have closed the Iranian-Afghan borders to them."

"What do you think about Shiite Moslems?"

"We call the Shiites Hanafite Mu'Tazalites and Ja'farites. The Ja'farites alone are standing alongside us in the holy war, waging holy war with us against the Communists. The Shiites liberated Bamian (an area of Afghanistan which the Soviets have now occupied) from the infidel Communists."

"What if Khomeyni ordered the Shiites in Afghanistan (there are 3 million Shiites) not to take part with you in the holy war?"

"Khomeyni will not give any such orders. If he did, the Shiites would not submit to them. There is much land and there are many buildings belonging to Shiites in Afghanistan; therefore, they will not allow red Russians to deprive them of their rights to their land."

As I was talking with Abdolhaye, Aboshshakkur was preoccupied with the rest of the mojaheds and did not take note of what was going on between us. When he saw me holding a tape recorder in front of Abdolhaye, who was talking, he reproached us, saying,

"I am the only person authorized to speak about the Jalalabad region."

I immediately resumed talking to him, after I had hidden the tape recorder, out of fear that the tape would be destroyed:

hurt), Aboshahakkur became more enthusiastic and found us another room we would have to go up the rocks to get into.

This is how harsh Commander Aboshahakkur was. The next day I related the story to his assistant, and asked him why he had behaved like that with us. Had he no compassion for God's creatures? He revealed to us that the phrase:

"Bibi wawa" meant, in the Afghan language, "the lady is happy." Had I told him "Bibi wayway," he would have realized the truth. ("Wayway" in Afghan means hurt.)

In any event, once in the citadel Aboshahakkur indicated for us to sit down on some stones to wait for the interpreter to arrive. When he came, he told him "Be prepared: we have come near a place where Khalqis are gathered."

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AFGHANISTAN

JOURNALIST PENETRATES BEHIND LINES WITH GUERRILLAS

London AL-HAMADITH in Arabic 11 Apr 80 pp 27-30

/Article by Huda al-Husayni: "AL-HAMADITH with the Mojaheds inside Afghanistan: 300,000 Afghan Martyrs Have Not Budged One Hair of the Head of the Western World!"/

/Text/ Aboshshakkur said, "Be prepared: we have come near a place where Khalqis are gathered." When we fell silent without discussion, demonstrating our desire to agree, he was amazed and looked at his men, saying "It seems they are not afraid." He then brought a stack of straw, put it in one room in the citadel, and set it afire! He did all this without our showing any reaction except mockery. We asked him "Is this the place where the Khalqis are gathered?" He did not answer our question, but said: "Prepare to move."

The fire began to catch in the room and spread to other rooms. Straw was spread about in the citadel, over which Aboshshakkur had raised a white flag. The flames of the fire started to rise into the air and light the dark night for us. I asked him, "While we are on our way to the place where the Khalqis are gathered, what are you going to do, Aboshshakkur?"

He replied, "Burn down some houses."

I told him, "I have confirmed the news the Baluchis gave me about you." He asked anxiously, "What did those wretches say?"

I replied, "They said that you are just bands whose mission is to burn down houses, schools, farms and hospitals."

He said, "So you believe that we are not fighting. That is, you believe what is being spread around about us."

I said, "I do not just believe--I have become convinced."

At that moment I was in a state of psychological collapse which had made me exasperated with life. I wanted to provoke the man--perhaps he would

shoot me and I would be spared this boring dilemma and would put him to rest. His whole concern was to kill someone and no enemies were before him.

He said, "Listen, if you repeat this kind of talk your husband and the interpreter will realize that you have offered yourself to me to kill you."

I told him, "Kill me, brother, and free me from your insanity. At one point you want to kill the Afghan army, at another point you want to kill the Khalqis--tell me, when do you want to kill the Russians? The Russians are your enemies, not the others. And here we are, traveling and traveling and not yet reaching the place where the Khalqis are gathered. Whenever we go a ways, we find that a mujahed is being drawn into a house. Tell us most frankly, you are substituting them for us--you are sending them to their homes one by one in order to overwhelm us. I would now like to go back to Peshawar. I have become fed up with you and your clownish movements."

Aboshshakkur shook his old weapon in my face and told me, "Stop talking. If you don't believe that we are going to attack a gathering of Khalqis, I will now make you regret the moment you were born." Then he started firing. The first shot went flying off into the night and a guffaw from Aboshshakkur followed it, with the question: "Didn't you feel fear?"

"No--your bullet had no more effect than the grenade full of air which you set off in the clammy wall of the citadel."

My two colleagues asked me to be quiet. We three had come to the end of our will, so, if we killed Aboshshakkur, what good would it do? He was looking for someone to kill and we were in front of him. The French journalist added, "That's enough provocation. Do you want to goad an old man who is looking for the role of a hero? He will kill us and tomorrow he will assert to his followers that we are Russians." Then the mujahed Abdolhayy came up to me and said, "Now do you realize why we disapprove of the education of women? For this reason! Have you forgotten that you are a woman? How can you raise your voice in front of a man who is older than your father?"

Suddenly the face of a mujahed speaking French emerged from the dark. He said, directing his words to the French journalist and to me, "Don't blame Aboshshakkur, he believes you came here prompted by ill will. Put up with his strange ways." He added, "Do you believe that I am happy with what I have become? My ambitions have died here in these muddy plains and jagged dry mountains. I studied law in Paris. I know Paris and its streets as I know Kabul, the capital of my country. I visited the United States a number of times and I have friends there. I will tell you, the people of Afghanistan looked upon America and the Western world with friendly eyes, it had very good relations with all Western countries, and we had very good relations with our neighbors--especially the great neighbor Russia.

The West has offered us nothing since our independence. The former and present governments of the United States of America have not honored this relationship politically or economically, and this neglect was one of the most conspicuous reasons for the disruption in the balance of Afghanistan's relations with the West and the Soviet Union."

He went on, "When the hero of the Watergate scandal, President Richard Nixon, was vice president he visited Afghanistan. Like all hospitable peoples, we welcomed him. Naturally, there is a difference between a welcome given by the American machine and a spontaneous welcome given by a simple people. Do you know what he declared when he went back to his country? He said, 'The Afghan people are very backward. United States aid to this kind of people will not benefit America.' Now America, the West and the Arabs as well are crying--no, pardon me, they are condemning the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. He assured that this intervention was no surprise to us. We knew it was coming. Everything that is happening in Afghanistan confirms this conclusion. We screamed to the whole world that a Soviet invasion would take place if the West continued to ignore us and if the Moslems continued to be silent and not give aid. They claim that they were amazed by the Soviet intervention. Is this kind of trick going to fool us? They believed that we assumed the role of the oppressed and they themselves assumed the role of the Silent observer."

We were continuing our nighttime journey, Aboshshakkur up front and the educated mojahed continuing his talk, saying, "With the Da'ud coup, the Soviet intervention started to assume overt form. They are the ones who made the coup. They influenced the course of events in Afghanistan in an indirect fashion.

"The bloody coups which took place after Da'ud, at the hands of Mohammad Nur Taraki, then Hafizollah Amin and now Babrak Karmal, were nothing but shifts serving one objective--the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

"You have paid for the commotion which was stirred up in the world by coming to us, we thank you, we have tired you a great deal, allow us to emphasize to you that none of this noise is compassion or assistance to a wounded people who have sacrificed 300,000 martyrs in a year and a half. Imagine--the death of 300,000 citizens has not moved one hair on the Western world's head. The Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan is what has stirred up this commotion, because it has exposed the world to danger. Imagine the level of sorrow which has reached us--we have not said that we understand the meaning of this commotion. I am just saying in the name of the wretched people who are happy to have you call them mojaheds that we are taking a positive view of this commotion and accept the aid of the Arab world, but the aid must be unconditional. Please let us keep what remains of our dignity."

After the Arab colleague had joined us, our interlocutor continued, saying, "Don't blame Aboshshakkur--how many revolutions have crushed their

children in the heart and afflicted them with a split personality? Here they all want to fight. Here I am in front of you and you see my weapon, an old machine gun which I know very well fires one shot at a time and whose shots could hit our chests rather than the chests of our enemy." He then directed his words to me, saying "You, speak and live up. Do you want to witness live battles? Do you know what goes on in the Konar Mountains? I believe you have visited them. You told me that your body froze and it was no longer in your power even to move your eyelids and the mojaheds were compelled to strip the snow which had gone up to your chest off you, as they strip off slabs of wood--do you know what they are doing there? They have learned how to make molotov cocktails. They know that setting off a bomb will not even shake the road dust hanging on a Russian tank. Yes, Maam, Aboshshakkur is afflicted with a split personality--not to say that he is crazy. Yes, he is our military commander. You say he does not plan, he does not understand the meaning of military plans, come let us draw up a military plan for attacking Jalalabad. What is the good of 'drawing up' a military plan which is 100 percent successful if we have no arms? We have no arms, you understand?"

The educated mojahed had come and added the cares of the mojaheds to my fatigue and despair. I told him, "Sir, I appreciate your sorrows, and I bow down in honor before your torment, but why are you inflating your claims and saying that you are killing hundreds of Russians and hundreds of Afghan army troops every day?"

The educated mojahed, whose name was Dastagir, replied,

"So our people do not lose confidence in us."

"How will they, if every Afghan, as you tell me, is a mojahed?"

"Do you believe that? You do not know the Pathans. Be so kind as to give a Pathan money and he will abandon his rifle and start counting the money."

"Aboshshakkur told me that you sell your land to buy arms."

"And what are the poor people going to sell?"

I remembered that I had been in an Afghan refugee camp in Pakistan, in the Azakhayl camp, specifically, which is turning more or less into folklore. The Pakistani government invites newsmen to visit it, as it invited Brzezinski to look at the refugees. I once went with two German journalists; we agreed that they would sit with the men and I would sleep with the women in one of the tents. We sat down with some families and observed that there was a large tent in which were sitting girls none of whom were more than 13. One of the refugees was arguing with an American over a sum of dollars. The Afghani then called one of the girls, who was

pretty, shy and small, and told the American, "I will not lower her price below \$2,000--if you accept, take her now, otherwise there are many."

We discovered that some Afghan refugees were selling their daughters for sums ranging from \$2,000 to 3,000. When I informed Dastagir of this he shook his head sadly and said, "Do you know that goats are more expensive than women among us?"

I asked him, "Are you in favor of this, Dastagir?"

He said, "No? I reject this principle, but if you throw small rocks at a mountain, what will fall, the mountain or the rock? I have learned about what is going on in the Afghan refugee camps, but what can we do? Didn't you ask any of the Afghan leaders sitting on the 'throne of the struggle' in Pakistan?" I replied, "I raised the matter to Boranoddin Rabbani and Seyyed Ahmad Kilani and they said it was a tragedy for which they are seeking a solution."

I do not know how much distance we covered while we were talking, before Aboshshakkur suddenly stopped in front of a house, then, directing his words to the interpreter, said "This is the place where the Khalqis are gathered. Before we launch our attack we must perform the prayer."

The number of mojaheds with whom we three had continued the journey in the night did not exceed 10. They were convinced that the matter was a big fraud. We left Aboshshakkur to perform the prayer and wave his machine gun at the mojaheds to surround the house.

Each one of them fired a shot in the air. I told Dastagir, "Is it true that there are Khalqis inside the house?" He smiled and said, "Did you see me using the machine gun? We all know Aboshshakkur. Wait."

Suddenly we heard movement inside. I approached the French journalist and told him, "It seems things are serious this time. Please, I cannot bear to witness the scene of a killing. May my lord forgive me for this adventure which I insisted on carrying out."

I threw myself onto the mud and hid my face in the ground. I did not want to see blood; I could not bear it. It is true that I like to read detective stories and war stories while I am spread out on bed, because they remain words and lines filling empty pages, but to see people raising their hands in surrender and still being killed is a sight I cannot bear.

I was trying to bury my face deeper and deeper into the ground when I heard the people inside the house say "Aboshshakkur has arrived." Then I heard welcoming voices and Abdolhayy telling the interpreter "They are the people from my village, Hada." At that moment I wanted to kill Aboshshakkur, to strangle him, as he was tapping me on the shoulder with his machine gun

to get up off the ground. When he tried to help me I pushed him away with all the nervousness raging in my heart. Wouldn't this man desert from one night of his madness?

I sat on the muddy ground and told my Arab colleague, "Tell the great commander that I am not going to budge."

That was one of the five houses Aboshshakkur owned in Kama; in following nights, he obliged us to visit them all. He also obliged us to visit the houses of some members of the Afghan army he had occupied and burned, lodging one of his men in each.

The sun rose over us as I was sitting in the mud. I had dozed off in this position when my Arab colleague came and told me, "By God's command, we are now being transferred to another town."

I told him, "Do you know, the one thing which would save me from my bad psychological state would be to see Soviet tanks coming into Kama, so that I could see Aboshshakkur's heroic recitations in real life? Why aren't you and the Frenchman complaining? You are just adding to this madman's hallucinations. I will stay here. I will not move. Go by yourselves, let me be. We have spent 3, maybe 4 days without tasting the meaning of rest. I do not want to fight a holy war and I do not want to go to Paradise. Let Aboshshakkur go there alone. That man is going to drive me crazy. I can no longer stand him. Does he believe he is Hitler, or Mussolini? I will stay in this muddy field and sleep, then get up and go on at my own pace. If I see a Russian tank I will signal to it and if the Russians imprison me I will know that I am in prison, even if it is for life."

The mojahed Dastagir approached and said "Don't you believe that Aboshshakkur himself is the prisoner of his anxieties? He is fighting illusory battles inside himself in which he is the victor and kills all his enemies. At night, sometimes in his mind day is night, when he is alone he knows the narrow, dark prison surrounding him. He is forced to hate you--he can laugh at his men because the horizons of their world are the horizons of the Jalalabad area, whereas you have come, one of you has lived through the Vietnam war and you have all lived through the war in Lebanon and the revolution in Iran. What do you want from him? He is Don Quixote, fighting windmills."

Aboshshakkur gestured to us. Rain was falling copiously and Dastagir's words were turning into water along with the drops of abundant rain. When he did not respond to his gestures, he approached and sat next to us. There was some dejection in his movements. He said that the holy war had tired him and the holy war of the night before had tired him greatly.

We asked him, "What holy war, Aboshshakkur?"

Suddenly he donned his veil and inhaled deeply. He lit a cigarette and said "During the night I burned up three Khalqi houses and killed four of them."

I asked him, "Who are you fooling? You were with us the whole night. At one time you flash your old weapon in our faces, at another time you order us to stop so your man can go home. Then you order us once to sit down on a muddy hill so you can take a nap that lasts an hour." His fury raged and he said, "This night I killed Khalqis while you were sleeping and dreaming in the fields."

And Aboshshakkur started mumbling words which I did not understand, and said, "You are my daughter's age."

I asked him, "Where is your daughter, Aboshshakkur?"

He said, "Nine months ago I sent my family to a camp in Peshawar and came here. For 9 months I have not seen my wife."

I asked him, "Are they happy in Peshawar?"

He said, "The Pakistani government pays everyone 4 rupees a day. That is significant."

Since I had been in Pakistan, I had learned how the Pakistanis differ over receiving the Afghan refugees. The Pakistani Pathans welcome them because they are from the same tribe, while the Baluchis in the south are wary of them, to the point where they have marched in demonstrations and forced the government to remove the refugee camps from the towns. One Pakistani told me once, "Don't let your heart sink when you see Afghan refugees among us; that has been their custom since olden days. Especially with the Afghan tribes which live north of Jalalabad, known as the Kuchis; members of this tribe have been constantly traveling between Pakistan and Afghanistan without transit passes. In the winter, they live in Pakistan, in the summer in Afghanistan. We Pakistanis call them 'Khanah bedush,' a Persian expression--'khanah' means home and 'bedush' means 'on the back,' that is, they carry their homes on their shoulders. However, the Pakistani government has exploited them for specific objectives, and when they heard that their lives would be materially secure they started coming by the hundreds. One of them says that he is married to four women and has 17 children. The Pakistani government cannot verify the facts about anyone because they hide their true and 'illusory' women."

I asked Dastagir, "Why have they let your families seek refuge in Pakistan?"

He said, "They are afraid for their children."

I told him, "Listen, I am against refugees and I reject fearing for children in principle. Perhaps it is Aboshshakkur's complex that he wants to fight, but he must wonder within himself what he is defending--homes which are mostly abandoned? It is true that everyone wants to defend his land, but not abandoned land."

Dastagir laughed and said, "You and I think that way, but Aboshshakkur is happy about the ones who have fled and taken refuge. He goes about in Kama, as you see, since you have been with him. He has his farms, but now all the other people's farms are his. So he believes. He does not hate the Russians as much as he hates the people who own the other farms. He burns their homes down only to prevent them from returning. You do not know what a house means to an Afghan. If an Afghan is without a house that means he is dead."

Aboshshakkur approached to ask me if I was able to keep going: "We are going to cross a mountain where a surprise is waiting for us." In my heart, anger with him and compassion for him were struggling with one another. The French journalist came up and said, "Listen, we have agreed with you on everything so far. I want to go up the mountain with him and our Arab colleague does too. It is not proper, now that you have claimed that I am your husband, for you to refuse to go with us."

I asked Dastagir about the surprise which was waiting for us at the peak of the mountain and he expressed his amazement as well as his readiness to learn about it. I believed that Aboshshakkur had become fed up with us and our ascent of this mountain was only the beginning of the road back. Because of my intense fatigue, I climbed the mountain by my feet and my hands as well. Because of my extreme "hatred" of Aboshshakkur at that time, I hoped that a Russian tank would appear before us. However, that seemed to be a dream. The Soviets' sole plan was to keep the mujaheds away from the towns and living in the dry, rough jagged mountains.

As we were going up the mountain, my thirst became severe, and I began looking for a hole where some rainwater had gathered. When I found it I was not concerned whether it was muddy or poisoned--the important thing was that it was water. On this excursion of ours, we relied on the technique horses used, leaning down and "gulping up" water in holes.

Aboshshakkur was on the road, graciously informing me that I was crossing the mountains which Alexander the Great had crossed. In my heart of hearts I cursed Alexander the Great and the Small and all the mountains in the world.

We reached the top of the mountain and Aboshshakkur made us go around a black rock, saying "The surprise is the wondrous thing you are going to see now."

It is well known that the mountains which divide Afghanistan from Pakistan are black, broken up by broad white stripes. Some of these stripes are recognized as legal boundaries between the two countries. At the Khyber Pass, the Afghan-Pakistan border is a white line which runs down from the top of the mountain to the bottom, as well as white stones which no one dares to remove lest the borders be changed and war erupt between the two countries.

We stood before the rock to which Aboshshakkur pointed and saw large lines as well as words in white on its side. Words were interspersed with the name of the prophet Muhammad (on whom be God's peace) and the phrase "There is no god but God," as well as words or letters, or lines, which were absolutely incomprehensible. Aboshshakkur tried to convince us that they were the words from the Verse of the Chair. "When did you discover this wonder, Aboshshakkur?" we asked him. He said, "Some time ago."

"After the Russians came in?"

He replied, "No, a year or more before."

We asked, "Who discovered it?"

Aboshshakkur was about to say that he was the proprietor of the marvel and the person who had discovered it when a mojahed appeared in front of him and said quickly, "I was shepherding a herd of goats here a year ago when I discovered this decorated stone and brought a friend of mine who knows how to read and write. He read the words on it. During our holy war now, we informed Aboshshakkur of the story and he rewarded me for it by letting me go with him from time to time."

We told him, "Congratulations, Aboshshakkur. Now, regarding this marvel, allow us to return to our country."

Aboshshakkur said, "No, we will now go back the way we came and go to Mowlavi Mohammad Yunus Khales."

We had no sooner returned to Kama than the night spread its wings over everything, including our eyes. We entered a house which consisted of one room in which a family of more than 12 people was living. Outside the room were some chickens and a cow. Because I was shivering with cold, Aboshshakkur "honored" me by spreading a stack of hay out for me near the cow. He told me that if I wanted to "enjoy" some warm sleep this would be the most suitable place; "the warm breath of the cow will give you warmth you will never find inside the house."

In the open air, near the cow tied by a rope fastened to the door, I sank into sleep unconcerned either with the place or with the disturbance I might be causing the cow.

After the dawn prayer, we met with Aboshshakkur. He asked me for a piece of white paper which he folded and hid in his pocket, and told us "Each one of you must eat a bread-loaf. You will go for days without food. You will now cross the Knor River and from there you will go through many orchards to reach the Khugiani region where the headquarters of our leader Mowlavi Mohammad Yunus Khales are."

I said goodbye to the cow and we started traveling before the sun rose. We reached the Konar River, which connects the Konar and Kabul areas. There there was a delapidated wooden boat. Aboshshakkur ordered us to move over to it. The three of us went up, waiting for at least one of the mojaheds to go up with us. Very strange looks flashed in Aboshshakkur's eyes, and before the rope of the boat was released he drew the piece of white paper out of his pocket and asked our Arab colleague to write the following: "We have chosen by our own will to cross the Konar River from Kama and therefore to cross the orchards to reach Jalalabad, which is 3 kilometers from the river; he, that is, Aboshshakkur, is not responsible for our lives." He requested that we sign this "document." The Arab colleague hesitated, the French journalist did not, and I did not know why I felt with a woman's sixth sense that the person who was going to fire on us was Aboshshakkur and no one else. He was the one who had spent 10 days talking to us about his way of killing the Khalqis and his love for killing. Up to that moment he had not killed anyone, and he at least had to regain face before his mojahed followers. We jumped from the boat after the three of us had studied Aboshshakkur's request, and asked him "Don't you want to send anyone with us? We don't know where the boat is going to take us and therefore we do not know the orchards we will have to go through to get to Khugiani."

He smiled in ridicule and said, "First, I will not send anyone with you. Second, do you believe that you will reach Khugiani alive and meet Mowlavi Khales? It seems you have nothing left in life except dreams."

Aboshshakkur released the rope of the boat, which sank in moments into the depths of the Konar River. Aboshshakkur's anger raged: he had lost the boat but not rid himself of us. He screamed at us, saying:

"You have turned into a curse which has been inflicted on me. You are the sin which has been following me for days. I do not want to see any of your faces. We liberated Kama with our blood and you came and brought Kama anxiety and took photographs of the anxiety we are experiencing. Be assured that the Russians will never come here. If they come you will be the last to see me, not my family. If the Russians withdraw (he said, directing his words to the Arab colleague), you will say, along with your people, that the Arabs scared the Russians off. As for you two, the children of accursed Europe, you will return to Afghanistan and the capital, Kabul, to buy heroin and opium on the open market, and I will look at you and be joyful; as I see you I will be seeing your children collapsing on our sidewalks. Europe has abandoned us, and I will make its children abandon it, the defense of it and its borders, and I will be joyful to see you piled up in our dirty alleys and on our narrow sidewalks."

We felt that things had reached their farthest limits and it was no longer possible to debate or even talk with Aboshshakkur. We quietly expressed to him our sorrow at causing anxiety and disturbance in Kama and told him

that we wanted to return, after we had emphasized our truly pressing need for his paternal satisfaction.

He looked right at us in ridicule and said, "I will still be better than you. I know that you are tired. In 2 days the car will come and take you to Gharu (the last place cars can go on the Afghan border) and from there the mojahed Abdolhayy will accompany you on foot."

Aboshshakkur kept us nailed down near the Konar River for 2 days and started to curse us as he talked about the mojaheds' need for arms, how the whole world was against the mojaheds, and how the Pakistani government was conspiring against them because it would not let them transport arms. In an attempt on my part to lighten Aboshshakkur and to pass the time before the arrival of the car which was to take us away, I told him, "Do you know, Aboshshakkur, that I reached Mount Knor with a group of Free Mojaheds, and do you know what I did?"

He said, "No."

I said, "Naturally I wore Afghan clothes and put on a veil as I did when I came with your group. However, the Free Mojahed group asked me to do them a little service; they wrapped dozens of little pistols around me, after which I put on my veil. Thus we passed nine Pakistani army checkpoints without being arrested, and the pistols came into the hands of your mojahed comrades in Konar."

For the first time I felt the nostalgia of fatherhood when Aboshshakkur patted my shoulder, wishing me long life and promising to greet me again in Afghanistan when he himself became the first and final president of Afghanistan--on condition that I request "that Afghanistan not become a Soviet Islamic republic."

The car came. It was a military truck. Aboshshakkur put me up in the front seat and asked the driver to start the engine. This truck started only when the driver descended and turned the crank in front. As soon as the driver did that, in order to get moving, the military truck shook with force and I found myself falling onto the ground, afflicted with a bruise which was almost fatal, after the door to my right had been ripped off and fallen down.

In the company of the bruises, and Aboshshakkur's mocking laughter, we resumed crossing the mountains Alexander the Great had crossed, going on foot to Peshawar. In spite of everything, I continued to dream of returning to Afghanistan with the mojaheds, but next time I hope the military commander will not be another Aboshshakkur.

11887

CSO: 4902

CHADLI'S COMMENTS ON NATIONAL HERITAGE REPORTED

Algiers ALGERIE-ACTUALITE in French 24-30 Apr 80 p 11

[Text] After the regional planning session, which took place at the Palace of Nations in Algiers, ended its work, President Chadli Bendjedid, the Party's secretary general, made an important statement about national culture in which, to sum up, he declared that:

"We will not allow national questions to be debated on the streets in an anarchical fashion that would make things more complicated instead of solving them, and which would give rise to marginal problems. I think that we can dispense with all that.

"We have spoken about the national language and about the need to restore to it the place which it deserves in an Algerian, Arabic and Islamic state, but it cannot be a matter of questioning ourselves on our identity.

"We are Arabs whether we want to be or not. We belong to the Arab Islamic civilization. The Algerian is treated, in whatever foreign country he is, as an Arabic Algerian. He has no other identity than that.

"We are Algerians, our language is Arabic, and our religion is Islam. We have a popular cultural heritage which is a gain for all Algerians, in the deepest historical sense, and which has been crystallized by the Arabic/Islamic civilization.

"Matters must be clear regarding the popular heritage. As I have said, it is an historical national gain for all the Algerian people and it is not limited to one party or group.

"The preservation of the values of our national character is the first concern of the Revolution. The popular heritage makes up a part of this national character and is a factor in its enrichment.

"We have exerted a great deal of effort in preserving this national heritage and instilling dynamics into the sector of cultural activities. Nevertheless, examination of the culture dossier must follow the same methods used to study other dossiers.

"The national culture dossier must be presented to all the citizens and militants, throughout all of the nation's territory, so that they can express their opinions, and in order to embark upon a program of specific tasks as was the case for other sectors.

"No person or group can claim for itself the right to monopolize the conversation on behalf of the heritage when 20 million Algerians have this right.

"The popular cultural heritage throughout the nation's territory makes up a part of the values of the Algerian Arabic/Islamic character, and constitutes a gain for all the Algerian people.

"Whoever rejects this concept or tries to go behind it cannot be considered animated by the Algerian nationalist spirit.

"However, this question must not be taken up on the streets, in an anarchical form, and probably aimed at well-defined political ends. That is a problem which we will not tolerate at all and which must not become the object of any outbidding.

"By virtue of the responsibilities entrusted to me by the confidence of the Algerian people, I declare that there will be no outbidding in anything which by nature harms national unity, whether near or far. We will use every means to fight any attempt to harm the national unity, no matter what its slogan.

"In the very recent past, the blood of our sons from Constantine, Maghnia, Tlemcen, Oran, Algiers, Tizi-Ouzou, Bejaia and other parts of the country has been intermingled throughout all of Algeria. In the east, west and south, colonialism has not succeeded in disrupting the unity of the Algerian people, despite all efforts, especially by arms, at causing division, according to the policy of 'divide and conquer.'

"It is shameful that such a subject should be brought up after 20 years of independence and that our fidelity should be witnessed in such a way to the martyrs whose souls are still present among us. For why have all these sacrifices been made if not for real independence and authentic national unity?

"To take up such questions on the streets and in an anarchical fashion could harm the national unity and end up sowing confusion. We will gain nothing from this, especially at a stage when we need all our energies to complete our national development and build the society which we are striving to attain.

"The exposé of this question and the form it is taking are happening at a time when we are waging a battle with colonialism which has no ties with our country except simply a cultural relationship.

"All the while restoring to the national language the place belonging to it, Algeria cannot remain cut off from foreign languages and cultures. We live in an era of diversified technology, and it is essential that every citizen, especially the young, know other languages.

"We have hit colonialism on the head and look how it is wagging its tail. Our efforts at protecting our gains and rights have pushed some people overseas to stir up plots whose purpose is to harm national unity and the socialist Revolution.

"We have suffered exploitation for a long time. To each one of our demands they are responding with armed revolt, conspiracies and pressures."

9473

CSO: 4400

BERBERS' CULTURAL DEMANDS POINT TO REGIME'S SHORTCOMINGS

Paris LE MONDE in French 30 Apr 80 p 7

[Article by Dominique Pouchin]

[Text] Algiers. Pretty soon they would tell us loud and clear that it was all just some trifle, an attack of fever, an accident along the road, in short, a lot of fuss for nothing! Three days of formed line of battle, 100 km from Algiers, in the midst of ill-natured and irascible Kabylia; a running fire of sarcastic pamphlets to get rid of the "malicious spies" sheltered by a France which is sad about the djebels [mountains] she has lost forever--and suddenly, not a word more. Curtains...

For the first time since the troubles began at Tizi-Ouzou, the Council of Ministers did convene on Sunday. But it was to listen to the minister of the interior on his return from the southern regions and the minister of health on his return from China; and to study, with the minister of energy, joint projects with Tanzania and, after hearing the experts' report, to discuss the steps to be taken to assure "the continuous and organized supply of markets."

Oh, excuse me! The prime minister did present a communique on the "events in Tiziouzu." There were two lines in EL MOUDJAHID which, just the day before, had devoted headline, editorials and two pages to denouncing the "foreign conspiracy." This time the matter is closed, the case shut, bound up.... What good is it to expatiate upon a passing spasm?

It is true that clam reigns at Tizi-Ouzou. Threats of a new strike on Monday were only empty rumors. The city is gradually regaining its provincial simplicity and for a while is getting used to the uniforms which have been unusually abundant. In Algiers, where there was talk of a strike at the central faculty, there were no disturbances, only some heated discussions in the market places and on nearby sidewalks. At the wall of the entry, militants from the higher level teachers' union posted a long eight-page leaflet, which was glanced over without too much pausing. However, the text has obviously been a long time in ripening, with each term carefully weighed, and the sum total delicately balanced: it preaches vigilance and steadfastness in the face of "imperialism, reaction and its conspiracies,"

but it is also concerned about too indiscriminate a repression and it even ventures to rout out, in "close-mindedness" and antidemocratic practices," some of the "profound causes" of the troubles which have arisen.

Is this a painful compromise after a debate in which a number of Kabyle teachers flaunted their views and their strength, also forcing the administration to make adjustments? Is it a clever attempt, at the price of a calculated overture, to win back most of the contesting parties, by isolating only the "pyromaniacs?" There is no doubt about it. But the fluctuation also reflects accurately enough the ambiguities and hesitations which the government manifested when it faced a "crisis" that seemed unmanageable.

In high places they did not spare an admission, in order to chastise them, of blunders made by the local authorities who could not see the lay of the land and be more flexible. Artful dodging! Even in Algiers, they experienced many difficulties to appreciate and characterize the present situation in Kabylia, sometimes underestimated and presented as a simple Sorbonne-like "getting it off one's chest," "having it up to here," and sometimes blown out of proportion to give a better indication of the significance, the gloomy designs and the treachery of the "conspiracy." Don't these explanations, cited in succession, although not very compatible, reflect above all some real contradictions affecting the governing organs of the party and the state? From then on it would be easier to understand the enthusiasm shown, once order had been restored, for shelving the affair, at least publicly. But the compulsory silence could not, by some miracle, settle the conflict: it could only help...to evade it. "As usual," some young technocrats ironically say, who are rather tired of seeking the "dossiers" closed again after barely being opened, and the burning questions always being put off "until later."

It is undeniable that the dissatisfaction of the Kabyles, heard in the streets like, not long ago, at the opposite extreme, that of the Arabists, can only arouse the latent contradictions accumulated these past months. "Ever since Boumediene's death, nothing is decided any more, no problem is really solved," explains, half resignedly, this higher cadre of one of the nation's large companies. In Algiers, there was a quick move to label such and such a clan in the small world of the governing organ. From "rather progressive" to "rather lukewarm," even including Arabists classified as "more or less radical," all of these nuances are at the disposal of the Cafe de Commerce strategists, who are curious about the slightest whisper in the confined passageways and airtight antechambers of the government.

/Irascible Contempt/

The absence of instituted pluralism leads in fact to the existence of "lobbies" which are often irregular and changeable. The unanimity proclaimed by the single party, on behalf of the myth of the "front," makes it difficult to have a public exposé of contradictions, in spite of certain overtures. Those naturally have the tendency to be expressed through the opaque filter of debates or arguments about language and culture. However, everything is permitted...as long as you remain in the framework of existing institutions, under the party's control and authority.

That is what some people, in recent times, seem unfortunately to have forgotten. Yesterday, students from the Arabist channels, coming from modest surroundings and worries about the lack of outlets, did not ask permission to protest from the National Union of Young Algerians (UNJA), the ad hoc institution. Today, the Kabyles are likewise scorning the official tracks, going from "anti-repression committees" to "committees for popular coordination," to tell the party people what they think of them, leave their quarters, and burn their cars. More than the disturbances, it is, in the final analysis, the irascible contempt for official institutions for which all of them will most severely reproached.

To knowingly ignore the party and its mass organizations is a crime against the system. In both cases, the state, through the voice of the President of the Republic, is saying likewise that it is revealing "the foreign hand." But the rebellion of the Kabyle students, certainly considered more threatening, gives rise to an even clearer rigidity. "Haven't we," thus notes an authoritative commentator, "left a little too much room for the critics who appear today not only sterile but still dangerous for the unity of the country and the socialist option?..."

For the Kabyles--and for others as well--the warning is clear: "Partisans of a radical Arabicizing want to take advantage of the situation and take up the offensive again," worriedly explains a young bureaucrat of Tizi-Ouzou. "They are trying to discredit us by making us pass for pawns of France in Algeria..."

In fact, attacks have not been lacking against all those who, rebellious or obstinate toward accelerated Arabicizing, now find themselves quickly assimilated to the defenders of the "French party." One is at first amazed--not without reason--at the sudden goodwill shown by a certain news publication toward the "full blossoming of the people's culture"...after more than a century of colonization when they worried, as if it were bad luck, about the language and traditions of the "natives." And, without looking for anything more, to see there the best proof that the Kabyle movement is supporting itself above all by colonial leftovers. "France has never given up hope of playing the Berber card to try to reestablish itself in Algeria," states EL MOUDJAHID. In fact, the daily paper adds, the Algerian people is "genetically homogeneous, entirely a mixture of Berber and Arab blood," with Islam having acted as a catalyst and unifier of [incomplete sentence in text]...

Here is where the tight relationship is formed between language and religion, which is the favorite subject of the most radical partisans of Arabicizing. Algeria has its integrists and from now on they are becoming more pressing. Under close surveillance by Boumediene, totally hostile to those people "who assume the djellabah/ [translation unknown] of Arabicizing or hide behind the screen of religion in order to sabotage the revolution," they have raised their heads again since his death. Haven't we seen, during a demonstration in January at El-Oued (South Constantine), Arabist high school students sacking nightclubs and harassing prostitutes? Still marginal, today they intend to take advantage of the reactions of rejection which the Kabyle has provoked, here and there, in order to gain some points.

Would the "old devils" wake up, as certain editorialists fear? It is obvious that the Kabyle contestors have not made friends in recent days. "They are talking about their singularity," cries a student from Algiers. "Well, that will turn against them. Because their singularity is above all that of privileges. They have everything here, from ministries to Moorish baths, from small trade to the best positions in large national companies. Everything that they need...It is a night of August 4!" And there has been mockery of the "alleged Berber culture:" barely 5,000 words, some poetry, no alphabet. "A dialect...a patois. They don't even have a theatre...!"

Perhaps. But wasn't Mouloud Mammeri, who was presented yesterday as the "evil genie of the pyromaniacs," that tranquil bard of the Kabyle soul, at the top of the pool of the Algerians' favorite authors, a poll published on one of those days of disturbance by REVOLUTION AFRICAINE,...central organ of the FLN.

9475

CSO: 4400

SONATRACH UNION, ORGANIZATIONAL PLANS DISCUSSED

Multinationals Seen Blackmailing Algeria

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 24 Apr 80 p 2]

[Article by Hamid Aberkane: "Participants at the Second Conference for the Renewal of SONATRACH's National Union Wish To Check the Multinationals"]

[Text] "We ask only for our rights." It is with this key sentence, short but firm, endowed with a sense of justice and a resolve to assert sovereignty, that the first day of the second conference devoted to the renewal of the national union of SONATRACH opened yesterday. The same tone was used by all the speakers whenever the "affair of the gas" was broached. The latter has confronted for some time now the Algerian Government mindful of exploiting its energy supplies, of setting a right price for them, the same one as that charged by a large number of gas exporting countries--namely, the United States--to the multinational corporations engaged on their part in genuine technological blackmail. This question, while it did not occupy the entire agenda of the conference, nevertheless pointed to an unquestionable resolve to move the discussion to the area of the country's major economic concerns.

"The battle of the gas." The expression was used by all the speakers. It evidences very close parallels to what had been just as difficult a situation, that experienced by our people in February 1971 at the time of the "battle of oil," difficult but conclusive, won under the leadership of the late president Houari Boumediene. Everyone yesterday recalled his words, still vibrant in the memory of the trade union cadres and the executives when he answered the slanders and threats of the foreign oil companies concerning the "red color" of Algerian oil: "Yes," Boumediene had said, "our oil is red because it is mixed with the blood of our 'shuhada [martyrs]'." The image again hit home in all minds yesterday, and the audience warmly applauded this pertinent rejoinder, a historic one, still valid today, because as was recalled by some speakers the battle continues since imperialism and the multinationals have not relinquished their plans either.

Technological Blackmail

Yesterday's first speaker was Belkacem Nabi, member of the central committee [of the FLN], minister of energy and petrochemical industries. Without being the only item "the affair of the gas" was one of the essential elements in Minister Nabi's speech. "This conference," he said, "is taking place under special conditions. It opens only a little time after the meeting that SONATRACH held with its foreign clients....Just as you were triumphant in 1971 you must also win today to defend the interest of the entire Algerian people." The minister then asserted that Algeria refuses to sell its gas or oil at bargain basement rates. The United States seeks at this time to impose on Algeria by using the blackmail of "foreign aid" and "technological superiority" a gas price that is below its rate on the international market. That very country buys Canadian gas at a price that is still higher than what is proposed to pay Algeria.

This situation has led the political leaders, managers, and trade unionists to consider the only possible alternative, that of Algerianizing industry, or to strive to limit to the maximum this "foreign aid" so as, first, to make possible the control of our means of production by Algerian cadres and, second, to protect ourselves from the blackmail of the multinational corporations so as to definitively emerge from our state of dependence on international capitalism. Would such an outcome not seem "hazardous," "premature," or too superficially nationalist to be true? The answer to this question was provided by the minister, Belkacem Nabi, who read the participants a message which his ministry had received yesterday from the Annaba phosphated fertilizer complex where one of its units relinquished by "foreign aid" was moved to an operational stage by the efforts of the Algerian workers.

The message read by the minister indicated notably "the decision to place this unit into service with the resources of the complex itself without the help of any technical assistance but exclusively with Algerian cadres." The message was hailed by frequent applause, especially when it disclosed that "the startup of production has been successful and the quality control standards have been exceeded to the great satisfaction of the SNIC [National Chemical Industries Company]," the latter being the company that uses the output of the complex.

February 1971: The Battle of Oil

That was proof of the "genius of the workers," "better than any speech," the minister concluded before broaching other questions just as topical and fairly appropriate to the trade union activities of SONATRACH. The example of this unit is not new in itself. One was provided after the startup in 1971 of the nationalized oil companies and the embargo imposed by the latter on "technical assistance to Algeria." It is young Algerian cadres who were slated to take over, and the facilities then continued to operate. "Such a trial is not new for us," a member of the national union

of SONATRACH told us yesterday as he gave us a long account of the birth of the trade union movement in SONATRACH, the deepening of this trade union thinking, and especially of the historic period of "24 February 1971," of the difficult conditions in which the "battle of oil" took place.

The party's representative at the conference, Mr Mesbah, and then Demene Debbih 'Abdallah, member of the central committee [of the FLN], secretary general of the UGTA [General Union of Algerian Workers], spoke in turn to summon the workers to a greater degree of mobilization. Demene Debbih 'Abdallah thus placed the stress on the presence in a room, "together, side by side" according to his expression, of the cadres and trade unionists to defend a common cause. Indeed, the danger has often been to make a distinction between the cadres and the trade unionists, to set them against each other, and also to divide the workers between "executors" and "executives," this again in order to undermine their unity and their solidarity. The result sought through this kind of maneuvers continues to be to weaken the forces won over to socialism, to open breaches to undermine the UGTA, or to disrupt the public sector.

The secretary general of the UGTA mentioned many important issues on the agenda and then elaborated on them, stressing in particular "the protection of the workers' purchasing power and the support of prices of mass consumption items." He then noted "the encouraging comments" which President Chadli Bendjedid made to the members of the UGTA's national secretariat, that is, "to see to everything that bears on the interest of the workers, on the interests of the Algerian people, and also to see scrupulously to the application of the directives of the National Charter."

Mr Lounis, secretary general of the FNTEMC [National Federation of Energy, Mining, and Chemical Workers], replaced Demene Debbih 'Abdallah on the rostrum. The speaker broached practically all the major themes on the agenda of the conference and gave specific directions on this score. He proposed to the participants the "revision of SONATRACH's collective agreement" in order to adapt it to new conditions, to plan it with reference to the provisions of the workers' labor code, and "to consider the fairest application of temporary measures of the SGT [expansion unknown]."

SONATRACH, Target of Imperialism

The discussion to which this "SONATRACH community" was invited is not simple because it involves a sensitive and strategic sector of the Algerian economy. The remarks made by Mr Lounis on this score are indicative of these labels. "SONATRACH accounts for 30 percent of the country's foreign exchange revenues and for 40 percent of its Gross National Product." SONATRACH employs more or less 90,000 workers distributed in some 600 work places across the country. In fact, the most commonplace designation of the enterprise in popular parlance is that which compares SONATRACH to "a state within a state."

This prompted a trade unionist to say that "the fate of the GSE [Socialist Management of Businesses] is being played in this gigantic enterprise" or, as Mr Rebah, secretary general of the national secretariat of said company, summed it up in his activities report:

"Because of the importance and dimension that it has gradually acquired during this period, SONATRACH has never stopped being the target of the multinationals and of the reaction which have tried and still strive to derail to their benefit this important resource of our people."

Restructuring and GSE

However, the gigantic size of the company and especially, too, a "consideration of the introduction of the GSE into SONATRACH" which occurred through practically the whole of 1978 in Hassi-Messaoud, Arzew, Algiers, and Skikda led to a discussion of its restructuring. The conclusion reached at the time of the third conference on the GSE organized at that time by the company was supported without reservation by the workers.

"SONATRACH is one and indivisible," most of the recording secretaries indicated. This does not prevent the discussion from getting under way once more today on this important matter with the new data which Mr Lounis presented yesterday. "The union must necessarily be identified with dialog," he asserted before mentioning the essential reasons to be envisioned for the restructuring of enterprises in general "to allow the exercise of popular control and through the state management organs," he noted.

"Foreign aid" is a subject which recurred in all the speeches yesterday, as did the reactivation of the trade union movement, too. The resolutions of the 5th Congress of the UGTA indeed anticipate unionizing all the workers and organizing trade union locals at all work places. The material and moral rights of the workers were also discussed at length, notably in Mr Rebah's report which picked up all the themes mentioned by those who spoke before him. He devoted long passages to trade union activity in SONATRACH.

"Trade unionism in the hydrocarbons sector," he said, "has often been, since the recovery of our national sovereignty, in the avant-garde of the Algerian trade union movement." Trade unionism in SONATRACH does not negate its interest in the material and working conditions of the 80,000 employees, some of them exposed to harsh conditions on the fringes of the desert, others affected by the deterioration of their purchasing power. However, he linked objectively the solution of the "workers' problems" with the necessary introduction of the GSE.

Algeria's Primary Interest

The streamers hung in the immense conference hall of the Palais des Nations or at the entrance of the complex itself all reiterated slogans supporting

the GSE, one of them proclaiming that "the GSE is a factor of cohesion of all the workers." Consequently, the GSE proposes to unite the 80,000 workers of SONATRACH still more even if, as Mr Rebah noted yesterday, "a restructuring of the enterprises into several national companies" is the goal that it is appropriate to aim for now that the prospects for introducing the GSE into SONATRACH appear in a new context," he said.

The important thing according to the trade unionists in SONATRACH is to seek "the country's interest."

The discussion at this second conference will certainly be more than a simple renewal of the members of the national trade union, the themes touched being quite topical. They will not fail to promote even further the trade union thinking and movement in Algeria.

Restructuring of SONATRACH Considered

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 27 Apr 80 p 3

[Article by Hamid Aberkane: "The Primacy of the National Interest"]

[Text] The conference for the renewal of the national union of SONATRACH which opened on Wednesday had not yet concluded its meetings yesterday morning even though the closing had been planned for the day before. The 600 trade unionists and cadres meeting on the occasion had to make up for a lag predictable right from the second day by extending the night meetings which continued up to the morning hours. The lag is explained by two facts: The first was some slowing down of proceedings during the weekend, and the second was the interest of the topics included on the agenda of the committees. For what was involved was not only to elect new representatives to the national trade union during this conference, a fairly complex matter incidentally despite the use of a simple procedure, but first and foremost to ponder the list of trade union, economic, and political problems in SONATRACH as well as the country, especially in a situation dominated by the technological blackmail of the multinationals and their fierce resolve to undermine our independence.

To be sure, the choice of men is a particularly important criterion. The procedure is fairly complex for a company the size of SONATRACH which employs between 80,000 and 90,000 workers distributed among some 600 work places. The process required furthermore a long operation involving the opening of the ballots to choose the new members of the national secretariat which lasted all night from Friday to Saturday. The participants had nevertheless given their verdict or rather reasserted their confidence in some of their outgoing representatives when a trade unionist stood up in the middle of the plenary meeting to make a suggestion which was applauded by the participants: "I move," he said, "that Mr Rebah (the outgoing secretary general) be continued as national secretary of SONATRACH." Indeed, the latter had been promoted to the FNTEMC [National Federation of Energy,

Mining, and Chemical Workers]. Rebah was thus re-elected yesterday to head SONATRACH's union. Even before the vote one of his colleagues seemed very sure of his re-election, desired by the workers, especially, as he said because of "his competence and integrity." Rebah's trade union career is long. It began with the birth of the trade union movement in SONATRACH more than 16 years ago.

The trade unionists of the hydrocarbons sector still recall the period of the 1960's when they still lacked legal status since they fell under the jurisdiction of the French labor law and were thus exposed to unrestricted dismissal without other means of recourse. Since that time many things have occurred. Trade union struggles in the hydrocarbons sector have taken a national and especially political dimension. The trade union movement has fought for the nationalization of the hydrocarbons sector, better known under the term "battle of oil" unleashed on 24 February 1971, the date which coincided with the 15th anniversary of the creation of the UGTA under the leadership of the late president Houari Boumediene. A genuine war was then waged against the foreign companies, especially the French ones, which used to exploit our oil and derived considerable profits at the expense of the interests of the Algerian state and workers. "Red oil"-- it is in these terms that the foreign companies tried to place an embargo on this Algerian resource. "Yes, it is red because this oil is mixed with the blood of the 'shuhada [martyrs].'" It is with this pertinent and unequivocal rejoinder that President Boumediene had responded to the blackmail and threat of the foreign companies.

Myth of Capitalist Technology

The present concerns of the trade union have again risen to the level of Algeria's major demands. Today, the trade union movement has taken over the gas issue side by side with the political leadership. The matter is highly topical since the negotiations between SONATRACH and El Paso Natural Gas Company had been suspended because of the obstinate refusal of the American firm to pay a fair price for Algerian gas. Why should gas from Alaska cost more than that from Hassi R'Mel? The United States itself buys Canadian gas at a distinctly higher price than what it wishes to pay Algeria. The matter has been aggravated since the multinational corporations have undertaken genuine technological blackmail against the Algerian economy. "Foreign aid," while it is still appropriate in many sectors, must for all that be seen in all its parameters and predominance, its coercive and constraining nature for the country's economy. In one of his latest speeches President Chadli Bendjedid showed himself to be very firm on the principle of putting a ceiling on foreign aid and using it only in case of absolute necessity, exercising constant control over such assistance. It was also this principle which one of the trade unionists of SONATRACH defended on Friday on the rostrum of the Palais des Nations, receiving the warm applause of the participants.

The limitation of foreign aid may seem in its formulation to be more than just a political resolve without technical justification because of the weakness of Algerian technology. In other words, can Algeria's substitution of foreign aid be assured? At least two events seem encouraging to initiate this effort. First, in Annaba, a unit of the phosphated fertilizer complex relinquished by foreign technical assistance was reactivated with much higher production thanks to the technical capabilities of exclusively Algerian cadres. This is proof of the nonutility or the low "raison d'etre" of some of Western technology. Then in Arzew where it is once again the workers of the Algerian enterprise ALTRA [expansion unknown] who reconditioned a gas flare, at less cost in Algerian dinars, in record time and very far below the terms offered by a Japanese company to do the job. With these results, without going to the point of shouting triumph from the rooftops, are we not witnessing the beginning of the explosion of a myth, that of Western technology, which has penetrated our national economy and some technocratic minds so deeply, to the point that it has made itself indispensable too easily?

Such a situation, denounced by the trade union movement and honest cadres, has undermined to a large extent the process of Algerianization which got under way with the recuperation of the hydrocarbons sector and its nationalization. Why then not put more trust in Algerian cadres? Without being posed in these terms this question was on the lips of more than one participant at the second SONATRACH conference.

Mixed Management: An Obstacle to the GSE

Foreign presence in the form of "mixed management," the management system set up at the GNL-1 [liquefied natural gas No 1 plant] in Arzew in itself represents a serious obstacle to the introduction of the GSE.

Other problems, these more technical than political, are also known at SONATRACH where the case of the GSE is not the smallest problem. It has furthermore mandated the holding of several national and regional conferences in Hassi Messaoud, Algiers, and elsewhere devoted exclusively to this topic. One of the conclusions of the recording secretaries was to ask the reactivation of the plan for the establishment of GSE structures. However, the gigantic size of SONATRACH and its development have led the trade unionists as well as the cadres to relinquish the principle defended earlier, namely, that "SONATRACH is one and indivisible." Today proposals are being made to restructure SONATRACH and to break it up into several medium-sized companies likely to represent basic economic units of adequate size for the introduction of the GSE. The themes broached during this second conference have evidenced the high degree of maturity of the trade union movement within SONATRACH, its capacity to assume not only the workers' social problems but also the major concerns of the Algerian economy. Trade union democracy consequently appears as an indispensable means to solve these problems of national interest. The experience shows today that the decision-making process cannot work without involving the trade union closely. This principle was stated unanimously by the leaders of the FNTEMC, of the national union of SONATRACH, and all the participants at the second conference.

ALGERIA

FRENCH PRESS COVERAGE OF TIZI-OUZOU EVENTS HIT

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 27 Apr 80 p 3

[Article: "The French Press and the Tizi-Ouzou Events"]

[Text] The role played by the French press at the time of the Tizi-Ouzou events, even though already taken up by the national press, would undoubtedly deserve to be discussed once again without the fear of useless repetition--and with good reason. For in analyzing the motivations prompting this press to anti-Algerian hysteria one notes first and foremost the animosity with which this press continues its virulent attack's at the very time when calm is returning gradually once the Machiavellian plans tending to transform an originally cultural problem into an all-round contest, outside the organic framework, jeopardizing national unity were unmasked.

In the past this role which has fallen on the French media did not hold any surprises, it being known in advance--except for a minority of newspapers--how great an apathy superficially (and circumstantially) Algeria, its people, and its achievements viscerally inspired in them. But today this virulence is not only stepped up to achieve dimensions hard to imagine but finds lots of space to exacerbate what should logically not be treated that way for, whatever that press so avid for what is sensational thinks, events have been surrounding with calm and dignity in a spirit of unity against efforts at division and diversion.

More than the written press whose impact is necessarily relatively limited, French Government radio stations such as France-Inter or peripheral stations have pursued, because they are easily heard in Algeria, a propaganda campaign with a zeal and crossness that are untimely for an "informational" subject to say the least. Very unfortunately, the prophets of division have found in part an echo among some mentalities which still bear vestiges of mean Francophilia and for whom the accomplishments of socialism represent an obstacle to their known voracity.

To enlighten those minds which "deem" that it is the pot calling the kettle black for the Algerian press to "accuse" the foreign press, let us recall that it is possible for any knowledgeable observer to compare this hostility

against Algeria and its national unity with the accomplice silence that these very media observe as soon as what are involved are strictly "French" problems, the most recent being that of Martinique where the tramping of 400 French gendarmes sent to assist Pointe-a-Pitre have not had the honor-- in contrast to the Tizi-Ouzou events--of making page one headlines in the Paris papers.

Similarly, how should one not be surprised at the flagrant partisanship of a so-called left press whose role at the time of the Algerian revolution is not about to fade from the memory of the Algerian people. Let us add to this that in newspapers ranging from LIBERATION to LE MATIN--passing through those habitually nostalgic for a French Algeria such as L'AUREOLE or FRANCE-SOIR--there was such well-organized consensus to remind us who are not fools that 18 years after Algeria's independence some Frenchmen have not yet digested their loss of Algeria, their defeat, and the resolve of Algerians to free themselves from all control, be it economic or, all the more, cultural. It is this fact that should be mentioned in the present situation without forgetting for all that the constantly accomplice silence that this same press observes at a time of the police roundups and crimes which the Algerian community in France has been experiencing since July 1962.

Nothing, absolutely nothing today could surprise our vigilance, still less our memory, even though in conclusion we should be allowed to draw attention to the champions and the true perpetrators of the actions taken in this way in Paris with formidable means for a "cause" lost in advance. Algeria is and will continue to be united, capable of meeting challenges, and in contrast to the hopes of messengers bringing bad tidings, Algeria is not and will not be put to "fire and sword." That is the best way to confront these eternal top-grade parrots.

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NEED TO REDUCE DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN AID

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 21, 22, 23 Apr 80

[Article by Mohamed Penchicou: "Foreign Assistance: Why It Is Necessary To Reduce It"]

[21 Apr 80, p 6]

[Text] The question of the reduction of foreign economic and technical assistance has been officially raised.

Last Thursday [17 April] President Chadli devoted a large portion of his speech to the matter, underlining the aspects of a blockage of development which an immoderate call for such assistance involves, such as the under-utilisation of indigenous cadre. This political will to reduce the economic and political influence of foreign assistance in our country has previously been considered by several members of the government.

Mr Belkacem Nabi, a member of the Central Committee and Minister of Energy and of Petrochemical Industries, in an interview last February with EL DJEICH, recalled that, "A very important effort remains to be made with a view to reducing the burden of technical cooperation by an Algerianization of the structures of SONATRACH and of the management of its units of production."

Mr Mouloud Oumesiane, member of the Central Committee and Minister of Labor and Vocational Training, has also underlined this important aspect of the matter in the speech which he made at the end of March in Constantine, stating that, "It is not necessary that shortages (in qualified manpower) be taken as pretexts for the introduction of foreign manpower in excessive numbers, even when it is not qualified or has only slight qualification...."

One thing is certain: the political will exists to face up to the situation created by an exaggerated presence of foreign assistance in our economy. There remains the application of this will.

I - With Masks Off

The ministries which we have contacted have confirmed to us the existence, at their level, of programs for the reduction of foreign assistance. Precise instructions have been given to the organisms concerned.

An inter-ministerial committee presided over by a responsible official of the Ministry of Planning and National Development has been working for three months on the question and should shortly submit to the government practical measures for the reduction of foreign assistance.

Elsewhere, there will shortly be forwarded to the National People's Assembly a draft law on the question of foreign manpower.

In short, the reduction of foreign assistance as a political and economic imperative has been admitted by the highest authorities of the country.

Why?

The question turns on very important political and economic considerations at a stage like that which the building of socialism in our country is currently going through.

— Politically, the exaggerated and uncontrolled presence of capitalist, foreign firms in the functioning of our economy poses the problem in terms of threats to the economic sovereignty of our country to the extent that this presence is noted principally in the economic sector of the State, the pillar of our political and economic independence and the object of all attention, both that of the patriots who wish to consolidate and reinforce it, as well as that of the imperialist and reactionary circles and of the multinational firms which desire to demolish and to destroy it, conscious as they are of the stakes.

— Economically, the question is still more concrete: one cannot build an independent economy and still less succeed with a plan which is proposed with the purpose of building socialism, by handing over the majority of the projects involved therein to foreign firms which are actively engaged in a strategy of domination and of exploitation of the Third World.

It is necessary to get at the bottom of things, as an official of the Ministry of Energy remarked to us.

An analysis of the nature of foreign assistance in our country shows that it is 90 percent capitalist, that is, coming from a system which has developed, thanks to the colonisation of other peoples and which is developing further through the exploitation of the countries of the Third World, whose efforts to develop it blocks systematically.

We have no intention to give a course on the strategy of multinational firms and of international capitalism in the Third World. The reader could refer himself to detailed lectures on this subject.

Let us say only that it is an illusion to wish to bring international capitalism to share our views and respond to our national and popular demands, which are fundamentally opposed and contrary to its strategy. And Algeria, as President Chadli Bendjedid recalled in his latest speech, is a privileged target of imperialism, which attacks through the cultural as well as the economic sphere. Consequently, in Algeria international capitalism wishes to empty industrialization of its meaning and of its function of independence and to make of it an instrument which, on the contrary, would reinforce our dependence in its regard.

It is not without reason that we have been constantly obliged to lower our growth objectives set out for our development plans.

It is not without reason that several projects listed in the second four-year plan have not yet been completed.

It is not without reason that our economy suffers from grave irregularities provoked by international capitalism.

It is not without reason that our country is today seriously in debt to the West.

The reasons? They are numerous and all are a part of this strategy of which we have spoken previously.

The Tricks Used

The First Trick: Cost Overruns

The capitalist firms which have respected the initial evaluation of projects can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Practically, all projects have been re-evaluated, which moreover has led to the revision of our growth objectives and to debts for the financing of their supplementary costs. (We might remark that, at the same time, the same capitalist circles block us in the negotiations for an increase in our own capacity to finance, by refusing to agree to the upward valuation of our raw materials, as is presently the case for natural gas.)

Thus, the initial project of the second four-year plan envisaged an overall investment of 60 billion dinars. But as a consequence of the cost overruns imposed by our capitalist partners, this total has been raised to 80 and then to 120 billion dinars.

Furthermore, a large portion of the projects set out in the plan have not been completed, and all the ardor and determination of the workers and of the cadres have been needed to complete certain projects, like the creation of 500,000 new jobs, the 6,000 agricultural production cooperatives [CAPRA], and several industrial projects.

This state of things has been provoked by the whirlwind of cost overruns of our capitalist economic partners, some of whom we could cite for example: The cost of the liquified natural gas factory at Arzew has been clearly overvalued by reason of the demands of the firms chosen as partners. Work on the project had already ended in October, 1975, after the firm CHEMICO claimed from SONATRACH in April, 1975, supplementary funds to meet "Increases which had occurred in the cost of equipment." SONATRACH refused and announced on 10 November 1975 the cancellation of the contract. In all, the first liquified natural gas factory will have cost \$1.0 billion against the \$880 million provided for originally, according to information available.

CHEMICO left the first natural gas factory still under construction, although it had only carried out 20 percent of the work on the ground.

Another American company engaged by the OAIC [Interoccupational Algerian Grains Office] to build 26 seed stations collected the total price while only constructing 13 stations which, moreover, are still closed. Pending since 1977, this affair has not yet been settled.

It would take too much space to cite all of the affairs of this type, almost all of which resemble the famous "BUM affair," which the whole world has heard of.

The other trick of capitalist firms lies in "over-dimensioning" projects in order to transfer their undesirable technology as a whole to the Third World. In Algeria, fortunately, the precise examples of these transactions have all been aborted, and we know of some of them, such as the SNS West project [National Steel Company - West] undertaken by Nippon Steel for SNS and the Valhyd plan.

It is astonishing that Nippon Steel, which is reducing its steel production, as one of its responsible officials stated to me in Japan (this industry does not meet the standards of maximum profitability), should transfer it so easily and so massively to our country.

The excessive delays are the other privileged practices of western foreign assistance. This is an important factor which explains the continual delay of our projects.

Thus, the first liquified natural gas factory, which was to be completed in mid-1976, was only finished in 1978.

At the paper complex in Mostaganem, the members of ATE calculated that one day's delay in the period of construction came to 4.0 million dinars by Algeria to the Pulman Kellog Company.

Other economic problems accompany foreign assistance. Thus, our country, not having all the means of maintenance and commercial sale, is in a delicate situation. Thus, a mere shortage of stock material could result in dramatic consequences. This is what happened in 1978, when the chemical fertilizer complex of Annaba was completely shut down following a delay in the delivery of sulphur. The ceramic factory of Ouelma had the same experience when its continued functioning was halted by a shortage in the supply of feldspar, an imported raw material.

At times the firm introduces schemes which our cadre could not foresee. The battery factory at Setif was provided by the constructor partner with machinery which only functioned with bixyde of manganese imported from Greece. When Algeria changed supplier, production underwent a sharp fall.

In brief, there is no shortage of examples. The essential thing is that there is a political will to resolve the spiny question of foreign assistance. Two ways have been mentioned: diversification and confidence in our own cadre.

[22 Apr 80, p 2]

[Text] II - An Exaggerated Presence of Western Manpower

Can one entrust the application of a plan which is intended to be scientific, imperative, and democratic to foreigners, brushing aside the greatest possible number of Algerians?

In schematic terms, through an exaggerated presence of foreign manpower in our country, we have reached the point of posing this question, which may seem absurd but which, basically, is sadly true.

After 10 years we are calling on foreign technical personnel, principally from capitalist countries, at a frantic pace. Job offers filled the want ad pages of LE MONDE. With the help of foreign exchange we recruited this kind of manpower on a massive scale, without checking either its qualifications or its political allegiance.

We also have appealed to the Swiss for projects in southern Algeria,* to an American firm to introduce GSE [Socialist Management of Business] in an Algerian company, and to other firms for equally bizarre work. In four years the cost of technical assistance services in the Algerian balance of payments has increased by 600 percent, going from 690 million

*See the report of our collaborator, Hamdi Mohamed, in Djelfa, last March.

dinars to 4.2 billion dinars, that is, as an official of the Ministry of Labor has remarked, "more than all our expenditures on education, on training, on higher education, and on scientific research during the same year." That is something to think about.

It is necessary to say that foreign manpower requires a very high level of remuneration, costly living conditions, and very substantial allowances over and above salaries. But that is not the gravest aspect. The gravest aspect is that this presence of foreign technicians from western countries, linked to multinational firms, manifests itself above all in the strategic sectors of our economy, those which must ensure, over the long run, our economic independence: hydrocarbons and petrochemicals, electronics, heavy industry, steel-making, and mechanical industry. For international capitalism are not these the means of carrying out the blockage of these strategic sectors which it is in its interest to see undermined by technical problems?

Complacency and Political Calculation

How is it that such a massive entry of manpower has been favored? Several reasons have been advanced in this connection, of which the first is that the foreign suppliers who transfer into our country a technology which is most often sophisticated and difficult for our technicians to master provide this technology with manpower qualified to make it function.

At the present stage of our development this kind of constraint is at times inevitable.

So be it.

But let us be objective: is all of it inevitable?

If one excepts the reasons relating to "complacency" before what is western, there is mental colonization (an Algerian company engaged a French typographer to make up the first issue of its newspaper, with all costs paid at a big hotel in Algiers for him and his wife.)* If one excepts therefore these motives, which are not negligible, there remains the tactic of those who wish to separate the Algerian technician from contact with the Algerian worker, to prevent the natural union between patriotic forces, the only means of breaking with the arbitrary past.

Obviously, the reactionaries are afraid of Algerian technicians, who are potentially attached to revolutionary values and to the building of a just society, because they come, in an overwhelming majority, from the

*Personal experience.

masses and not, as was the case before independence, from the well-off categories of the population.

The pretext of the "incompetence of Algerian technicians" has become the slogan in the mouth of those who, voluntarily or involuntarily, guarantee the practices of imperialism. "We accept a margin of error of 25 percent from Algerian cadre and not one or two percent from foreigners, because the Algerian cadre can learn, and the foreigner costs us foreign exchange," stated President Chadli last Thursday [17 April]. Let those people take note!

In passing, we would like to make two remarks:

First, has Algerian manpower always been brushed aside for "incompetence" (even supposing that it is)? An analysis of the situation proves that this is not true.

Thus, when 2,000 graduates of the National Institute of Light Industries (INIL) were refused access to employment two years ago, was it for "incompetence"? Meanwhile, to our knowledge the light industrial sector is one of those where one notices foreign manpower the most.

According to information which we have, these engineers reportedly were not always assigned directly to the production centers but rather assigned, after a series of representations made to the authorities, to administrative posts.

The same question should be asked about the plastic materials complex at Skikda where, in 1977, 350 Algerian workers, including technicians with valid, recognized skills, were replaced by Japanese technicians.

Incompetence? Let's Talk About It

Secondly, in analyzing the concept of incompetence in a basic way, have we verified the qualifications of foreign manpower?

The facts prove that often we have displayed a blind confidence (in the true sense of the word), without attempting to apply the same controls which we have hastened to apply, curiously enough, to Algerian cadre.

Thus, we have learned with astonishment at the bicycle and motorcycle complex at Ouelma that the firm "DIAG," whose emblem is a subject of adoration for some, with all its technological superiority, was not able to control its production sufficiently, for the manufacture of which it was

engaged in the first place.* Results: delays and cost overruns in the completion of the project.

In Tokyo I met a young economist who admitted to me that the work assigned to him by SONATRACH in 1976 had been beyond him. He was not up to doing the work at all. That did not stop him from enjoying (and he admitted it in all honesty) housing pertaining to his job in the center of Algiers, a company automobile, and very substantial pay. On his return to Japan he has been rated at his true value: he is out of work. Each one of us knows at least one example of cases where foreign engineers recopy purely and simply work done by Algerians and who then take it over later, for their own account, presenting high-priced bills! There is an Algerian proverb which summarizes the situation very well but which, unfortunately, cannot be translated!

At times the deceit goes further than that! Thus, a foreign firm obtains Algerian workers on loan from an Algerian company, who are paid at the minimum [SMIG] level, but a bill is presented to the same Algerian company at triple the cost!

Setting aside Algerian workers has, for some years, affected even the workers, since foreign firms export to Algeria, at the same time as the machinery, maintenance workers or simple manpower, recruited in other countries of the Third World. According to estimates of the Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training, the capitalist firms have sent to Algeria manpower from different countries (Asia, Europe, America) estimated at more than 25,000 workers.

And meanwhile, how often Algerian workers and technicians, making up for the shortcomings of foreign assistance, have carried out work assigned to them, at a lower cost and of better quality.

Let us recall the workers of the former Terrin factory who, since last April and despite material and financial difficulties, have been able to complete 200 jobs (repairs, technical changes) on ships, at a lesser cost, of better quality, and in less time. These jobs, prior to that time, were assigned to foreign firms, at a high price and in foreign exchange! The workers are said to be ready to carry out 40 percent of the orders which the Algerian National Shipping Company [CNAN] traditionally has placed abroad, which will permit saving 40 percent of the 9.0 billion centimes [sic] which the CNAN sets aside annually for this purpose!

*EL MOUDJAHID, July, 1977.

Recently, Mr Abdelhamid Brahimi, Minister of Planning and National Development, paid tribute to the workers at the bottled gas factory at Batna, who successfully completed a job from which its Western partner had withdrawn at the last minute.

At the GP complex in Arzew a team of Algerian workers from ALTRA (a subsidiary of SONATRACH) developed an anti-pollution system, out of their own knowledge, which cost 300,000 dinars when a foreign firm previously constructed one, which broke down, and which had been billed at 1.8 million dinars, or six times more expensive!

In the port of Algiers, at the electricity generating plant to be precise, Algerian technicians, by working day and night, succeeded in constructing a spare part necessary to the plant.

By doing the work ordinarily turned over to a foreign supplier, they were able to ensure that the plant did not stop functioning for three months, as was previously the case, but for only five days! Thus, more than 2.0 billion centimes [sic] were saved, reports the newspaper REVOLUTION ET TRAVAIL.

One thing is certain: our economy can do without a large proportion of existing foreign manpower and limit it to strict essentials. Our national capacity, in quality and in quantity, is enough for that. The last census of 1977 shows that the number of Algerian cadre and technicians has gone up, between 1966 and 1976, from 71,000 to 234,000, or more than 300 percent!

Algerian cadre today represent 5.4 percent of the present active population, and technicians represent 11.6 percent of the same population.

Was it necessary to commit enormous expenditures to train these Algerians in order not to use them?

It is a matter today of responding, and of responding quickly to these questions. Economic independence should not suffer from beating around the bush.

[23 Apr 80, p 6]

[Text] III - How to Diversify

In the first two parts of this article our colleague has covered two dangerous aspects of the exaggerated dependence on foreign assistance:

-- Blockages in economic development.

-- Setting aside Algerian manpower, recalling that this is done in the face of all logic and for reasons relating either to a mental attitude

of certain economic figures (complacency at the "Made in USA" label) or to a political calculation aimed at separating the workers from the intellectuals and the patriotic cadre, in order to prevent the unity of the workers in anti-imperialist and anti-reactionary action.

In this way and despite the fact that the training system has provided the national economy, between 1966 and 1976, six times more cadres and Algerian technicians, foreign assistance continues to be made use of, while brushing aside Algerian manpower. The example of the National Institute of Light Industries, 2,000 graduates of which were denied access to employment in 1976, is instructive in this connection.

Today's article concerns the policy of diversification of economic partners.

Was he wrong, this banker, a former Under Secretary of State of the United States and former U. S. Ambassador to the UN, when he responded to the question as to whether the United States is afraid of progressive states? "I don't know what a progressive state means. If a country has a 'progressive' government and its trading partner is the United States, then that does not bother me."

Objectively, no. And the leaders of the capitalist, multinational firms are the first to admit that they work strategically to combat the State sector in the Third World countries which wish to build socialism.

And Algeria wants to build socialism.

So?

So, the question is posed in terms of a political choice.

The problems which our country is encountering regarding raising the prices of our raw materials, and currently natural gas, and all the offensive efforts at reduction of its purchasing power, come from the capitalist world in terms of its world strategy. Now, what do the figures tell us about the geographic division of our trading partners? There has certainly been an effort made in the regrouping of our principal sources of imports and our export customers since the policy of diversification was undertaken in 1966. Nevertheless, there has been a very strong concentration of the trade flow towards or from the capitalist world (European Economic Community, United States, and Japan), which provided 77.07 percent of our imports in 1978 and which took 89 percent of our exports. And as a result of the commercial and financial practices related to the strategy of reduction of the purchasing power of the Third World (inflation, change of monetary rates of exchange, cost overruns, extra delays), our country is in a deficit position regarding the capitalist world (10.9 billion dinars with the EEC, to cite only that case).

These deficits are not unknown, of course, in terms of the growing indebtedness of our country, of the blockage of Algerian development plans, and of the economic delays which we are experiencing.

In view of this picture, two solutions, the only ones which compel recognition, are presented.

— Increase of domestic production ("we cannot continue to pay in foreign exchange for what we can produce ourselves," President Chadli has said).

— Diversification of trade, by turning further towards the socialist countries (which only represent 4.73 percent of our imports and 3.34 percent of our exports) and the countries of the Third World (less than 3.0 percent).

These are two preferred forms of the struggle for the reduction of the negative influence of foreign assistance. Whether one wants it or not, these are the only ways of escaping from imperialist pressures and from the speculative activities of the capitalist, multinational firms, instruments for the domination of the Third World, which are causing serious losses to our economy (see the two preceding articles). In that direction much remains to be done. To take only the light industry sector, we note that the role of capitalist firms represents 81.5 percent in the total activity.

The socialist countries (Hungary, Rumania, China, Bulgaria, Poland, German Democratic Republic, and the USSR) have only participated in 9.74 percent of the total activity. The same scenario is found in the other sectors, including the strategic sectors (hydrocarbons, heavy industry).

The diversification of economic relations, "an instrument in the struggle against overseas dependence and a factor for the consolidation of our independence," as our Constitution states, is far from being a reality at home.

Most often, we have "diversified dependence," to use the term of a colleague. That is, we have chosen other partners "within the capitalist system," without seeking to do so outside this system. There are several reasons for that.

A Program of Reduction Over 20 Years!

The first reason is the recourse to the classical invitation for international bids, which seriously limits participation of the socialist countries, in the sense that this procedure is not compatible with their planning needs, and the countries of the Third World, which depend on the West for information. This is a constraint which is not ignored by our

economic leaders, and which must be avoided if we want "to turn towards the socialist countries and the Third World," as the Central Committee has recommended.

The contacts which have taken place between the economic delegations of socialist countries and of our country have made it possible to approach the possibility of inscribing our industrial projects in the economic forecasting of these countries.

The technical and economic assistance of the socialist countries has this advantage, according to many experts, of not being accompanied by speculative and discriminatory practices such as those of the West.

The other constraint which it is necessary to get past, in order to stimulate the provision of economic assistance from the developed socialist countries and from the countries of the Third World, is to watch carefully over the choice of those who provide our credits. In general, the financial circles to which our economic leaders address themselves are, for the most part, capitalist banks which, in practice, are closely related to the industrial circles and which, in various ways, impose on us the choice of our business partners, thus, capitalist firms.

The maritime transport and communications networks, concentrated on the West, often have favored the rejection of trading partners other than the capitalist countries. It is time for the responsible officials concerned to consider facilitating transactions with the socialist countries and the Third World. It is also a matter of by-passing mentalities set firmly in admiration of the "western model," the complacency before everything which is made in the West (considered as the privileged place of technology) and in the systematic rejection of socialist, African, or Arab cooperation.

Haven't we often heard economic leaders ask themselves, "what can the developing countries provide us with," when there has been no effort at listing what might be done regarding the possibilities for trade with the Third World, until very recently.

The experiments carried out over the last few months with certain countries, such as India, Mali, or Ghana, prove that we can find methods of specific cooperation among countries of the Third World, in order to reduce the influence of the West.

But this effort also involves a strengthening of our means of communication. The effort of Air Algerie to expand its air relations with the African countries is meritorious (see our advertizing section).

In conclusion of this piece, which is far from being complete, we could say that the possibilities for reduction and control of foreign assist-

ance exist, and the best proof of this is the number of Algerian cadre and technicians trained since 1966 (more than 250,000 in 12 years), who constitute the best alternative, and whom our economic leaders do not always seem to take into account.

There is also the diversification of our economic partners. The program for the reduction of foreign assistance, which is under study in the strategic ministries (energy and petrochemicals, heavy industry, light industry, planning, housing), must be completed as rapidly as possible, as Mr Abdelhamid Brahimi has emphasized.

The pretexts used by certain leaders to slow down this process must be resolved. "A national company has presented me with a program for the reduction of foreign assistance, spread out over 20 years. When that time comes, we will have no further need for the program," Mr Brahimi said, at the close of the Algiers regional planning seminar. It is necessary to end the era of beating around the bush!

5170
CSO: 4400

PHOSPHATE PLANT OPENS WITHOUT FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

Algiers EL MOUMJAHID in French 24 Apr 80 p 2

[Article: "Opening of A Phosphated Fertilizer Complex Unit Denied Foreign Assistance"]

[Text] Workers of the Annaba phosphated fertilizer complex sent the following message to the Ministry of Energy and Petrochemical Industries which Belkacem Nabi (minister of energy) read to the conference:

"We workers have the pleasure to inform you that the 'Tripoli' phosphates of soda unit has been in operation since April 1980 and that it has produced 700 tons to date.

"The management of the phosphated fertilizer complex took the decision to put this unit into operation through the complex' own resources without any technical assistance and exclusively with Algerian personnel.

"We inform you that the opening of the complex, its adjustment, and its production startup have been satisfactory.

"We have reached and gone beyond quality control standards set by the SNIC [National Chemical Industries Company].

"As for the daily production rate we have voluntarily maintained that level at 50 percent of capacity to enable the personnel to become more familiar with the facilities.

"We advise you that the existing needs of SNIC represent only 35 percent of the unit's capacity.

"Our stocks in raw materials are such that we have not deemed it necessary to increase production capacity to 50 percent of the plan.

"After we receive raw materials we shall undertake long-range trial runs carried out at a cruising rate of operation.

"We are very confident regarding the results obtained and can assure you that we already have this unit well under control. The decision taken occurred following too long and unacceptable a halt after the shilly-shallying of the builder who failed to meet the conditions necessary for this unit's startup."

INTERVIEW WITH ABU TALIB ON ISLAMIZATION OF EGYPTIAN LAW

LD231545 Paris LE MONDE in French 23 May 80 p 4

[Interview with Egyptian People's Assembly Chairman Sufi Abu Talib by J. P. Peroncel-Hugoz in Cairo: "The Harmonization of Our Laws With Islamic Laws Is Under Way"—date of interview not specified]

[Text] Cairo—Mr Sufi Abu Talib, chairman of the People's Assembly since 1978 and former rector of Cairo University, now aged 55, is known for his simple, studious way of life in Egypt. He received his law doctorate from Paris University in 1952, is author of many books including one on the legal status of women in Arab countries published in French in Beirut under UNESCO's auspices 10 years ago. Mr Abu Talib, who is close to the Rais, has stood out as the advocate of the Islamization of Egyptian laws within the regime. Six ad hoc committees have been working to this end under his guidance for 2 years.

[Question] What stage has the committees' work reached?

[Answer] The work is well under way. The work which has made most progress relates to replacing the civil law of French inspiration introduced to Egypt at the end of the 19th century. Next comes the work on commercial and industrial law and so forth. We will probably complete the harmonization of our legislation with Islamic law in a few years with criminal law which crowns the edifice.

'Khomeyni Is Not Islam'

[Question] Will Egypt then be similar to Iran or Saudi Arabia?

[Answer] No. Khomeyni is not Islam. For instance, when he dismissed Iranian women judges because they were women, he made a mistake. In Islam, aside from the episode of Queen Shajarat al-Dur who was reigning in Egypt when Saint Louis landed there, the only role which a woman cannot fulfill is that of head of state. Similarly, the flogging of nonmuslims in Saudi Arabia for drinking alcohol is not in keeping with Koranic Law. Once our legislation has been Islamized, 95 percent of the laws will remain flexible and adaptable. However, there will be immutable, rigid regulations for anything connected with homicide, theft, adultery, giving evidence, inheritance, the consumption of wine and pork by Muslims and the renunciation of Islam.

[Question] Will the Christian minority be subjected to the Shari'ah (Islamic Law)?

[Answer] The dhimmis [non-Muslims] which you translate by the French word "proteges" are not second-class citizens and under the Shari'ah enjoy complete religious freedom and have equal status to Muslims in all activities aside from the fact that they cannot become head of state just as a non-Anglican cannot reign in London. Muslim law does not mean that the coptic Christians will be subject to all Islamic bans since the intention is, for instance, that they will be able to consume pork and wine freely. The korenaic maxim (no constraint in religion) applies to the dhimmis since a Muslim cannot change his religion under any circumstances.

[Question] Will the coptic Christians be able to build churches freely?

[Answer] They will have to obtain a building permit as the Muslims do for mosques. Unfortunately, however, you can never prevent there being petty-fogging officials.

[Question] In this extremely indulgent Egypt will we see thieves having a hand or foot cut off?

[Answer] Jean Valjean [reference to character in Victor Hug's Les Miserables] doing penal servitude for stealing a loaf of bread is inconceivable in Islam because the needy thief cannot be found guilty under Islamic Law any more than someone who steals public property because that property belongs to everybody and hence also to the thief and you cannot sentence somebody who steals from himself....

Capital Punishment for Adultery

[Question] Will capital punishment be used for adultery?

[Answer] Yes, for in a country governed by Islamic Law, adultery by two married persons, duly reported by four witnesses, is a "public" crime, in other words a crime against society. Therefore, it cannot be pardoned.

[Question] Nonetheless, flesh is weak and the Koran constantly talks of mercy....

[Answer] Flesh is weak but society's future is more important. However, pardon is possible and praiseworthy is the case of a "private" crime, in other words when society is not directly affected. The victim's family can then ask the court to show clemency to the murderer and the court should grant it.

[Question] How can the needs of modern economic life be reconciled with the prohibition of risk and charging interest on loans?

[Answer] Opinions differ widely on the question of bank interest. As for risk in business, it is only to be condemned if it implies the exploitation of a third party.

[Question] What about the emancipation of women?

[Answer] The Western idea of women's liberation has no sense in Islam since there is equality between the two sexes. The double share of inheritance given to boys is explained by the fact--for everything in Koranic Law is balanced--that the father, brother, husband or son has the legal duty to supply all the woman's financial needs. Note that a Muslim woman who works or has personal property is not obliged to contribute to household expenses which is not the case in the West.

The rule that a man's evidence is worth that of two women only applies to a few cases such as commercial transactions in which women rarely take part. Polygamy, which can be restricted but not completely banned, prevents men having mistresses and illegitimate children, thereby destroying the family which is the basis of society.

[Question] Do you think that once all laws have been harmonized with Koranic Law, the Muslim brothers and the Islamic University group will stop attacking President Al-Sadat's government?

[Answer] We think so, while realizing that whatever we do there will always be some dissatisfied extremists.

CSO: 4800

LAW ISSUED REGULATING MANAGEMENT, SUPERVISION OF MILITARY TECHNICAL INSTITUTE

Cairo AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH [Official Gazette] in Arabic No 11, 13 Mar 80
pp 279-285

[Constitution of Armed Forces Technical Institute]

[Text] Law No 69 of 1980 Concerning Constitution of Armed Forces Technical Institute

In the name of the people,

The president of the Republic,

The People's Assembly has ratified the following law and we have promulgated it:

Article 1: The Armed Forces Technical Institute shall undertake to prepare the technical officers needed by the armed forces in all the fields of specialization so that they may be capable of supervising the technical and vocational tasks of the armed forces (technical use, maintenance, repair, technical supply, rescue and evacuation, technical training) and may serve capably in the armed forces' units, maintenance workshops and educational, technical and vocational installations.

Article 2: The institute shall undertake the following:

- A. Graduate Technical officers with the technical, practical and leadership capability to assume the positions of technical officers of the armed forces.
- B. Take part in preparing students for the military colleges.
- C. Take part in the technical preparation for some specializations of the students of the Reserve Officers College.
- D. Prepare technical officers of the armed forces for promotion.
- E. Take part in preparing the technical officers working in other technical specializations in the armed forces.
- F. Any other tasks specified by a decision from the minister of defense.

Article 3: The institute shall be organized and managed by:

- A. The institute's Higher Council.
- B. The Faculty Council.
- C. The Institute Council.
- D. The institute director.

A decree shall be issued by the minister of defense forming the institute's Higher Council and Institute Council and specifying their duties.

Article 4: The institute shall have a set of bylaws issued by a decree from the minister of defense on the recommendation of the Institute Council and with the approval of the institute's Higher Council. The bylaws shall cover the following:

- A. Organization and management of the institute.
- B. Formation of the Faculty Council and the designation of its duties and the method to appoint the institute director and specify his duties.
- C. The conditions for student enrollment.
- D. Organization of the teaching faculty.
- E. The system of study and examinations.
- F. Rewards and incentives.

Article 5: With the exception of issues requiring the issuance of a decree by the president of the republic, the decisions taken by the institute's Higher Council on the recommendation of the Institute Council shall be effective immediately upon their approval by the minister of defense or whomever he deputizes for the purpose.

Article 6: The institute director shall be the official with the primary responsibility for all the institute's educational, disciplinary, administrative and financial affairs and for implementing the decisions of the Institute Council. The director shall be empowered to issue the instructions and directives necessary to guarantee the progress of work in the institute and his instructions shall be binding, within the limits of the military regulations in force in the armed forces, immediately upon their announcement.

Article 7: Officers of the armed forces shall be delegated to teach at the Technical Institute in accordance with the conditions set by the institute's bylaws.

Article 8: The duration of the delegation of officers to teach at the institute shall be in accordance with the institute's bylaws.

Article 9: An applicant for enrollment in the Armed Forces Technical Institute shall be required:

A. To be a graduate of the armed forces vocational training centers teaching a three-year course to graduates of the preparatory [junior high] school. A graduate of these centers shall also be required to have spent at least 5 years in the units and formations after graduation from the vocational training centers.

Graduates of the technical training institutes or of parallel institutes with a secondary [high] school diploma or industrial secondary school diploma may be enrolled in the specializations where sufficient numbers of the graduates of the armed forces vocational training institutes are not available.

B. Not to be 28 years of age when beginning studies at the institute.

C. To be a citizen of the Arab Republic of Egypt. On a decision by the minister of defense, citizens of the Arab and friendly countries may be excluded from this stipulation.

D. To meet the physical fitness requirements demanded of a technical officer of the armed forces.

E. To pass the Technical Institute's acceptance examinations whose standards shall be determined by the Institute Council.

F. Not to have been convicted of a crime of honor violation, unless rehabilitated.

G. To be of good conduct and reputation and concerned with the security of the armed forces.

H. To have a vocational specialization similar to one of the Technical Institute's technical specializations.

I. To pass the psychological tests that determine his fitness to serve as a technical officer of the armed forces.

J. To meet any other conditions set by the Council Institute.

A student shall be required to continue to meet these conditions throughout his enrollment in the institute.

Article 10: The institute's Higher Council shall select the required number of students meeting the conditions stipulated in article 9. The council shall seek help in this regard from the priority components that it determines and from the degree of the fitness of the applicant to be a technical officer of the armed forces.

Article 11: The period of study at the institute shall be 2 academic years under the terms and conditions set by the institute's bylaws after which the student shall graduate with the rank of technical lieutenant under probation. An applied course [firqah tatbiqiyah] shall be then held at the institute after graduation for a maximum period of 6 months.

On successfully passing the examinations for this course, the student shall be awarded the technical specialization diploma.

Article 12: The student may complete a part of his practical or training education in civilian vocational training or specialization centers in accordance with a decision by the Institute Council.

Article 13: The state shall shoulder the educational, training, clothing, food, medical care and housing costs of the students who are citizens of the Arab Republic of Egypt during the period of study. The minister of defense may exempt students who are not citizens of the Arab Republic of Egypt of all or part of these costs.

Article 14: The student shall retain his military or civilian job during the period of study at the institute if he is a state or public sector employee.

In this case, the student shall continue to collect his salary for the job or grade he holds upon enrolling in the institute, as well as any future changes in this salary. The Ministry of Defense shall shoulder these costs. As for the institute students who are not state or public sector employees, they shall be given a monthly reward equal to that given to their colleagues in the armed forces or that given to their colleagues in the state apparatus--whichever is higher--holding the same qualifications.

Article 15: A student partially or completely disabled or martyred during and because of study shall be treated as an officer of the armed forces and on the basis of the salary of a technical officer of the armed forces insofar as retirement or compensation are concerned.

Article 16: Throughout their enrollment in the institute, the students shall be subject to the martial rules law and to the military decrees and orders complementing and implementing it in regard to whatever is not [sic] in conflict with the rules of this law. In such a case, the students shall be treated as NCO's and soldiers of the armed forces.

Article 17: The disciplinary penalties that may be imposed on the students are:

1. Lowering of the attendance, conduct and military discipline ratings.
2. Minor penalties, such as additional training, inspection in field fatigues for a period of no more than 3 days, denial of leave or strong censure for NCO's.

3. Detention at the institute for a period of no more than 28 consecutive days.
4. Solitary or ordinary imprisonment for a period of no more than 168 hours.
5. Demotion of NCO's by one or more grades to the rank of student.
6. Warning of expulsion from the institute.
7. Delay of seniority in the list of those passing the graduation test.
8. Preventing a student from sitting for the final examination following the imposition of a penalty.
9. Demotion to a lower academic section.

The penalties stipulated in paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this article shall be followed by a subsequent penalty consisting of a lowering of the attendance, conduct and military discipline ratings in accordance with the rules specified by the Institute Council.

Article 18: The authorities to impose the penalties:

1. The institute director:

He may impose the penalties outlined in paragraphs 1 to 6 of the preceding article and may empower other institute officers to impose all or part of these penalties.

2. The Institute Council:

It may impose the penalties outlined in paragraphs 7 to 9 of the preceding article after an investigation conducted by the institute director or by an institute officer delegated by the director to perform this task.

Article 19: (A). A student shall be dismissed from the institute in the following cases:

1. When convicted by the judiciary of a crime of violating honor.
2. When failing to meet any of the conditions of acceptance at the institute.
3. When repeating the same academic year twice.

B. The Institute Council may decide to dismiss the student in the following cases:

1. When a student commits a crime violating the institute's discipline, bylaws and permanent orders.

2. When a student is unfit for military life.

3. When the Institute Council deems that public interest requires the dismissal of a student.

In all cases, the dismissal decision shall be issued by the Council Institute with an explanation of the causes and with the consent of a majority of the attending members after hearing the student's statements and after examining his defense. The student may appeal the Institute Council's decision to the minister of defense. The dismissal shall not be considered final unless approved by the minister of defense.

Article 20: The resignation of a student may be accepted after approval by the Institute Council.

Article 21: The minister of defense shall award a diploma of technical specialization to the institute graduates after they pass the applied course given by the Technical Institute in accordance with the provisions of article 11 of this law.

Article 22: The graduates holding the citizenship of the Arab Republic of Egypt shall be appointed technical officers of the armed forces with the rank of lieutenant under probation and shall be then promoted in accordance with the conditions of service in the armed forces.

Article 23: A travel allowance shall be disbursed to every student for duty outside the republic on the basis of the categories set for first assistants [NCO's].

Article 24: As of the date of their appointment as technical officers of the armed forces, the graduates shall be awarded a monthly technical allowance of 5 pounds.

Article 25: The provisions of this law shall apply to similar technical institutes set up in the armed forces to meet the [need for] increased specializations or to supply a larger number of graduates.

Article 26: Law No 41 of 1968 concerning the establishment of the Armed Forces Technical Institute and presidential decree No 1169 of 1968 issuing the executive regulations for law No 41 of 1968 shall be abolished.

Article 27: The current system of acceptance at the institute shall continue to be in force for an interim period of 7 years during which enrollment applications shall continue to be accepted from graduates of the armed forces vocational training centers who hold general or industrial secondary school diplomas, provided that an applicant's age is not over 28 years when starting his studies at the institute.

The minister of defense may also apply the stipulations of paragraph 2 of provision A of article 9 during this interim period.

Article 28: This law shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall be effective as of the day following its publications.

This law shall be stamped with the seal of the state and shall be enacted as one of its laws.

Issued at the Presidential Office on 6 March 1980

(Signed) Anwar al-Sadat

8494

CSO: 4802

PREMIER'S DECREE ISSUED FORMING ECONOMIC COMMITTEE

Cairo AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH [Official Gazette] in Arabic No 12, 20 Mar 80
pp 348-349

[Prime Minister's Decree No 223 of 1980]

[Text] The prime minister,

After perusing the constitution;

After perusing presidential decree No 422 of 1979 approving the agreement to implement and finance the Telecommunications Authority projects agreement concluded between the government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the European Consortium for Manufacturing Telecommunication Means, signed in Cairo on 17 September 1979 and ratified by the People's Assembly on 13 October 1979;

After perusing the travel allowance and transportation expense regulations issued in accordance with presidential decree No 41 of 1958 and of the decrees amending it;

After perusing presidential decree No 489 of 1978 empowering the prime minister to exercise some of the powers of the president of the republic;

And after perusing the memorandum of the minister of communications;

Has decided:

Article One

A permanent committee entrusted with the task of performing the works to guarantee implementation of the financing conditions stipulated in the agreement concluded between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the European Consortium for Manufacturing Telecommunication Means shall be formed of:

1. 'Abd-al-'Aziz Hasan Zahawi, the undersecretary of the Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade, as chairman.

2. Sayyid Maghribi Sanjar, the director of the General Directorate of Foreign Relations at the Central Bank of Egypt, as member.

3. Engineer Tadrus Nasim 'Aqdawi, the deputy chairman of the Telecommunications Authority's Financial, Commercial and Administrative Affairs Department, as member.

4. 'Abd-al-'Al Ahmad Sawabi, the undersecretary of trade affairs and economic research at the Telecommunications Authority, as member.

The Egyptian trade adviser at the embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt in each of the states of the European Consortium shall join this committee as one of its members when the committee travels abroad.

Article Two

This committee shall be empowered to travel abroad whenever the need arises, provided that the date of travel and the duration of the trip are set with the knowledge of the minister of economy and foreign trade.

Article Three

The budget of each authority concerned shall shoulder the travel and the actual accommodation expenses, in addition to an allowance amounting to three-quarters of the set travel allowance.

Article Four

The chairman and members of the committee shall be permitted to travel first class when going abroad.

Article Five

The use of foreign air carriers may be permitted in case of necessity.

Article Six

The stipulations of this decree shall apply to all the trips of this committee outside the country.

Article Seven

The authorities concerned shall implement this decree.

Issued at the Prime Minister's Office on 11 March 1980.

(Signed) Dr Mustafa Khalil

DECREE EXPROPRIATES LAND TO EXPAND MILITARY PROJECT

Cairo AL-WAQA'I' AL-MISRIYAH [The Egyptian Minutes--Daily Supplement to the Official Gazette] in Arabic No 39, 11 Mar 80 pp 4-6

[Decree No 182 of 1979 by Ministry of Defense and War Production]

[Text] The minister of defense and war production,

After perusing law No 577 of 1954 on the expropriation of lands for public interest or improvement and of the laws amending it;

After perusing law No 252 of 1960 amending some regulations on the expropriation of property and seizure of land for public interest;

And after perusing prime minister's decree No 263 of 1975 approving the public interest in the lands necessary for military project No 109 and approving the direct seizure of the lands necessary for the project;

Has decided:

Article One

The land with an area of 2,129.59 square meters in Maniyat al-Sirij of al-Sahil District in Cairo Governorate shall be expropriated for military project No 109. The location of the land and the names of its owners are specified in the attached memorandum and detailed report and maps which are approved by the Egyptian Public Survey Authority.

Article Two

This decree, its explanatory memorandum and the attached detailed report shall be published in AL-WAQA'I' AL-MISRIYAH and shall go into effect as of the date of publication.

Issued on 22 December 1979

(Signed) Gen Kamal al-Din Hasan 'Ali
Minister of Defense and War Production and
Armed Forces General Commander

Memorandum

To be presented to the minister of defense and war production regarding the expropriation of lands necessary for military project No 109:

The prime minister issued decree No 263 of 1975, dated 5 April 1975, acknowledging the public interest in the lands necessary for military project No 109 to expand Military Plant 27 in Minyat al-Sirij subdistrict of al-Sahel District in Cairo Governorate.

The Land Survey Authority in Cairo handed over the site to the Shubra Engineering Industries Company (Military Plant 27) to implement and operate the project.

The Land Survey Authority has been unable to complete the procedural steps because of the failure of the owners of two plots of land within the project site to sign the sale contracts. The first has an area of 25,161.25 square meters and your excellency issued decree No 117 of 1978, dated 13 December 1978, expropriating this land. The second plot has an area of 2,129.59 square meters and specified as follows:

Contract Number	Area		Plot Number		Number and Name of Basin	Name of Owner and Number of (Notification)
	Square Meter	Square Decimeter	(Cadister)	New		
10	2,129	59	Within 50	Within 70	36th, No 12	Ibrahim and Ahmad Mustafa Siyam

Total area: 2,129.59 square meters only.

Delineation of Borders:

Northern border: Rest of plot No 50 (cadister).

Southern border: Plot No 29 (cadister).

Eastern border: Plot No 7, 6 (cadister).

Western border: Plots No 3, 5, 28 (cadister).

In view of the fact that article 9 of law No 577 of 1954 and its amendments on the expropriation of lands for public interest or improvement stipulates that "a decree shall be issued by the minister concerned for the expropriation of lands whose owners fail for any reason whatsoever to sign the aforementioned forms," and in view of the fact that it has been impossible to get the signatures of the owners of the aforementioned plots, the attached draft decree has been prepared to expropriate these plots.

In case of approval, please issue the decree.

Minister of State for War Production
Engineer Kamal Tawfiq Nassar

8494

CSO: 4802

POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF HOSTAGE RAID DISCUSSED

Paris LE FIGARO in French 28 Apr 80 p 2

[Article by Paul-Marie de la Gorce, "Political Exploitation of the Crisis"]

[Text] Immediately after the American operation in Iranian territory, slogans of popular mobilization spread throughout the country. Confusion, disorders and false reports were multiplied; but that is not what is most important: What is essential is that one could observe a political exploitation, rapid and methodical, of the new episode of the conflict with the United States.

Without any doubt, those who took the initiative, and who will profit the most, are the leaders of the religious current properly speaking, representing the "integrist" conception of political and social life, and for the most part regrouped within the party of the Islamic revolution, directed by Ayatollah Behehti.

In this affair they set themselves three goals:

--They wanted to reduce the authority of President Bani Sadr, as they have done whenever it was possible. They have never forgiven him for defeating their own candidate in the elections, and they suspect him--not without reason--of wanting to remove the civil power from the influence of the clergy. Already at the time of the attempts to negotiate with Washington over the fate of the hostages they favored a hardline, knowing very well that Bani Sadr, who had never concealed his hostility toward the whole American Embassy affair, wanted a compromise. Now again they are pushing for a renewed hardening, in order to force him into an attitude from which he will not be able to extricate himself.

--They also wanted to decrease the pressure of the elements on the left and the extreme left, and to wrest from them the role of ringleader of the anti-American struggle. The latter had recovered a freedom of action and an audience that they had lost after the repression to which they were subjected last summer. For the Imam--always vigilant with regard to the "atheists" and the "Marxists," and even more decidedly for the leaders of

the religious current, it was a danger: They risked losing control of the revolution. The terrible bloody offensive against the universities, where the leftist organizations had their bases, their liaisons, and their headquarters, was intended to prevent that danger. Those in charge of the Tudeh Communist Party advised in vain against replying to hostilities in kind, arguing that, in view of the superiority of the religious forces, it was necessary to "stick to the Imam line" for the present. The extreme communist left overestimated its own capacities, and relied too much on the arbitration of Bani Sadr, who indeed wanted to prevent the others from crushing each other, in order to profit from the balance between them. The result of this bargain was some tens of dead and thousands of wounded. And now the American operation affair gives the "integrists" the opportunity to rival the left in the "anti-imperialist struggle."

--At the same time, the "integrists" tried to accelerate operations against the Kurdish minority, accusing it of "playing the enemy's game." Here again it is the left and the extreme left who are aimed at, for they favor an agreement with the Kurds and other minorities--among whom the "progressist" parties have more influence--to confront the adversaries of the revolution, particularly in case of a conflict with Iraq.

It thus appears that it is only the personal authority of the Ayatollah Khomeyni and the religious forces surrounding him which limit or reduce the power of the revolutionary current. But, for the moment at least, it is only by situating themselves in the leftist political field that they are giving the Iranian revolution the orientation that they wished for on the international plane.

The fact is that no sooner had the Europeans cautiously begun to move in the direction of sanctions against Iran than the latter was heard to be sealing an extensive agreement with the Soviet Union, to be followed by other agreements with several socialist countries, notably East Germany.

There can be no doubt: If economic relations between Iran and the main Western countries are interrupted, the communist states will be able to replace them sufficiently for their sanctions to have no serious affect, at least so long as exports of food products are not involved.

Simultaneously, Iranian diplomacy reacted to the American commando affair by trying to unite the nonaligned and Islamic countries behind Tehran against Washington. It is not yet certain that they will be entirely successful. But the fact that most countries in the region, beginning with Pakistan, have already condemned the United States' action shows that the crisis in Iran has now pushed the Afghanistan affair to a position of lesser importance. That is perhaps the gravest result of the American operation.

CONTACTS REPORTEDLY MAINTAINED AFTER SEVERANCE OF TIES

Paris LE MATIN (Supplement) in French 19-20 Apr 80 pp 3-4

[Article by Jean-Louis Arnaud: "The Incredible Haggling About the Tehran Hostages"]

[Text] Ever since 53 of his diplomats have been held prisoner in Tehran Jimmy Carter has been blowing hot and cold alternately on Iran depending on the needs of an acrobatic diplomacy or the requirements of a difficult campaign to insure his re-election. In the space of a few days if not a few hours President Carter has been seen moving from the most threatening wrath to comments chock-full of moderation, understanding, or even regret. But this does not prevent him from returning a little later to that martial and hard-line tone which a majority of Americans, it seems, considers the only one appropriate to an American president.

This week, and after Carter had widely distributed in the preceding days his ration of sanctions, warnings, and puttings on notice, more tepid winds began to blow from this enigmatic White House. While, however, avoiding any official declaration, it was implied in Washington that before undertaking irreversible measures patience would be shown for a few more weeks. For those who know how to decypher this mysterious language it meant that, between now and the meeting of the Iranian parliament scheduled for mid-May 1980, the hope of finding a peaceful solution to the crisis remained.

It is true that at the same time something was happening in Tehran where the intractable guards of the hostages, those famous "Islamic students" who follow, it is said, only "the path of Islam," agreed without too much difficulty that a representative of the International Red Cross and two other physicians pay a visit to the hostages. There they were, then, those paragons of the pure and unflinching revolution, approving right on the spot something that they had obstinately rejected for 5 months before that. And this only a week after the break in diplomatic relations. It was as if, after Washington's outburst and the new wave of anti-American passions in Tehran, it became less difficult for the Iranian leaders to have some of their decisions accepted by the most recalcitrant of their activists. It was as if in the labyrinth of negotiations, that small jolt made possible

by Ariadne's clew was the signal of relief awaited by those who are in on the secret to resume their slow advance. For that is indeed what is involved, to resume negotiations which, contrary to appearances, have never really been halted. And in this connection LE MATIN was able to check with what minuteness and what concern for detail they have been pursued, followed up, and, as events occur, updated in the past 3 months.

The point of departure of these negotiations should be placed around the end of January 1980. On the American side people were overcoming the illusions of [the hostages' release by] Christmas and the vexations of the end of year followed by the failure of the Tehran mission of Kurt Waldheim, United Nations secretary general, and the U.S. diplomatic initiative in the UN Security Council halted in short order by the Soviet veto. On the Iranian side, after much contention, an effort was made to patch things up: Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr was elected president of the Islamic Republic of Iran with the astonishing majority of 75 percent. On 4 February 1980 he took his oath of office before the imam [Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni] who had difficulty recovering from a serious heart problem but appeared determined to support the power of his disciple.

It is against this background that agreement was reached both on principles and on a procedure which, despite accidents of passage, were to constitute the plot of this unprecedented political and diplomatic serial which was then getting under way between Washington and Tehran and which is still in process. Everything was premised on the construction of a carefully laid out, prepared, and approved scenario. The initial stages were meticulously described, the subsequent ones were sketched more rapidly, the roles assigned, and the actors named and accredited.

The action has taken place on two principal stages, in the two capitals, less importantly at the United Nations, in Panama where a parallel action slated to fail was under way to secure the extradition of the former shah of Iran, and finally in Paris and Bern, the principal technical relay stations for communications and exchanges between the major protagonists.

In Washington the setting has been simple: The proscenium has consisted of the White House; a little farther back is the Department of State. Their approaches have been well guarded and the actors are relatively few: Jimmy Carter and the [ex] secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, have been the stars, well surrounded by their closest aides though among the latter the leading role has been played by the Number One confidant, the man given difficult assignments, Hamilton Jordan, 35 years old, White House chief of staff, a great talent for skullduggeries and possessing all the skills necessary to move between the United States, France, and Panama without allowing himself to be spotted by newsmen. More in the background but also very active in preparing and transmitting decisions, occasionally also in traveling, is Harold Sanders, 49 years old, one of Vance's deputies for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs.

In Tehran the hierarchy of roles follows very different laws and the stage is more crowded. In the proscenium, naturally, is the new Iranian president, Bani-Sadr, 47 years old, who has settled in a big palace close to the former residences of the imperial family in the northern section of the capital. He has strived in vain to form a real government so as to get rid without further delay of the control of the Revolutionary Council whose duties he has nevertheless spelled out. Some 2 kilometers away is the man who took Bani-Sadr's place as minister of foreign affairs and his former rival in the presidential race, Sadeq Qotbzadeh, 43 years old, a close aide to Khomeyni and a former exile in Paris. He also works round the clock and has set up his bedroom next to his office in the immense building housing his ministry where the three American diplomats, including U.S. charge d'affaires Bruce Laingen, have been held. These three had found refuge there when the U.S. embassy was seized. Yesterday the two men were vying with each other for power. Circumstances have brought them together in a common struggle to consolidate the achievements of the revolution and to put the Iranian Government back on the tracks. In this difficult resumption of a dialog between the United States and Iran they inevitably carry the burden of the heaviest responsibilities.

But the long shadow of Khomeyni has continued to hover over the stage of the Iranian revolution. After leaving the hospital the 80-year imam has withdrawn to a house in Shemiran, in Tehran's northern suburb. There are many people around him and several accesses to this sanctuary of Islamic politics, well guarded by the "pasdarans," the militiamen of the revolution whose guide continues to be the imam. Since his sickness Khomeyni's voice has been heard less and less frequently. But all of Iran's religious personnel and politicians have continued to consult him and to watch on his lips for that word or that sign of approval which, in one way or another, will carry the decision. And it is his son, Ahmed, also a mullah, who took over on the outside as spokesman for his father and holds the seal of power, with the signature of the imam, which Ahmed has used without necessarily referring either to the Iranian president or to the other leaders. Ahmed Khomeyni is not a member of the Revolutionary Council but he attends the meetings and discussions of the Council's 13 members: Six laymen, six religious, plus President Bani-Sadr. For all important decisions the president and ministers have to secure the approval of the Revolutionary Council which, when it is divided, takes its disagreements to the supreme organ, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni, respectfully asking the imam to give his opinion. In this game it has become evident that it is not always those who believe they have the imam's ear who come out on top.

Finally, in the wings are the students who have that tendency to burst onto the forefront of the stage and appropriate roles not assigned to them--at least by the authors of the American-Iranian scenario. In contrast, one can bet a lot that some of them are inspired by a different scenario whose real authors could very well be in Moscow.

The United States and Iran are 10,450 km apart by Boeing jet. But since 4 November 1979, the date of the seizure of the U.S. Embassy, the ordinary channels of communications, from government to government, have not been functioning. However, in very short order and as with any organ struck by disease and which is determined to put up a good fight against the ill which afflicts it, makeshift mechanisms developed. Diplomats from third countries, friends of one side or the other, have taken over from private parties, international organizations, or embassies, and have offered their services. Finally, the two administrations concerned have resorted to specialists, most often jurists or lawyers, whom they have asked to represent them and protect their interests directly vis-a-vis their adversary or before the courts which may have to deal with some aspect or other of the enormous American-Iranian dispute.

In this swarming of intermediaries, some of them more or less spontaneous, others carefully researched and screened, a few have emerged in short order as indispensable wheels for the development of the negotiations: First diplomats and--more power to the neutrals!--it is the Swiss who were given the essential role of transmitting memorandums and messages while guaranteeing vis-a-vis the addressee the authenticity of a document and the credentials of its author. In Tehran the Swiss Embassy is the only one to be located close to the presidential palace: This is fortunate for ambassador Eric Lang, a diplomat with a truculent disposition who, sometimes several times a day, must make the shuttle on foot between his teletype machine and Bani-Sadr's antechamber where he discreetly takes his place and waits for 2 to 3 hours if necessary to transmit to the right person the telex message that he has just received.

More recently a prelate from the Vatican, Monsignor Bugnini, the apostolic nuncio, one of the authors of liturgical reform, whom the pope preferred to keep at a distance from Rome by sending him to Tehran, has made his appearance. In the Iranian capital Monsignor Bugnini is famous for his skills as a diplomat but also for the quality of his table--excellent cannelonni may be eaten there--and the variety of his cellar not all of whose wines are used exclusively for the celebration of mass. Last month the representative of Pope John Paul II was made the member of another commission, the latest one in the chronology of the hostages affair, together with ambassador Eric Lang, the former Greek Catholic bishop of Jerusalem, Monsignor Hilarion Capucci, and two international lawyers--a Frenchman, Christian Bourguet, and an Argentine, Hector Villalon--both of them 45 years old, and since September 1979 discreetly working from their respective offices in Paris, at the Observatoire and at the Trocadero, for account of the Iranian Government.

During the last 3 months Bourguet and Villalon have become the mandatory link in everything being played out between Washington and Tehran. They emerged from the half shadow only last week when Bani-Sadr paid them homage publicly following the misunderstandings that had emerged from the exchanges of messages between Washington and Tehran and the interpretations of them

in the American press in particular. To be quite sure that it had been heard, the Iranian Government even took the trouble of having its communique published in the Western press in the form of an advertisement-announcement to give credit to the "honesty" and "devotion" of Bourguet and Villalon and to renew its "complete confidence" in them.

In February 1980 the United Nations' commission of inquiry was an essential element in the scenario on which agreement had been reached with a plethora of details which excluded neither the exchange of repatriates nor silences of good omen in Washington as well as in Tehran. Some points of this program were detailed on a day by day and hour by hour basis.

All of this was expected to result in the following:

1. The transfer of the hostages under the protection of the Iranian Government (with the students relinquishing their seats in the stage-box which they occupied too noisily).
2. The return of the United Nations commission to New York.
3. The publication of its report which was to take into consideration Iran's complaint against the former shah and his regime and its demands for the return of his property and assets abroad. A little later the efforts should have led to the release of the hostages and to the establishment of a joint American-Iranian commission entrusted with solving all the bilateral problems that have accumulated since the start of the crisis and drawing up a gigantic account in which Iran's debit was estimated at the close of 1979 to total U.S. \$50 million in daily losses and which experts now estimate at over \$100 million a day.

The vicissitudes experienced by the United Nations commission several of whose members reached the limits of exasperation hastened their departure [from Tehran] on 11 March 1980 with the obstinacy of the students in playing a role that was no longer theirs, the alleged maneuvers--par for the course--of the Soviet superpower on the Iranian political stage disrupting that scenario. The scenario that replaced it immediately did not differ at all in essence from the preceding one and the latest spectacular episodes at the end of March and in early April 1980 did not alter the basis of the relationships between revolutionary Iran and its humiliated former protective power. The break in diplomatic relations decided by Washington did no more than translate into legal terms a "de facto" situation. Politically it was received as a relief by the leaders in Tehran. It enables some of them to avoid being treated abusively by their adversaries as agents of U.S. imperialism--which is important for them--as long as the parliamentary election contest has not been completed.

Finally, these latest reactivations have put into evidence the reality of the exchanges between Washington and Tehran. The famous "letter" of Carter to Khomeyni, made public on 30 March 1980 by the Iranian authorities, was

undoubtedly not a genuine letter signed by the chief in the White House and opening with "my dear imam." Between the two capitals the messages transmitted through the telephone of the lawyers and the Swiss teletypes have circulated in the form of memorandums from one administration to the other. Those emanating from Washington are prepared by Carter's close aides (or, in some cases, by those of Cyrus Vance) and express very meticulously, in the American style, the thinking of the U.S. President (or that of the secretary of state): Such or such a point under discussion or such and such a suggestion which the interlocutor is asked to study or to take into consideration. It happens that these messages may be preceded by a particular notation, indicating for whose attention they are specially prepared: The imam, the Iranian president, the minister of foreign affairs. That was undoubtedly the case of the letter which was transmitted to Ayatollah Khomeyni and which his son, in all likelihood, received and ordered published, at least in part, in Farsi translation. Under these conditions it is not surprising that Jody Powell, spokesman for the White House, was able to swear on a stack of Bibles that there had never been a "letter" while recognizing that the substance of this alleged correspondence reflected fairly well some sentiments of the American head of state.

That at a level of responsibilities less vulnerable than that of Jimmy Carter real letters should have been exchanged appears to be nearly certain, were it only to concretize the good faith and soundness of American intentions since what is involved is to convince men whom everything prompts to be suspicious that the all-powerful America has renounced practices which the Islamic revolution is striving to ban forever in government-to-government relations.

Washington has good reasons to wonder in whose hands the decision-making power lies in Tehran. But on their part those men who toppled the shah's regime can also wonder about the value of the commitments made by a team which mingles--without too much discernment--diplomacy and electoral politics. On one hand is the arrogant impatience of the American politician; on the other, the ruse and patience of the Iranian negotiator. That is indeed the haggling of the century: Fifty-three diplomats of the richest country in the world against the pride of a people ready to spend billions of dollars to defend its honor.

2662

CSO: 4900

SCHOLAR DECLARES: 'IRANIAN REVOLUTION IS IRREVERSIBLE'

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 13 May 80 p 3

[Text]

RAWALPINDI, May 12: A prominent Iranian scholar Ayatollah Mohammad Ali Shirazi asserted here today that Iranian Islamic revolution was irreversible because it derived its strength from Almighty Allah and had the full backing of the Muslim Ummah.

The scholar explained that Iranian Revolution was brought about under the inspiration of Islamic renaissance and its real strength lay in Allah's blessing. He maintained that God had been protecting the Revolution through trials and tribulations and would continue to protect it from all the evil designs of enemies of Islam.

Ayatollah Mohammad Ali Shirazi who is currently on an extensive tour of Pakistan at the head of a four-member Ulama delegation said that they had come here to convey to the Pakistani brethren a message from the Iranian revolutionary leadership they must adhere to the dictates of Almighty Allah.

The Iranian scholar said enemies of Muslims and Islam were baffled at the great change in Iran after the monarchy was uprooted.

Mr. Shirazi, Western mass media which had inherent enmity against Islam, had been engaged since the

time of the revolution in undermining it and its impact. He expressed the confidence that all propaganda based on doubts and misgivings against the Revolution was baseless and Iran was gaining strength day by day on the basis of eternal Islamic principles. The Iranian scholar said it was important to understand, which the Western world was not trying to understand, that if there was complete Allah's help and assistance with the Iranian nation, the super-power politics and their claims could not pose a threat to them.

Recording his impressions of his extensive tour of Pakistan, Ayatollah Mohammad Ali Shirazi said during his visit to Rawalpindi, Lahore, Karachi, Sargodha, Faisalabad, Gilgit and Baltistan, he felt that the people of Pakistan had immense love for Islam.

The Iranian scholar said he met the cross section of the society including workers, engineers, doctors, scholars and the urban and rural people and found them inspired with the love for Islam. They also met Ulama of various schools of thought.

The delegation is leaving for Peshawar today to visit the camps of Afghan refugees. —APP

BRIEFS

AYATOLLAH SHIRAZI DEBUNKS WESTERN PROPAGANDA--The leader of the six-member Iranian Ulema delegation, Allameh Ayatollah Agha Seyyed Mohammad 'Ali Shirazi, said here today that the Western Press had let loose a campaign of vilification against the revolutionary Government of Iran propagating that the people in Iran were being killed without any proper trial. He said it was a white lie and added that the culprits were punished after a thorough and just investigation and given full liberty to defend themselves in the courts of law. Talking to pressmen, he said that during such a short period of 18 months six elections in various tiers had been held so far and no such example could be found in the history of the world. He said that in his meeting with the President of Pakistan in the recent past, he was assured by the President that if a constitution based on religion was framed the scholars of all schools of thought, including Fiqah-i-Jafria would definitely be consulted and the religious rites of all sections of society would be fully protected. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 16 May 80 p 20]

CSO: 4920

INTERNAL CLIMATE OF COUNTRY REVIEWED

Paris LE MONDE in French 21 Apr 80 p 3

[Article by special correspondent JP Peroncel-Hugoz: "Opponents Are Not Disarming Despite the Government's Achievements"]

[Excerpts] Baghdad. Standing, larger than life, the head alone, smiling or serious, in parade dress or in a casual suit, on his feet or writing, in a neo-Louis XV or damascene frame, printed or painted ..., everywhere in Iraq one finds the portrait of Saddam Hussein, president of the republic, president of the Council of Command of the Revolution, secretary general of the Iraqi administration of the Baas party, deputy secretary general of the Pan-Arab administration of the Baas party, marshal and commander in chief of the army, but who prefers to be called /"el rais el monadel"/ ("the fighting president").

Hangings and Arrests

In December 1979, there was a twist in the economic environment with the hanging of three officials of state companies and a businessman who were accused of /"embezzlement and passing on secrets to foreign companies"/ (in this case Japanese). This month a Shi'ite was executed who, /"at the instigation of the Iranian Embassy in Beirut"/ had, in November 1979, committed a crime in the holy city of Kerbala, killing four persons, one of whom was a Shi'ite Baas official.

Despite a certain number of discharges, the prisons always hold, at the least, several hundreds of Kurd, Shi'ite, Communist, military and Turkoman (also called Turkmen) prisoners. And in the capital, in this spring of 1980, every day there circulates unverified information about arrests among stubborn citizens at the word of the omnipresent Baas, the party of the Arab revival, in power in Iraq since the military coup of 17 July 1968.

However, the country, diligently applying itself to countless building jobs, shows a calm aspect. One can move around day and night in Baghdad or in the country without being questioned by a soldier or shadowed by a civilian in a suit that is too well-pressed. And if it is true that

foreign diplomats are all more or less thought of as working spies, by contrast the Iraqis, despite their natural reserve, are quite welcoming to foreigners.

The Kurd, Shi'ite and Communist opponents continue for the most part refusing to adjust to the government, but the young people of the cities, especially in Baghdad, a huge city where on about a 40 km long area live 3 out of 13 million Iraqis, and where ethnic differences are weakened, require numerous achievements, recognize Baas the (as published). Thus Iraq is today one of the rare Arab nations where the political and social climate is not necessarily plunged into Islamic bigotry. Secularism there is not a shameful disease. Discrimination based on religious affiliation alone is diminishing, especially regarding native Christians (Chaldeans, Nestorians, and Syrians) from 500,000 to 1 million according to sources. An unthinkable development in another Near East country (except, clearly, in Lebanon): it is a Christian, Tarik Aziz, deputy prime minister (There is no government head. This function is performed in fact by the president of the republic), who is entrusted with the nation's cultural guidance. In contrast to Egypt and Lebanon*, religion is not indicated on identity cards in Iraq.

The Islamic University that is going to be opened will not have the mission of educating "turban wearers," who believe they have all the knowledge in the world because they know the Koran by heart, but that of "bringing to life the Arab Moslem inheritance, studying the philosophical thought of our nation and of Islam to closely bind relations between the Arab countries and the Moslem world."

A Development Effort

Borrowing from the West without distortion those customs that seem to it likely to unlock a society paralyzed in fear, misery and ignorance since the Mongol and Ottoman invasions, Iraq, yesterday a stronghold of the most unmanageable Arab "machismo" is appointing its first women judges at a time when Islamic Iran is objecting to its own. A Baghdad journalist who had been criticized by one of her colleagues because she was living alone, thus transgressing eastern morals, saw her slanderer suspended for 6 months from his work by order of President Hussein. Divorce pronounced by judges, which neo-liberal Egypt did not succeed in imposing on its theologians to replace renunciation, was established in Iraq. All women from 15 to 45 years old must take literacy courses under the same rights as men.

Even the government's detractors acknowledge that petroleum income is massively invested in basic facilities and in development and every day benefits more Iraqis. Everywhere housing, schools, roads, bridges, factories, etc. are springing up. Certainly, even in Baghdad one still discovers the

*The Secretary General and most important individual of the Pan Arab Baas party is Michel Aflak, a Syrian of the Greek Orthodox faith, born in 1910, with a degree in history from the Sorbonne and who created the Baas party in 1939. He lives today in Baghdad, where he is surrounded by the honors due to the "founding father."

same "dust, flies and dirty water" described in 1936 by the Iraqi novelist Safira Jamil Hafes. But today very good quality free care is dispensed to everyone, foreigners included, in hospitals that are often new.

For the first time perhaps in the history of this country between two rivers, bilharzia is receding.

Rich and with a relatively low population, Iraq has not spilled out this restless youth, obsessed by the idea of having to find work abroad, who one meets in Alexandria, Sfax and Algiers. Iraq offers numerous jobs and decent wages to its children. The average wage of a teacher is about the equivalent of 2,000 francs and that of a laborer is around 1,000 francs. Second grade meat costs 10 francs a kilo.

Without wanting to bring bad luck to the Baghdad government, one still cannot help noting certain similarities between the Iraq of 1980 and the Iran of 5 or 10 years ago: hastened introduction of Western technology with their inevitable sociological accessories, the will to impose secularism and modernity on a theocratic and patriarchal society, a harsh political system with a single guiding principle that scarcely has a chance to adapt to the parliament with which Iraq is going to be endowed for the first time since the royal family was overthrown in 1958. Throughout Iraq, from the steelworkers of Khor-el-Zubair (Bassorah) to the students of Kirkouk, there are signs indicating that the economic confusion is arousing at the same time reactions of rejection and yearning for more freedom.

Shi'ite Hostility

In the solely political area, another comparison, as offensive as it may be to the ears of the Iraq Baasists, springs up this time with the government of /"brother enemy"/ Baasists in Damascus. In Syria power is exercised almost entirely by the Moslem Alaouite minority (less than 1 million persons in a population of 7 million). In a slightly less definite way power is exercised in Iraq by the Sunnite Arabs, who number a little over 3 million out of 13 million Iraqis. If the Christians are sufficiently satisfied with their lot and if the Kurds (non-Arabic speaking semitic Moslems) can benefit from the autonomy statute of 1974 (a regional legislative assembly is going to be elected in Kurdistan), the Shi'ites, who probably make up half of the total population, are often hesitant or hostile toward the Baasists, despite the rallying to this party by numerous /"anti-clerical"/ Shi'ites. The political revolution accomplished by the Shi'ites in Iran has only revived among their Iraqi co-religionists a dissatisfaction that periodically results in assassinations, such as that of which Tariq Aziz has just been the victim.

Iraq would certainly be pioneering in the region if it succeeded in establishing the idea of secularism in the political system of a Near Eastern people. Still, for this system to have a chance to take root, it would be necessary to allow greater participation in power without delay for the communities that have been until now more or less kept on the sidelines.

This is perhaps the only chance for Iraq to emerge from the cycles of violence into which, as through a kind of fatality, it has periodically been drawn since its achieving independence in 1930.

2. [sic] Lebanon made the decision, but still has not applied it, to distribute to its nationals identity cards that do not indicate religion.

9545

CSO: 4800

TAX MEASURES AND RECENT REFORMS DISCUSSED

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 17-23 Mar 80 pp 22-23

[Interview with Samir Szuqi, Iraqi Minister of Finance, by 'Abd al-Wahab al-Qayati "Man of the Staff of the Revolution"--in Baghdad, date not given]

[Text] [Question] What are the reasons for adopting these tax measures?

[Answer] Financial policy represents the main support for the system of government in the modern state, any state. It covers an important aspect of the multi-directional interaction between the people and the leadership as regards achieving broad aspirations. In the forefront of these aspirations is to provide a good life for the people and to strengthen the national economy.

The tax structure forms the cornerstone upon which financial policy rests, by virtue of the fact that it is one of the main channels providing the public treasury funds. Therefore, the government of the revolution set about to adopt practical steps which reflect its feelings of responsibility toward the people. Thus, it accomplished, on one hand, ambitious, developmental planning, aimed at making the country prosperous and increasing its economic and social strengths and forces. On the other hand, it took a chain of measures aimed at achieving balance in the distribution of the tax load, in accordance with principles characterized by justice, universality, and as much relief as possible for the citizens, so as to raise their standard of living, increase their purchasing power, and generally stimulate economic activity.

[Question] What were the bases for abolishing the tax on agricultural land?

[Answer] The tax on agricultural land was imposed in accordance with a law promulgated in 1961, replacing the expropriation law, from the negative aspects of which the citizens suffered greatly. Abolishing the tax on agricultural land was done to present a new picture of revolutionary support for the Iraqi farmer. It is a means of ensuring a high degree of flexibility in agricultural production, reducing its costs and facilitating its marketing,

in contrast to the difficulties set forth by the previous law in regard to this production.

Abolishing the tax on lands used for agriculture will raise the productivity level of these lands. It will promote their cultivation, and play a major role in developing the national wealth of the Arab nation in general, and in achieving food self-sufficiency as a step toward achieving surpluses and embarking on exports.

[Question] What are the features of abolishing the tax on residential houses?

[Answer] The goal of abolishing the tax on residential real estate and owner-occupied apartments was to reduce the tax burden on the citizens, to support housing projects, after enlarging the limits on loans from real estate banks and reducing interest rates, and to encourage the private sector to build more housing units and share in making the country prosperous. The goal was for us to encourage owners of investment dwellings to increase their investments in the housing sector by reducing the escalating tax imposed upon the owner's income from commercially invested residential real estate property. The tax exemption has been increased to the first 2000 dinars of income (instead of the first 1000). The escalating percentage has also been reduced with respect to income which exceeds that amount.

The fundamental changes occurring in the standard of living were taken into account on the one hand, and on the other hand, the existence of a number of middle-income families that basically depend for their living on income from small real estate holdings which they own. It must be noted that the maximum tax on real estate income cannot exceed 25 percent of the income, while the maximum income tax can go up to 75 percent.

[Question] What does abolition of income tax pertaining to salaries of officials of the state, socialist sector and the mixed sector mean?

[Answer] This decision is derived from the profound belief that wages set for employees of the state and the socialist and mixed sectors were based fundamentally on the mutual balance between effort expended and the return from this effort. Accordingly, the true estimate must be aimed at fixing the wages without recourse to the tax structure, especially since the wage source is public funds and tax revenue supplies the funds.

This also led to exempting pensions and end-of-service remunerations from income taxes, out of consideration that the pension is the equivalent of recompense for the effort of specific years given on behalf of the state or the socialist sector.

[Question] How have you dealt with the principle of the connection between wages and productivity, so as to avoid the condition of concealed unemployment? Has President Saddam Husayn endorsed this principle?

[Answer] The new budget was based on two differently-oriented principles to deal with this subject. The first direction embraced achieving the highest degree of cooperation between financial planning embodied in specialized agencies within the finance ministry and experts in the various state ministries and offices, to set the employment needs of the state apparatus within a framework of reality based on an objective study of practical needs in terms of various cadres.

The second direction embraced giving the ministers the power to grant specific cash awards to those associated with offices under them who do exceptional work. They were also given the authority to grant office chiefs this same authority within limits which they deem appropriate. The necessary funds were authorized for this in the budget.

I have also planned to initiate the use of a new method during the fiscal year, which entails cooperation with the ministries through carrying out a field survey of their working conditions, for the purpose of getting to know, at first hand, their actual requirements, and the elemental results reflected by those steps, in order to intensify the successful steps and avoid negativism in an interaction which should achieve the highest possible degree of efficiency and effectiveness.

Investment in Human Energy

[Question] Has the new budget dealt to any extent with the requirements to build the new man in Iraq and with human investment?

[Answer] The budget situation is quite clear with respect to this subject, which is one of the main goals of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party and the leadership of the revolution in Iraq, through the high growth rates which the budget granted to the health, education and youth sectors, in comparison to growth rates in allocations for the rest of the state apparatus. At a time in which the growth rates fluctuate in governmental administration allocations between seven and 10 percent, the rates in the aforementioned sectors have risen to between 29 and 53 percent.

The leadership of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party firmly believes that man's wellbeing and raising his standard of living is the primary goal of developmental planning. Man is the material of the revolution, its sensitive nerve and its means of achieving the goals of the Arab Nation in unity, freedom and socialism.

Control in Iraqi and Arab Hands.

[Question] How did the new budget look at the citizen, since he is an important tool for development in socialist planning?

[Answer] Development goals are under the auspices of socialism; the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party and the leadership of the revolution are working toward raising man's standard of living in Iraq and the Arab nation. The

revolutionary leadership strongly believes that there is no true growth unless the elements of national investment are abundantly available for productivity projects, which the development plans include, and unless the actual operation is in Iraqi and Arab hands for the service projects which the government of the revolution constructs in Iraq.

Therefore, both the yearly planning and the ordinary budget concentrated especially on bolstering the human developmental projects from the stage of fighting ignorance to higher university studies within Iraq and abroad, in addition to offering exceptional support for domestic, vocational studies in order to graduate the required number of trained cadres to work on these projects. There was also concentration on improving health and youth services. I do not think it excessive if I say that the Iraqi budget reflects the largest plan in this field at the developing nation level, or even relatively for a number of advanced states.

New Shortening of Routine

[Question] Clearly you have employed many ways to make disbursement from the budget easier, when it is apparent that problems of routine are the predominant characteristic in most Third World countries, and that these problems are largely what hinders the progress of work there.

[Answer] Based on directives from the revolutionary leadership, the ministry of finance, after ample studies, set out to broaden the limits of financial authority belonging to the executive offices, within the framework of the authorized budget and without the need to have recourse to the finance ministry. Previous financial instructions required officials to seek approval from the finance ministry or the cabinet regarding matters of contracts and disbursement when the amounts exceeded specific limits. Ministers were also granted the right to make transfers among the articles of the budget's sections pertaining to their ministries, in order to provide the highest degree of flexibility. Contingency funds were also placed under the minister of finance's authority in order to meet emergency and urgent requests of any of the ministries. We have used new methods to execute the budget and to organize its accounts on the basis of a decentralized system. We have greatly expanded the subsidy for banking services in cases of paying salaries and in many other cases. All of us hope that this integration of financial and accounting planning will be a model to be emulated by the rest of the other countries, since we would be fully prepared to offer our expertise developed in this field to our brother Arabs and to all those who request the benefit of it in sisterly and friendly countries.

7005
CSO: 4802

OIL POLICIES REVIEWED

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 17-23 Mar 80 pp 38-39

[Article: "Awmi Shakir, Iraq's Representative to OPEC, States: 'We Will Market Our Oil Directly, Without Middlemen'"]

[Text] The consideration which the oil-producing nations confront is the need to put an end to the international companies' control over national wealth. This consideration represents the only guarantee of political independence for these nations.

This is because the oil companies have always controlled the size of production in accordance with market conditions and consumer nations' requirements, while the producing nations' interests rank second in importance.

This was the thrust of the lecture at the Iraqi cultural center, delivered by Dr 'Awmi Shakir, chief of the foreign relations office in the Iraqi ministry of oil, and Iraq's representative to OPEC.

Dr Shakir pointed out that Iraq was the first state to enjoy actual control over its petroleum resources in terms of exploration, production and marketing.

International Companies

The old concession contracts granted the international oil companies special political prerogatives. These companies carried out their operations as if they were a state within the state. First priority was paid to foreign interests. Fixing production policies was kept separate from the political situation of the producing nations. In addition to that, the companies tended to increase production in response to requirements in the consumer nations and to reduce it if placed under pressure. As a result of that, prices were fixed in accordance with circumstances which the companies themselves in accordance played a role in determining.

The producing nations feel a special sensitivity regarding that; the ultimate goal was to maintain the oil-exporting nations as producing nations and sources of raw materials, and to prevent any trend toward industrial development.

The importance of that was evident in light of the trend toward dependence on foreign labor in exploratory and production operations, and in avoiding the use of national labor. Dr Shakir stressed that speculation with the levels of national revenue, as a means of applying economic pressure, was one of the methods to which foreign firms resorted.

If the producing nations were concerned with increasing the size of their national reserves and directed investments toward exploratory operations, the companies tended to exploit and develop huge fields and ignore exploration. Dr Shakir referred to the fact that the companies operating in Iraq concentrated on the Basrah and Kirkuk fields. The game of applying the preferential laws entered into that, and they ignored areas in which possibilities of rapid discovery of new wells were slight.

The features of oil policy in Iraq are determined on the basis of giving priority to national and pan-Arab interests. In the field of exploration, national reserves have been at least doubled in 10 years, with the help of national control and expertise. This policy in the field of exploration is concerned with an availability of reserves to meet the national and Arab needs in the first instance, and then the needs of the Third World developing nations.

As for production, Iraq's policy rests on the understanding that, "Oil is a dwindling resource; its use must be on behalf of pan-Arab benefit." Stabilization of the oil market requires a rational production policy, carried out in compliance with legitimate needs, which does not permit huge stockpiles that could be used against the producing nations' best interests. The production policy is concerned with considerations of reducing dependence on oil as a source of energy, and safeguarding its utilization, in order to extend that as long as possible for future generations.

Iraqi policy believes that, despite the approximate 100 percent rise in oil prices during a year in which the state of instability in the marketplace was clearly shown, it is getting close to the true price level. However, the Iraqi viewpoint rejects price leaps and calls for gradual increases in the future, until it reaches the true level.

In view of the 40 percent production increase during the past year, Iraqi oil sources emphasize that this increase was to meet the demand of developing nations. As a result of this increased production, Iraq is earning additional cash income, which will share in fulfilling the development plans' requirements. Iraqi sources deny that this increase in production was for the benefit of industrial nations or to build a strategic stockpile to be used to apply pressure on behalf of reducing oil prices. On the contrary, Iraq's viewpoint is to work toward marketing its petroleum products directly to the ultimate consumer, outside of the international companies' channels and the spot market. Iraqi dealings in the oil market will be directly with national firms in the consumer nations.

Furthermore, oil profits are being used in Iraq to develop the other industrial sectors and to build petroleum industries, such as petrochemical industries,

and to use that to train the national labor force to acquire modern skills. With respect to the increase in cash profits from oil production, Iraq is earmarking 30 percent for long-term investment on behalf of future generations. The remainder will be used for domestic economic development, and for assistance and loans being offered to the Third World developing nations.

One cannot separate Iraq's method with respect to the use of oil profits from its viewpoint regarding investments abroad. Dr Shakir stressed that the value of investments in Western nations would be subject to erosion because of the decline in currency values as well as inflation. That occurs as a result of restrictions imposed by Western nations regarding fields to which these investments can be directed. They are restricted, for the most part, in the area of banking reserves, which are also subject to freeze in the event of political pressure, as happened with regard to Iran's assets in American banks.

As regards pricing policies, Iraq confirms that its position is to concentrate on setting "fair and reasonable" prices. This implies that these prices be equal to the true value of a barrel of oil, in light of the prices of other alternatives, and also embraces compensation for inflation and the decline in currency values. Dr Shakir pointed out that the leap in prices during 1979 was the result of two factors: first, the actual value of oil prices in 1978 was less than comparable ones in 1974; and second, oil dealers exploiting the black market for advantage, and their desire to achieve huge profits before price increases. That happened despite the decrease of Iranian oil production and the subsequent compensation for that in the production of several other OPEC nations.

Relations With Consumers

Apart from granting assistance to developing nations, which constitute a segment of the oil consumers, relations with the industrialized nations are taking another form. Iraq is aware that it is a nation belonging to the Third World and has an interest in establishing a new world economic order. That constitutes a basic element in relations between Iraq and the industrialized nations. Therefore, Iraq thinks that any guaranty of rapprochement between the industrialized nations and the oil producing nations, for the purpose of assuring oil imports for the industrialized nations, must take into account that the oil producing nations are developing nations in need of the technology owned by the industrialized nations. Therefore, relations between the industrialized nations and the oil producing nations must be within a world framework which represents the Third World nations as a whole, including the oil nations on one hand and the industrialized nations on the other.

The exchange of viewpoints between the two sides should be on this basis, without priority being given to the needs of one of the two sides at the expense of the other sides' requirements. In this regard, Iraq calls for the rapid transfer of technology to the Third World, and for an end to discrimination against the importation of non-petroleum raw materials from the Third World.

BRIEFS

EXECUTION REPORT--More than 100 persons have been executed in Iraq since the beginning of March, asserts Amnesty International in a communique published on Thursday, 17 April, in Stockholm. The organization sent a telegram to President Saddam Hussein to express its deep uneasiness in the face of this "wave of executions." Among the 100 victims are, according to Amnesty International, 45 soldiers shot and about 60 Shi'ites. These executions are "the response of the Iraqi Government to growing opposition activities, which for several months have taken an increasingly violent form, especially with the attack in April against a deputy prime minister of the government," says the communique. [Text] [Paris LE MONDE in French 19 Apr 80 p 7] 9545

CSO: 4800

OPPOSITION LEADER DEFINES PEACE STANCE

Paris L'ARCHE in French May 80 pp 27-29

[Interview of Shimon Peres, Israeli opposition leader, at the headquarters of the Workers' Party in Tel Aviv by Andre Scemama]

[Text] [Question] The party of which you are the leader governed the State from its birth in 1948 until the 1977 elections, and for 3 years you have been in opposition. On this 32d anniversary of Israel, with tremors shaking the Begin government, do you think you will return to power before long?

[Answer] I am no astrologist. Moreover, it is difficult to predict. But, according to all public opinion surveys, if general elections were held today in Israel the Workers Party and the Labor Alignment would receive more than 50 percent of the vote. This would be unprecedented in the history of the State of Israel. In addition to opinion polls, more than five by-elections have recently been held in Israel and we have won all of them.

Necessary Majority

[Question] Might a coalition led by the Labor Party give a portfolio to Ezer Weizman, who in his latest statements has supported several of your positions?

[Answer] Above all, we ask the people to give us a majority. The country needs to finally have a government based on a solid majority, so that it will not be restricted by all the combinations and dispensations which formation of a coalition requires. That would also avoid, and this is very important, all the individual quarrels, and I believe we will obtain a majority. As for the choice of members of the government, these individuals will have to accept the terms of a national common program. The issue is not choosing this or that individual, but the content of the political program. In my view, there is no reason to exclude Ezer Weizman and I would be very happy to see him in the government.

[Question] Would a crossover by Weizman to your side also cause others to leave Likud and follow?

[Answer] I have no idea. I believe our position is strong enough as it is.

Limits To National Consensus

[Question] There has been much talk about a broad national consensus on a large number of points. What are the limits of this consensus?

[Answer] We share identical views with the Likud on a number of points: no Palestinian state; no negotiations with the PLO; preserving a unified city of Jerusalem and obtaining defensible security frontiers.

There are also fundamental points upon which we don't agree, for instance, we are absolutely opposed to the inclusion within the boundaries of Israel of 1,200,000 Arabs against their will. This, in our opinion, would imperil the Jewish and democratic character of our state and, in order to avoid that, we are ready to renounce some of the territories on which these Arabs live. On this point, our view and Likud's diverge completely.

[Question] By renouncing populated territories and keeping the remainder, do you think that Arabs and Americans will understand your position better?

[Answer] In the first place, if we are ready to renounce some territories it is because we think this is to Israel's benefit, and I presume that this will facilitate the pursuit of peace negotiations. Another point of divergence which separates us from the Likud involves the settlements issue, because we do think that these settlements must respond only to security imperatives. Between the Arabs and us there is no religious confrontation, there is only confrontation between two peoples, the Arab people and the Jewish people who both have rights in this country. We must not forget that the Jews have only one state and the Arabs 22 states. Just as we don't want the Arabs to destroy the only extant Jewish state, nor do we accept that this Jewish state commit suicide by doing things incompatible with its interests. I repeat that our attitude is not governed by our concern to please this group or that. We have been attacked, and our elementary right is to assure our defense. The Americans, for instance, have accepted that we keep our army along the banks of the Jordan, and as far as I know, neither the Americans nor the Egyptians have called on us to dismantle the establishments which we have created.

[Question] It has always been said that you head a loyal opposition. Yet, since a few days ago, following announcement of your meeting with Carter in particular, you have been judged less loyal...

[Answer] This is nonsense. No foreign opposition leader visits Israel without being received by Begin; and when Begin was in opposition he never failed to visit those foreign leaders who wanted to receive him.

Israel and the Diaspora

[Question] Shimon Peres, in your opinion, what should be the diaspora's attitude toward Israel? Should this diaspora be committed to Israel's side, and what form should this commitment take?

[Answer] According to the terms of the Independence Charter, the State of Israel belongs to the whole Jewish people and to the citizens who live in Israel. We regard the Jews of the diaspora as partners in the construction of Eretz-Israel, and I think that there is reason for satisfaction with that collaboration, which should continue to grow. We need the overseas Jews just as they need us. There is no meaning to Jewish life without Israel, just as there can be no meaning to Israeli life if Israel does not concern itself with world Judaism.

[Question] French Judaism is very unhappy with the attitude of the French government on the Israeli-Arab conflict. In your opinion, how should French Jews react?

[Answer] I think that they are right to be worried about the present policy of the French government. I profoundly admire the courageous attitude of the Jews of France, who have not concealed their solidarity with Israel, and I think that they should continue to proclaim this solidarity.

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CSO: 4800

GAZA RESIDENTS SPEAK OUT ON FUTURE OF STRIP

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 15 Apr 80 p 19

[Article by Ezra Yanov: "'Blood Will Be Spilled In Gaza If Israelis Leave Strip Suddenly,' Say Residents"]

[Text] In the refugee camps, some want to be "forced into" elections to establish their own leadership. Others say, "Only Arafat is our father." "We want to live side by side, Jews and Arabs, if we can have a state," says a member of a family which supports Sadat's policy.

Let us suppose that one day the residents of Gaza wake up in the morning, and there are no Israelis around. In 24 hours, the local leaders must organize an independent government. What would happen?

The answer of Gaza residents: "Blood would be spilled in Gaza." An official, Riyadh, who has been involved in administration for 10 years, says in fluent Hebrew: "It would be better to leave the situation as it is. It is better to have the Israelis than to be left here in confusion. That is no way to establish a state. There would just be conflict and acts of violence."

A leftist lawyer who supports the PLO says, "You have done us injustice for 12 years. Since we have not had elections in Gaza, the leaders of the old generation from the Mandate period have remained. The exodus of the Israelis would be likely to place them in power as a matter of course, but, actually, the majority of the population does not want them and does not identify with them." As an example, he points to the change in leadership in Judea and Samaria following municipal elections.

Egyptian Influence

The pro-PLO lawyer and his friend, the principal of an elementary school for girls, explain: "You Israelis have not changed anything and have not advanced things. Actually, the mayors have not changed since the Egyptian period. If, in Gaza, Rashid al-Shawwa were not mayor at the time of the Egyptians, you would have chosen him because he is easygoing and more respected than other leaders. But who has asked whether the people want leaders like these?"

These two also fear that if "the Israelis leave suddenly," Gaza will have a period of "organizing" which is likely to be accompanied by bloodshed.

A member of the Abu Warda family in Gaza, a family well known for its open support of President Sadat's policy as far as the fate and future of the Gaza Strip is concerned, said this: "Prime Minister Begin's autonomy plan is not a possibility, and would not be accepted in the Gaza Strip. But President Sadat's plan, including the "Gaza first" part is likely to be accepted. Therefore, the scenario of Israel's sudden exodus is not likely to frighten the Gaza Strip population. The Egyptian influence exists and will grow stronger. Therefore, those opposed to Egypt will not dare to appear openly and demand political dominion over the void that will be created. The people of Gaza like the Egyptians more than they have told you." He reminds us that every family on the Gaza Strip has a relative living in Egypt. It is hard to break such ties.

We pointed out to this member of the honored Abu Warda family in Gaza that the mayor, Rashid al-Shawwa, "the strong man" of the Gaza Strip, also rejects President Sadat's autonomy plan, because it separates the Strip from Judaea and Samaria. The mayor has emphasized once more that he would reject any autonomy plan for the Gaza Strip which did not promise the Palestinians self-rule and total independence, including the establishment of the hoped for Palestinian State.

Another member of the Abu Warda family, lawyer Muhammed Abu Warda, whose brother met with a representative of the Egyptian embassy in Israel about the possibility of a visit by the Egyptian ambassador to Gaza, says: "We must first define who we are. While identification papers will I keep in my pocket? Here and in all the occupied territories, the entire nation wants a Palestinian State. Not only the PLO or al-Shawwa want this. We can live side by side, Jews and Arabs, if we can have a state alongside the State of Israel."

New Leadership

Like others, he denies the image produced by many Israelis and by the media. He says: "They make it seem as though the entire Gaza Strip is centered around the leadership of people like Rashid al-Shawwa, on the one hand, and Dr Haydar Abd al-Shafi, on the other. If elections were held, it would reveal that a new generation of leaders exists in the region."

"We reject elections for autonomy according to what Begin wants," they say in Gaza. "We oppose the establishment of autonomy, Israeli-style, and the idea of living in freedom under Israeli rule. What would we be accomplishing? It would just be a continuation of the Israeli occupation."

The youth from the refugee camps whom I spoke to at the crossroads as they were waiting for a lift to work in Israel want elections. "There should be municipal elections and village council elections as is done on the

West Bank," say the brothers Fahid and Hamid Al Shuka from Jabila. In the largest refugee camp, there are 36,000 people. There is no municipal or village council. They would be willing, if Israel pressured them, to establish a village council, "on condition that the refugees could for once choose their own leaders."

Fahid and Hamid's friends laugh and tell them they should not think that way. "We have a father of our own. We have our own leader, Arafat. We do not need these leaders here."

A refugee from Camp Shati in Gaza, who wanted to remain anonymous, says that "you must open the door to the refugees to take control of the Gaza Strip, because they are the majority and they have suffered more for the Palestinian State." His brother is being held in an Israeli prison. He was sentenced to 12 years, and there are 4 years left till his release.

People from various circles in Gaza say that the leadership of Dr Haydar Abd al-Shafi is being eroded. Shafi is the head of the organization, the Red Crescent, on the Gaza Strip. He is seen as the leader of the extremist left pro-PLO faction in Gaza. For 2 months, Dr Haydar has not called together the leadership of the Red Crescent in Gaza. There are those who say that he fears being ousted.

On the one hand, the sector of the population led by Dr Haydar Abd al-Shafi has no way of preventing the normalization of relations from taking place between Israel and Egypt, nothing to oppose the influence of the open border with Egypt or the granting of permission at the end of the month to the Palestinians who are residents of the occupied territories to come to Egypt without visas.

Egyptian statements about the beginning of autonomy, even "if Gaza is forced to be first," and the desire to establish an Egyptian liaison office in Gaza, weaken the position of the Leftist-PLO faction of Dr Haydar. Even since the campaign of incitements of the Moslem extremist circles against him, Dr Haydar Abd al-Shafi has been more isolated than any leader in the region.

The Religious and the Secular Groups

In opposition to him, the strength of Shaykh Awad, the extremist religious leader, has grown. At a time when these factions are divided among themselves in struggles over religion and secularism, they do not have time for struggles against normalization, autonomy, and the Israeli policy in the region. In such a situation, it is easy for Egypt to weave a dream of increased influence in Gaza and to take advantage of a situation of weakening of the local leadership to pick the fruit of the Sadat initiative to establish autonomy. This would resemble almost completely the situation on the Gaza Strip at the beginning of the '60's. Privately, everyone rejects Sadat's plan for "Gaza first." Openly, however, almost no one dares to reject this Egyptian initiative. Thus, they find leaders like Dr Haydar and others, and wait for the future in silence.

WHAT WILL D'ESTAING'S VISIT ACCOMPLISH

Jerusalem AL-SHA'B in Arabic 10 Mar 80 pp 1, 5

[Editorial: "The Significance of D'Estaing's Tour"]

[Text] The important significance of the visit of French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing is that it is suitable in principle to work for establishment of a clearly defined Palestinian strategy, initially in the Arab world and then internationally.

The many positive aspects of President d'Estaing's declarations, which have been to a large extent tailor-made to conform to the political attitudes of the countries he has visited, cannot hide the evils of certain Arab regimes with regard to their attitude toward our [Palestinian] people's cause and right of self-determination, unless these declarations lead to an emphatic definition of all issues connected with this cause.

The French President stopped at many points, including Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates [UAE] and to Jordan. In the light of the joint declarations issued in these countries, we can predict what he will probably say in Saudi Arabia, his last stop.

We find the courage which distinguished the Kuwaiti-French declaration to be a very positive step, even if it will not fulfill the just and fundamental Palestinian demand, namely the establishment of a free Palestine under the leadership of the PLO.

It is even reached the point where some of us have said that France's recognition of the right of our people to self-determination would be the beginning of other closely patterned acknowledgments from other European countries.

We are not overlooking the fact that certain Arab regimes are intent on continuing to usurp the Palestinian identity or to claim the right to represent our people, in spite of the fact that most of the world's countries have recognized the sole legitimate representative [the PLO] of this people.

Much remains to be said in this regard in due course. Nevertheless we affirm that adoption of a limited strategy in the Arab and International domains, will safeguard Palestinian representation and independence. It will close the door to every presumptuous attempt to abuse our cause and our people.

As for d'Estaing, for the duration of his Arab tour, we extend greetings.

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CSO: 4802

CARTER'S POLICY SEEN AS CONTINUING TO PLUNDER ARAB WORLD

Jerusalem AL-SHA'B in Arabic 25 Jan 80 pp 1,3

[Editorial: "Carter Declares War"]

[Text] Since his arrival at the White House on the 20th of January 1977, American President Jimmy Carter has pursued a policy of a return to cold war and tension in the world.

Carter, in pursuing this policy, has been complying with the interests of American financial and industrial monopolies which helped him leap from his peanut farms in the State of Georgia, deep in the American south, to Washington. These monopolies were frightened by the defeat that American imperialism has sustained in Vietnam and Cambodia and in many African countries. These monopolies were frightened also by the fear-complex that had been sown in the American public, the fear of getting involved in the outside world, following the death of tens of thousands of Americans in Vietnam. They also felt that the relaxed mood on the international scene, which the United States had to accept, adversely affected their profits, particularly in the sphere of solidifying their grip on the resources of the developing countries and in the sphere of exporting arms to areas where tension exists.

During the past three years, Carter has attempted to exploit every opportunity to contribute to a tense atmosphere on the international scene. We all remember how he invented, last summer, the story of Soviet troops in Cuba, and how he later denied his lie.

And now it appears that the planners of American policy feel that there exists an auspicious opportunity to strengthen their authority in the world, particularly in the Middle East. Carter's new attack which came in his speech yesterday seems to focus on several points. Some of these, relevant to our area, may be set forth as follows:

--Attempting to sabotage the work of the national movement for freedom in the area through the brandishing of imaginary dangers. Washington believes that this sort of agitation would be capable of disrupting the work of the freedom movement which is essentially anti-imperialistic.

--Containing the effects of the Islamic revolution in Iran by using Islam itself as a cover for Washington's movements. Washington believes that this will make it possible to neutralize the Arab national factions, and, at the same time, afford a suitable cover for reactionary countries to strengthen their ties with Washington.

Within this context, we can account for the surprising wave of faith and religious sentiment which has overwhelmed many reactionary countries in response to the happenings in Afghanistan. In this context also, the Islam-Abad Conference seems to be an exemplary American creation, the purpose of which is to build a new pro-American alliance which will also necessarily be pro-Israel, pro-Sadat and essentially anti-Soviet Union.

The primary and fundamental objective of this American initiative is to assure that imperialism will continue to plunder our nations' wealth and to silence any national movement striving against Washington.

Carter officially proclaimed war yesterday on all Arab and Moslem nations by announcing that America is prepared to intervene militarily in the Gulf if her interests were endangered.

Arab countries must be attentive to this serious proclamation, and must begin a search for better methods of counter-action in their struggle for life and existence.

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CSO: 4802

AMERICA URGED TO CHANGE ITS POLICIES

Jerusalem AL'QUDS in Arabic 25 Jan 80 p 1

(Text) International peace and security these days stand at crossroads. This is because the world, as a whole, and hot spots like the Middle East in particular, have become a battleground for rivalry between the two super-powers nearing the point of fatal confrontation.

The warning that the American President Jimmy Carter directed at the Soviet Union, in that he would use military strength if the Soviets attempted to intervene in the Arabian Gulf, adds to international tension. For military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Arabian Gulf would spark off a third world war. However, if Carter's warning is aimed at extending his popularity in the American presidential election year, he is mistaken, because his people have had enough of wars, and have not forgotten the Vietnam crisis and the woes it brought on America.

President Carter must put American foreign policy right so that it does not shake the peace in the Middle East. He must likewise reconsider American policy in the area, a policy which ignores the Arab position and refuses to acknowledge the rights of the Palestinian people and their aspirations for liberty and for self-determination on their own soil.

The United States has been lucky so far in that it has dealings with some Arab countries who, quite unfortunately, do not know how to use international developments to achieve a just solution for the Palestinian question. These countries do not know how to benefit from such developments and how to use them as instruments of pressure to effect a change in American policy so as to make it see reason and cease from siding with Israel. In this way Americans would see that their own interests lie in changing their policy and strategy so as to place these on new bases of wisdom, neutrality and far-sightedness.

SAUDI ARABIA AT ISLAMABAD SEEN MORE AMERICAN THAN CARTER

Jerusalem AL-SHA'B in Arabic 29 Jan 80 p 1

[Editorial: "Observations in Bad Times"]

[Text] What can we say about Saudi Arabia's proposal, made at the Islamabad Conference, to use oil as a weapon against the Soviet Union?

Shall this make us again ask the very simple question: Why is it [not] proposed that oil be used as a weapon against the United States?"

Over many years in the past, the Saudi leaders were always bent on refusing to use oil as a political weapon, justifying this on their claim of anxiety concerning world economy. In reality they were only anxious that the ailing imperialist economy should not fare worse. They were anxious to stay in power so as to continue plundering the wealth of our Arab peoples in the interest of the United States.

During many years in the past, the leaders of Saudi Arabia did nothing but issue some empty pronouncements indicating their phoney concern regarding the holy places in Jerusalem and the occupied land. When the events in Afghanistan took place, Saudi Arabia flexed its muscles and assumed the role of protector of Afghan moslems. Moreover, the proposals and the actions undertaken by Saudi Arabia against the Soviet Union show her to be more American than Jimmy Carter. At the same time, Saudi Arabia is cooperating with Washington against the Islamic revolution in Iran and has induced a country such as Tunisia to vote in the Security Council in favor of political sanctions against revolutionary Iran.

What can we say? Shall we say that impudence and attempting to fool the Arabs, which Anwar al-Sadat has dedicated as examples in political activity, are justified to be initiated without restriction by all Americanized, reactionary organizations?

Shall we say that the Arab circus, thanks to al-Sadat who boasted to Saudi Arabia yesterday that he is more pro-American, now presents the worst of its programs, the most dangerous and the most repugnant?

AREA PEACE DEPENDS ON ISRAEL DESISTING FROM ADVENTURES IN LEBANON

Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 8 Feb 80 p 1

[Editorial: "Will Lebanon Pay for Failures of Others"]

[Text] Lebanon has been bleeding for more than six years, with other Arab countries making a show of their compassion without extending any help. And now Lebanon is facing a tough test following the decision of Damascus to pull out its forces from Beirut and its surroundings. For this country, famous for its discord, lacks an authority strong enough to enforce the law and maintain security. And so, every armed person there has become a state within a state in the absence of discipline and stability which are essential to any country.

The Syrian move, coming at the wrong time, since Lebanon has not managed to form an army capable of playing an effective role in maintaining security, was actually imposed on Syria by the sensitive situation created on its front with Israel. Thus, Syria has had to redeploy her forces in Lebanon in order to be able to face anticipated moves on the part of Israel.

The mounting tension between Syria and Israel lately has led to an exchange of accusations with regard to "aggressive" intentions. Thus, Israel, having learned that Syria had received immense amounts of Soviet arms, warned Syria lest it entertain any thought of attacking the Israeli front. Then, Damascus accused the Israeli leaders of preparing to undertake "aggression" against Syria and to create an excuse for a military blow-up.

Israel, which justifies intervention against Lebanon on the basis of concern for the Christians there, warned through Prime Minister Menahem Begin yesterday that Israel would not stay put if the Christian Community in Lebanon were exposed to danger, and that this commitment applied to the whole of Lebanon, not just the south.

Will the happenings in Lebanon spark off a military confrontation between Syria and Israel? Will such a confrontation be confined in one front or will it extend elsewhere? Should one believe the predictions of Harold Brown, the American secretary of defense, that a departure of Syrian forces from Lebanese cities would lead to a general deterioration in the Middle

East and could even lead to clashes and a total confrontation between Syria and Israel? Finally, is Lebanon always destined to pay for the failure of others to find a comprehensive, just and peaceful solution for the Palestinian problem? Has not Lebanon sacrificed enough, following the disintegration of Arab unity?

Lebanon and the [Middle East] area as a whole would be saved from the spectre and woes of war if Israel would heed the voice of reason and logic, desist from any adventure that would crush hopes for a just peace, and stop denying the legal rights of the Palestinian people.

9378

CSO: 4802

AMERICA, ISRAEL SEEN AS SEEKING NEW TROUBLE IN LEBANON

Jerusalem AL-SHA'B in Arabic 6 Feb 80 p 1

[Editorial: "A Dubious Concern"]

[Text] The concern of America and Israel with what is happening on Lebanese soil leaves one convinced that American imperialism is determined to ignite new civil strife in Lebanon aimed primarily against the Palestinian entity, and directed, secondarily, at the hard line the Syrians have adopted toward the Camp David agreements and overall American policy in the Middle East.

It is not difficult for America to create more than one Sa'ad Haddad in more places than the "south" of Lebanon.

The media of Israeli propaganda, which the latest Syrian operations have amply supplied with headlines, contradict themselves daily. This is so, because policy makers in Washington and Tel-Aviv have been preparing to strike another blow at Lebanon ever since Israeli occupation forces left Lebanon in March 1978. and do not want to miss the opportunity to do it.

But then any new invasion will mean that the whole area will explode. Will Washington comprehend this before Tel-Aviv does?

9378

CSO: 4802

MOSHE DAYAN: 'ONLY CONSISTENT POLICY CAN ENSURE LAW, ORDER'

Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 20 May 80 p 10

[Text]

ONLY A CONSISTENT policy on the West Bank and in Gaza can ensure law and order, says Moshe Dayan, who, as defence minister, was responsible for enlightened military rule between 1967 and 1974.

Tough measures should be pursued to crush all disturbers of the peace, he said irrespective of what Europe and the UN might have to say.

However, indiscriminate punitive action must be carefully avoided. And care must be taken to avoid hurting anyone willing to keep public order.

Dayan was talking in an exclusive Shavuoet interview with *The Jerusalem Post* and *"Yediot Aharonot."*

Irrespective of President Sadat's hot-and-cold technique in the autonomy talks, Dayan was more convinced than ever before that Israel's tactics were wrong, and that Sadat had no mandate to speak for either King Hussein or the Palestinians.

His attitude to trouble-makers in the territories was epitomized in the earthy Spanish proverb he quoted. Better, the proverb said, to stamp out a field of thorns with one's bare feet before they had grown; later, they would resist a herd of elephants. Remarking on the threat of a PLO spokesman to "make Israel's life a hell," Dayan said the tables must be turned. If PLO people made trouble, their lives must be made hellish.

By way of preamble, Dayan spoke about his visit to the mortally ill ex-Mayor of Hebron, Sheikh Mohammed Ali Ja'abari. He had been disgusted to hear that attendants at the funeral of the Kiryat

Arba victims had gone on a rampage, and broken the windows of the Ja'abari home. The 90-year-old man is paralysed and dying. Dayan was appalled that no one in authority had the decency to call on the old man and express Israel's revulsion at what had happened.

"I wished to express my shame. I won't comment on what the military governor has or has not done, or whether he should have gone to see the old man.

"My visit was more than just a private event, although I went as a private person. I insisted on not having an official escort, for I wanted to avoid official overtones.

"My visit was authorized during the curfew and I was warmly received by the entire family assembled at the bedside. We only had coffee, and I declined their invitation for lunch.

"I kissed Ja'abari on both cheeks and presented him with a cake Rachel (Mrs. Dayan) had baked. He certainly took in what I said, and his relatives were able to interpret his reactions."

Dayan was accompanied by Jerusalem District Commissioner Rafi Levi, who was born in Hebron, knows its people well, and speaks their dialect. Levi had assisted Dayan from 1967 in his contacts with the Hebron leadership.

WHEN DAYAN asked them whether there was anything he could do to help, they said all Hebronites suffered from the curfew, but the poor most of all.

He noted at this point that thousands of Hebronites had moved to Jerusalem since 1967, and the Ja'abari family told him some of

them wanted to send food for the Hebron poor. He explained he could hardly get involved in military government affairs. However, he asked them whether he could bring a specialist from Israel or elsewhere for their father.

They did try to discuss the present position but he said he was merely a private person and would not be into discussion.

Dayan's face shone with pleasure as he spoke fondly of his ties with the Ja'abari family. The old man had once visited his Zahala home, and he had invited the family again to visit him.

He certainly did not accept any attempt to equate the Hebron killings with the terrorist raid on Magav Am. Dayan had heard nothing that would link the killings with the cabinet's decision to settle Jews in the heart of Hebron. "However, my sources said there was no certainty there was not a connection," he added.

He stressed how wrong he thought the authorities had been in not ejecting at the start the Kiryat Arba squatters from the Old Hadasah building in Hebron.

He believed the terrorist act was the work of a local gang; it recalled the murder of the soldier in Hebron market.

HE AGREED that the situation in the territories had seriously deteriorated.

In the past, the West Bank leadership had often claimed they could not prevent terrorism. "When Ja'abari was mayor of Hebron, and during Elias Freij's earlier incumbency at Bethlehem, that was certainly the case."

However, attitudes had become radicalized and the official leaders have not condemned stone-throwing, tyre-burning, business strikes and inflammatory speeches. In Dayan's opinion, the established leaders cannot claim they are unable to establish who was behind the violence. They could take preventive steps if they wished.

The former defence minister found it repugnant that Israeli soldiers should have to chase teenage trouble-makers. This would make for ridicule; the local people should tackle the problem.

However, motivation for such preventive or punitive action hinged on the prevailing social climate.

The authorities must make it clear to the mayors and other local authorities that the damage will be greater for them in the long run. "They have to realise that their disturbances of the peace won't make the IDF leave the area, or result in a Palestinian state."

He remarked, with much firmness, that "If the PLO wanted to make life hell for Israel, then they should discover that terror will make their lives hellish."

DAYAN HAD some indications that PLO-inspired unrest was affecting local people negatively. He had information that wealthy West Bankers were transferring their capital elsewhere, and skilled people were moving to other countries in search of regular work.

"They must realise that they can allow things to deteriorate to the degree where local people will sell off their land and leave, thereby impoverishing the region."

No, he would certainly not call it anything as dramatic as "civil rebellion." Israeli life certainly was not affected. Even if some Arab labourers stayed away from work, they had little influence on the economy.

Dayan referred to wider developments in order to understand the changed West Bank climate. There had been a radicalization throughout the Arab world; strong xenophobic trends had culminated in Khomeinism. Even Sadat, in his latest speech, had found it necessary to emphasize the Moslem character of Egypt, and to come out against the Copts.

Dayan had observed signs of this trend for some time in Egypt, for instance in the refusal to allow the U.S. to use the Sinai bases.

The 1980s had begun with the legitimization of the use of force for political purposes, whether with local Palestinians, the Russians in Afghanistan or Khomeini in Iran.

IN SPITE of the enlightened administration of the territories throughout the period 1967-77, the past three years had been dominated by inconsistencies. The Bassam Shak'a case had epitomized the off-on policy.

He pointed to an underlying cause for the present situation. Matters had been aggravated by the weak Israeli response to tyre-burning

and stone-throwing. Israel had also to tread softly during the negotiations with Egypt in order to prove its good will. In addition, a new generation of militant West Bank leaders had come to the fore in the last municipal elections. Then there were two opposing interpretations of autonomy. Israel talked about self-rule, the Arabs about self-determination.

A boundary line had been crossed when political activism had deteriorated into acts of violence. Some had been committed by local gangs; others originated with the PLO outside Israel. While he preferred not to speak in terms of "civil rebellion," Dayan saw indications of even less appetizing trends.

Mayors and other local leaders must be held responsible for all acts of disorder because it was in their power to stop them, he said sternly.

He would have acted firmly, and if necessary he would have expelled agitators. However, care must be taken not to harm the innocent, and a clear distinction must be made in punitive action. There should be no wholesale collective punishment of an entire region. Punishment should be more selective. If Hebron misbehaved, then its people must be taught a lesson, but that did not mean sanctions should be imposed on Tulkarm.

"The mayor of Nablus will see to it that peace and order are restored if the town's truck drivers complain at Town Hall that they have been forbidden to ply the route across the Allenby Bridge into Jordan, and their business had gone to the drivers of Tulkarm."

As for acts of civil disobedience among Israelis, and provocation by Jews, he would take very strict measures. He would forbid unauthorized settlements.

If charges were justified, then he approved the detention of Meir Kahane. At any rate, all measures must be adapted to exigencies, Dayan stressed.

NO, HE WOULD not say things had passed the point of no return, though they were bad enough.

What worried him particularly was the change in public climate in the West Bank. This must be rectified, even if harsh measures were needed. The local leadership must be confronted with the consequences of resorting to political action.

If they opted for violence, then strong measures had to be taken. For instance, "I would not hesitate to block windows facing on to an entire street in order to make it safe for Israeli and Arab vehicles to travel along it. Even if the Europeans, the Americans and the UN make a fuss, we should persist."

Dayan stressed that his proposal for unilateral action in the West Bank, that is, the removal of military government, still held good. Hebron and Halhul were two test cases. Neither of them had a mayor at the moment. Israel could approach the local leadership, and urge them to take over their own affairs, otherwise an IDF officer would be put in charge. They themselves could inform the Gaza leadership of Israel's readiness to withdraw its army from the town, and allow them to run their own affairs. The condition would be that they did not provide bases for terrorists and prevented stone-throwing and road-blocks.

HE TURNED to the autonomy talks. The man who, as foreign minister, had most to do with bringing the peace negotiations to a successful conclusion, found much wanting in Israel's tactics. He noted sarcastically that Interior Minister Yosef Burg's pronouncements of progress in the autonomy talks had worn quite thin with the approach of their first anniversary. He sounds less and less optimistic of late. Dr. Burg looks increasingly like the White Queen in "Alice Through the Looking Glass," the character who had to run so much in order to stay in the same spot.

It was poor negotiating technique for six ministers to participate in the talks. Dayan thought that better results were achieved either by the Kissinger method or else as at Camp David, where Premier Begin had often left matters to Defence Minister Ezer Weisman and himself.

Collective negotiations were neither effective nor likely to produce results. "It's too ponderous a process. As a rule, the negotiating team should consist of either one or two people. If he or they haven't the authority to conclude the deal, then at least he/they should display flexibility, and put forward his/their proposals. When six at the table

watch each other. It's impossible to reach any kind of collective conclusion. I warned Begin right from the start it wouldn't work."

Dayan certainly thought autonomy should be implemented. But this was to beg the question, for it was uncertain whether Egypt had the authority to conduct the negotiations.

At Camp David, agreement had been reached on the assumption that either the Palestinians or King Hussein would eventually participate, or authorize Sadat to speak for them. This had not happened.

"Sadat told us that if Hussein wouldn't come, 'I have the power to speak on his behalf.' To my way of thinking he does not have a mandate to speak for them."

"If we do achieve a deal with Egypt, does that commit Hussein or the Palestinians? Look how he lambastes the other Arab rulers and closes down their embassies. No, I don't think he has any mandate from them."

DAYAN REMARKED mockingly:

"(U.S. special envoy Sai) Linaurita reaches an agreement with Burg. So what? The next question will be: What is the point of the exercises we have conducted with the Egyptians if it does not commit the Palestinians?"

"The Egyptians are certainly aware of this state of affairs. Cairo and Washington will then insist that Israel does something to make the proposal more attractive to the Palestinians. This means that they will break out of the Camp David framework and arrive at something quite different."

"That is totally unacceptable to Israel."

Dayan noted that when Shimon Peres emerged from his meeting with President Jimmy Carter at the White House, he hurriedly announced Labour's readiness to negotiate with Jordan, an offer shot down by Hussein 34 hours later.

"All the Hashemite king wants is to get everything, including East Jerusalem, and just come to the table to sign the receipt."

ISRAEL

SADAT'S MUCH TOUGHER LINE

Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 20 May 80 p 10

[Text] Moshe Dayan believes that President Sadat's recent speech is the harbinger of a much tougher Egyptian line.

Asked whether Sadat's hardening position was a function of internal and external difficulties or part of a grand design, he said the Egyptian president was under pressure from home and abroad, and he was seeking ways to demonstrate Egypt's Arabist nature.

"All of a sudden, out of the blue, he singles out the Copts, emphasizing that Egypt is a Moslem nation."

Dayan also believes that Sadat is striving, by raising the temperature, to exert pressure on the U.S. to persuade Israel not to take such steps as legislating on Jerusalem and establishing more settlements in the territories.

His speech was an expression of his extremely difficult position, with no other Arab country supporting him, and Dayan believes that Israel should take Sadat's warnings most seriously: "I take him to be signalling that he is in great distress in his isolation in the Arab world, and all the steps he has taken so far to establish a rapprochement with the other Arab countries have failed."

That was also the reason for the latest changes in his government: "Thus, I expect him to become a much tougher partner in the autonomy negotiations, putting much harder demands to us," Dayan predicted.

While he does not expect Sadat to cancel the peace process, Dayan will not be surprised if the Egyptians make many more difficulties about the details and contents of the peace agreement.

What worries the former foreign minister is the spate of reports about the dismissals of Egyptian officials who have been in close contact with Israelis over the peace process.

All told, he predicts a much tougher Egyptian negotiating partner when the talks are resumed.

'AL-SHA'B' QUESTIONS ISLAMIC CONFERENCE

Jerusalem AL-SHA'B in Arabic 6 Mar 80 pp 1, 3

[Editorial: "A Real Test"]

[Text] Two months ago a feverish concern for the welfare of Islam gained ground in circles of the American government. Its effects have spread to the reactionary countries in both Asia and the Arab world. We have begun to witness a "show of force" operation employed by the United States to support its military presence in the Arab sea and near the oil fields.

In the following weeks puppets of American imperialism competed with each other to sound alarm bells of danger and to call for a unified Islamic position. They organized a conference in Islamabad, the principal aim of which was to give further support to the policy of the U.S.

In response to these events, the PLO invited the Islamic nations to convene a conference to discuss the alarmingly dangerous American position on Jerusalem and Arab occupied lands. This constitutes a realistic test of the earnestness of those regimes who claim concern for Islam and of their willingness to confront Washington's position.

Carter has already indisputably made it apparent that his government supports the Israeli settlements policy as well as Israel's attitude toward the Holy City. As a result, he has directed a strong challenge to all Muslims and Christians.

We are certain that the Arab regimes will hesitate to respond to the PLO invitation, and that they will look for excuses to justify their inability and unwillingness to sever their ties with American imperialism.

In any case, this is a suitable opportunity to unmask all misleading propaganda, and to force all parties to clearly define their position. Thus, [each regime] has to reveal that it is on the side of [American] imperialism which announced that its vote at the Security Council was a mistake "which will never happen again," or it has to reveal that it is on the side of the people in their quest for freedom and an honorable life.

9587

CSO: 4802

SO-CALLED POSITIVE NEUTRALITY ATTACKED

Jerusalem AL-SHA'B in Arabic 11 Feb 80 p 1

[Editorial: "To Hell With This 'Positive' Neutrality"]

[Text] Can one accuse hell of positive neutrality and of assuming the stand of spectator in the midst of this turbulent sea of human violence?

The calls for neutrality come in succession. And Arab "treaties" are becoming numerous. One party calls for what is labelled as neutralization of the area vis-a-vis the two contending super-powers, while another party searches for a policy of non-partiality.

But here is a simple equation: Do Arab rulers think that the super-powers on the one hand, and world imperialism on the other, will not [continue to] contend for the area?

And have Arab rulers asked themselves this question: Who has invited world imperialism and colonialism to interfere in the destinies of the nations of the area and to indulge in manipulating these destinies?

The attempts to atone for the guilt (if there be a sense of guilt) have become so numerous that they reach from Mount Tawbad--about which the poet Shawqy has written--to the White House. We know that all Arab leaders go out on national tours to the White House, protesting the injustice of this partiality that prevails in Hell.

Under this circumstance, the call to follow a policy labelled as positive neutrality seems urgent, but it is identical to the call for the renewal of the oath of alligiance to world imperialism under the guise of neutralizing hell.

Moreover, who says that hell's heroes (those who are dead) are different from hell's heroes of our times? The politics are the same, the causes are the same. Only different faces are now on the scene.

In the past, it was said that the policy of standing aside indicates neutrality. But how about those who stand astride two walls?

As for us, we will reiterate what has already been said by others: "There is no neutrality in hell."

And let us add this simple statement: To hell with this "positive" neutrality.

937B

CSO: 4802

GOVERNMENT POLICIES CRITICIZED

Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 26 Mar 80 p 1

[Editorial: "A Dangerous Policy"]

[Text] Any Israeli politician who believes that the current policy being followed by his government serves the cause of world security and peace is mistaken.

It is just the opposite. It does not even serve the interests of the Israeli people themselves. Naturally this belief did not emerge from a vacuum; it is based to a great extent on its own serious and objective justifications.

There are grave developments in the Middle East crisis which Israel continues to make more volatile by inflammatory actions and by putting obstacles in the way of finding a solution. It is not difficult to imagine that these developments will ultimately lead to disastrous international consequences.

Among the evidence that indict Israeli policy with the charge of hampering the establishment of a just peace is the Israeli government's continued denial of a Palestinian entity as a political factor with a vital role to play in putting out the hot burning fuse in the Middle East. Other evidence is the continued occupation of this people's land and the increasingly frequent appropriation of it. This pertains particularly to Israel's recent decision to establish two religious schools in the Arab city of Hebron, and the escalation of tension that will result from this decision.

It is perhaps unfortunate that these actions almost remind us of those dangerous policies which the ancient and modern world were plagued with and the irresponsible and reckless actions they caused.

It is unfortunate that this policy sometimes encounters indifference on the part of the U.S. administration, and sometimes encounters encouragement and warm support. One would assume that this policy would be met with the most intense anger and disapproval, especially as the U.S. administration claims that it is a full and neutral partner in the Middle East peace negotiations.

It remains for us to say that the current situation created by Israel in the occupied territories is very grave. It has developed harmful roots which will have a negative impact on any negotiations for establishing a real, permanent and comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

GRASS ROOTS MILITARY PREPARATIONS CALLED FOR

Jerusalem AL-SHA'B in Arabic 28 Mar 80 p 1

[Editorial: "The Other Way"]

[Text] We have nothing but respect for the importance of political action, and we may value a new international resolution supporting the right of our people to establish an independent state. However, we believe that a new reality will be created and Arab national goals will be attained not through voting in the General Assembly in New York, but in the Middle East itself where the struggle is taking place.

Perhaps it is only a coincidence that while the representative of the Arab League in New York declared that the Arab countries would call upon the UN General Assembly to hold an emergency session to discuss the Palestinian issue, Sa'd al-Din al-Shazli, the hero of the October War, called on the Arab countries which claim to want liberation to send their troops to the Syrian front.

Despite the fact that certain Arab quarters are working hard in New York in their belief that there must be concerted effort on all fronts, most Arab regimes use this type of activity as an easy substitute for the responsibilities of grass-roots action or patriotic burdens.

Therefore, the true test of the seriousness of an Arab regime regarding the Arab national cause is its readiness to support the two principal participants in the resistance at this stage—Syria and the PLO.

Following the example of Damascus means developing Arab power and mobilizing all capabilities and resources to stand up against the continual imperialist conspiracies. This reveals the enormity of the task being undertaken by the countries of the steadfastness and resistance front to solidify their axis, enlist Arab capabilities and expose effete regimes. This reveals the extent to which the peoples of this Arab nation are prepared to defend their right to live.

TREATY WITH EGYPT CRITICIZED

Jerusalem AL-SHA'B in Arabic 27 Mar 80 pp 1, 5

[Editorial: "One Year After the Treaty"]

[Text] On this day (yesterday) last year, Anwar al-Sadat, Menahem Begin and Jimmy Carter signed the separate treaty between Egypt and Israel to implement the Camp David accords.

During this year, the imperialist information media have been applauding a new era in the history of the Middle East in which the political map of the region has been redrawn to serve the interests of Washington.

From the very outset, our people understood the meaning of the treaty. They understood the attempts that preceded and followed it to impose an autonomy plan in the occupied territories. Our brothers, the Egyptian people, through the struggles of their revolutionary vanguards, are also becoming aware of the grave dimensions of al-Sadat's policy. This policy has made the Egyptian will subject to the interests of the United States of America, and has laid the foundation of Egypt's isolation in the midst of the vast Arab world.

A year after the signing of the treaty, its true colors have become clear through what it has accomplished so far, namely an inchoate Egyptian-Israeli alliance. Now the activities of normalization and submission are being carried out under the tutelage of Washington to crystalize it. We are faced with al-Sadat's numerous concessions at the expense of Arab rights. We are faced with an American policy deeply entrenched in support of all Israeli policies aimed at the Judaization and annexation of Arab land.

After 1 year of the treaty, we sadly admit that despite measures taken to boycott and isolate Egypt, the Arab countries have not been able to go beyond the minimum. Most of them have thereby provided al-Sadat with a justification to use Arab impotence as a propaganda weapon.

AL-SADAT CRITICIZED FOR ADMITTING SHAH

Jerusalem AL-SHA'B in Arabic 25 Mar 80 pp 1, 5

[Editorial: "The Shahs of This Age"]

[Text] Al-Sadat's propaganda media have settled the issue: The decision made by the Egyptian Khedive to welcome his deposed friend was in keeping with Egypt's traditional hospitality--no more, no less.

This is what AL-JUMHURIYAH said yesterday, and what was repeated by al-Sadat's propaganda media. It is certain that, while insulting the intelligence of the Egyptian people, this yellow journalism has not found itself in an enviable position. In addition to the burden imposed upon it of singing in a chorus [of conformity], this yellow journalism will henceforth find itself stuck with a double job: defending both the deposed [Reza] and the reigning [Sadat] "shahs" of this age.

In Tel Aviv, they do not want the Egyptian ruler to deprive them of the "inevitability" which has characterized the period of their new alliance with him. Their minister of health--"health" here does not mean "well-being"--hastily announced his ministry's readiness to offer "Israel's medical experts," if they should be needed.

The strange thing is that, through this course of action, the rulers of Egypt and Israel have demonstrated that it is possible to find a way around the edict on the proverb which says: "a person cannot give away that which he does not have."

Al-Sadat, the leader of the Egyptian regime which is being strangled by isolation, asserts that he can give to someone else something which he does not own. To anyone who has ears, his announcement that the Shah's sojourn in Egypt will be permanent means that al-Sadat has granted the shah protection and brought him out of exile.

The rulers of Israel who measure their "well-being" with an eye dropper are volunteering to export health to the ailing shah!

But we have cause for reassurance. This is maybe why we were not surprised by the shah's arrival in the Egypt of 'Abd-al-Nasir, Ahmad 'Urabi, Sa'd Zaghlul, al-Barudi, Kamil and others. [Our cause for reassurance] further underscores the common denominator between the two "shahs"--the shah of Egypt and this deposed shah.

We should add that we are not surprised by al-Sadat's inability to understand the lessons of the Iranian revolution and every revolution in history. It is because of the stupidity of this reigning shah that he decided, even if only as an experiment, to oppose Washington's view for once and demonstrate independence from the White House.

9123

CSO: 4802

HEBRON SETTLEMENT DECISION CRITICIZED

Jerusalem AL-SHA'B in Arabic 24 Mar 80 p 1

[Editorial: "Another Nail In the Coffin of Camp David"]

[Text] The purpose of the Begin government's decision to establish a "religious academy and a field school" in the heart of Hebron was to assure that a government of "national impotence" in Israel will not some day be able to change "its ability to be impotent" with an ability not to be impotent.

Contrary to the claims of Begin and the government of "national consensus," we firmly maintain that a government that confuses the concepts of power and impotence can never assert its power when it urgently must do so.

We are not accusing the Begin government of surrendering to the threats of the Gush Emunim gangs.

Perhaps it was also a precious coincidence that the decision was made only a few hours before the arrival in Israel of Sol Linowitz, the U.S. special ambassador. In any case, there is enough in this action to help dampen the dreams of those who are chasing the false notions that have arisen in connection with the autonomy conspiracy. These depict autonomy as just a beginning which will lead to the establishment of a Palestinian entity independent from Israel.

9123

CSO: 4802

EFFORT TO COMBAT ILLITERACY REPORTED

Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 24 Jan 80 p 2

[Article: "A Training Course for Teachers to Combat Illiteracy"]

[Text] A training course for about 90 teachers, participating in the drive to combat illiteracy on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, has ended at the Arab Institute in Abu Days. The course lasted 8 days. It was arranged by the Committee for the Elimination of Illiteracy and for Adult Education, in cooperation with the Section for the Elimination of Illiteracy at Bir Zayt University. Participants received instruction in methods of teaching adults and they also engaged in demonstrating these methods with the help of teachers from the Abu Says Progress Center and the Charitable Organization.

The Union of charitable organizations in the Jerusalem district hosted the course and conducted visits to charitable organizations and to archaeological and historical sites in the district, within the extra-curricular program. They toured the charitable organizations in Abu Days and the Orthodox Charitable Shelter at 'Ayzariyyah, the walls of Jerusalem, Beir Zeit University and the Arab College for Nursing.

The Arab Institute at Abu Days offered lodging and board and whatever the course necessitated. It also attended to the well-being of the participants. At the conclusion of the course, the Arab Institute conducted a farewell musical party which included the distribution of prizes to outstanding participants in the course.

9378

CSO: 4802

MINISTER SHARON SHOWS COLLEAGUES 'REQUIRED' ARAB LANDS

Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 14 May 80 p 2

[Article by Joshua Brilliant]

[Text]

Agriculture Minister Ariel Sharon yesterday took cabinet colleagues to Kiryat Arba and Efrat and explained why he believes Arab land must be seized for Jewish settlement.

Sharon conducted the tour as chairman of the new ministerial committee seeking a solution to the land shortage of seven West Bank settlements.

Only two of the other five ministers in the committee joined the tour, Minister without Portfolio Moshe Nissim and Justice Minister Shmuel Tamir, who was accompanied by Attorney-General Yitzhak Zamir. Finance Minister Yigael Hurvitz, Education Minister Zevulun Hammer and Defence Minister Ezer Weisman stayed away, but Weisman sent his assistant for national security affairs, Aluf Avraham Tamir.

Sharon wants more land for Kiryat Arba, which is now confined to a 650-dunam area.

On a hill east of the Hebron suburb, Sharon pointed at small, 50-sq.m. patches that he said Arab farmers plough merely to claim ownership. They take advantage of Israel's reluctance to seize cultivated land and plough areas on which the government plans to establish settlements, he alleged.

During the tour, Sharon pointed to houses that Arabs had recently built, without permission, on land he said was contested. He said such building should not stop Israel from establishing settlements there.

Sharon said he was not satisfied with land on Givat Harsina north of Kiryat Arba that has been earmarked for the suburb, nor with scattered tracts available for Efrat, although Justice Ministry officials pointed out that they have already located a total of 500 dunams for Efrat. One cannot build a synagogue in one location, and a dispensary far away in another, he objected.

CSO: 4820

NEW PLAN FOR CIVIL SERVICE: REWARD AND PUNISHMENT

Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 14 May 80 p 2

[Article by Asher Wallfish]

[Text]

Rewards and punishments will be introduced into the civil service to help ensure a better administration. If the Knesset State Control Committee and Minister without Portfolio Moshe Nissim get their way.

Committee chairman Shmuel Toledano told *The Jerusalem Post* yesterday that in future he would publish the names of civil servants responsible for especially serious infractions, referred to in the state comptroller's official reports.

State Comptroller I.E. Nebenzahl did not intend to make the names public but would give the names to the Knesset committee to do with as it saw fit, Toledano believed.

Yosef Tamir (Shal) will next week submit the Committee draft laws on state control, which will oblige the government to debate the annual report once a year within three months of its appearance; oblige each cabinet minister to brief the Knesset about the section of the report relevant to his responsibilities; and empower the state comptroller to request that civil servants be prosecuted for wrongdoing.

These draft laws were worked out in consultation with the legal advisers of the Knesset and the State Comptroller's Office, Tamir said.

Tamir noted that in 1978, during the last Knesset, the State Control Committee agreed to publish civil servants names in cases of grave derelictions. However, when one case cropped up — that of a civil servant blamed for an economic dereliction — the State Control Committee voted 6-5 not to name

him. Grounds for the decision were his previous impressive record in another civil service branch, which was not generally known.

Since then no proposals have come up in the committee to name erring civil servants, Tamir said, though not because none such existed.

Yesterday Nissim published the recommendations he will table at next Sunday's cabinet meeting, in the wake of the 29th annual report which came out a year ago. Nissim had been charged with studying that report, and recommending action in light of it. His findings and recommendations have been squeezed off the cabinet agenda because of urgent business ever since.

Nissim recommends that a permanent committee of ministers on administration and state control be set up, chaired by the deputy prime minister and comprising the ministers of finance, defence, interior and justice.

His proposal, which contains over 20 points, covers issues such as eliminating wasteful duplication, encouraging proper planning of all projects, obligating all directors-general to be responsible to the committee of ministers for rectifying faults, expanding internal control inside each ministry, and specifying punishments for negligence.

Nissim said in his memorandum that the great security, political, economic and social challenges facing Israel "are no excuse for postponing the problem of the maladies of the administrative system."

MAJORITY OPPOSE TRADING AREAS FOR JORDAN TREATY

Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 20 May 80 p 1

[Article by Mark Segal]

[Text]

TEL AVIV. — A majority of the public is against returning Judea and Samaria to Jordan in exchange for a peace treaty, and the public is divided on starting the autonomy scheme in the Gaza Strip first.

This emerged from the latest poll conducted for *The Jerusalem Post* by the Modi'in Research applied research centre among 1,500 adults.

The first question was: "Are you for or against returning the administered territories in Judea and Samaria to Jordan in exchange for a peace treaty?" For — 34.3 per cent, against — 60.1 per cent, undecided — 5.6 per cent.

The answers to the question whether autonomy should be implemented in Gaza first: yes — 41 per cent; no — 43.9 per cent; undecided — 15.1 per cent.

Centre director Amiram Yarkoni noted that 83.3 per cent of men op-

posed returning the territories, as did 76 per cent of the 17-23 age group, and 68.4 per cent of the 20-30 age group.

Similar views were held by 52 per cent of oriental communities, 60.9 per cent of low-education groups, 68.7 per cent of blue-collar workers, 77.5 per cent of religious people and 63.3 per cent of those of low income.

These sentiments were heaviest among residents of Jerusalem and new towns. The strongest opposition came from voters from the Likud — 78.4 per cent; National Religious Party — 77.3 per cent; Agudat Yisrael — 70 per cent; and Tehiya — 67.5 per cent.

Strongest for returning the territories for peace were women — 36.1 per cent; and in the 31-40 age group — 40.6 per cent. The higher the income and education, the greater the support for returning the territories.

ARAB ELECTRIC COMPANY HEAD VOWS TO STAY IN BUSINESS

Jerusalem AL-SHA'B in Arabic 24 Mar 80 p 2

[Article: "Nusaybah On the Issue of the Jerusalem Electric Company: We Have Been Compelled To Wage a Battle With Our Backs to the Wall"]

[Text] Jerusalem--Mr Anwar Nusaybah, chairman of the board of the Jerusalem Electric Company, held a news conference yesterday afternoon at which he made the following statement:

"The board of directors and the labor union of the Jerusalem Electric Company are impelled by a profound feeling of membership and absolute loyalty to our land and our people. They have high esteem for frank discussions, since there is no way to avoid one's responsibility. Accordingly, I am meeting with you to exchange views with the utmost frankness, objectivity and honesty. The question of the Jerusalem Electric Company is part of a general problem that has been imposed on us. It is a very complex battle which we must wage with our backs to the wall. Do not for a moment doubt our singleminded sincerity and patience. There is no room for winning political points here and there. We have nothing to lose but our existence. All of us, from the extreme right to the extreme left, are in the same boat. If it sinks we all drown, and if it stays afloat we are all saved. That is my concept of nationhood.

"On the basis of this unequivocal position I want to set forth the following facts:

"1. The subject of bringing the issue before the Israeli Supreme Court or not doing so was presented to the company's board of directors on 10 March 1980. The board also discussed the matter with its labor union, because the fate of the workers is linked with that of the company, and because both management and labor belong to the same company. On the basis of the facts, the board of directors decided to postpone discussion of the subject without expressing an opinion in order to complete its study.

"2. I have in fact prepared an additional memorandum in which I explored every possible result of any step the company may resort to to defend its

concession in this critical situation. In this memorandum, I explored the legal aspects--both positive and negative (in this case the negative outweighed the positive)--of resorting or not resorting to international or local courts in the matter of the Jerusalem Electric Company.

"3. Therefore, I have proceeded to consult with more lawyers here and in Amman. I have also thought about consulting with the International Jurists' Organization. In the meantime, I have requested the lawyers whom I have consulted to prepare a legal study. The manuscript will be presented to the board of directors at its next meeting. I am awaiting this study, and I expect to receive it within a few days.

"4. The board of directors and labor union of the Jerusalem Electric Company may be in the best position to understand the political ramifications of this difficult battle, and they have brought them to public attention. Nevertheless, both management and labor are also concerned about preserving the company's concession. By preserving its rights, the company will not only retain its existence as an Arab company, but will accomplish a political objective which must be obvious to everyone. Therefore, the company cannot give up any effective weapon available to it. The company is not interested in resorting to local or international courts because it likes to do so. Nor will the company resort to such courts if it has a weak legal case or if the negative political effects of such a course of action will outweigh the positive effects. Nevertheless, the company would commit a breach of faith if it were to relinquish this weapon in advance and yield to a fait accompli without giving all aspects of this matter the attention and objective study they deserve at the highest levels. After the study is completed, the company alone bears the responsibility [for appropriate action].

"5. Notwithstanding the above, both management and workers of the company have not and will not overlook other means of resistance, including diplomatic, political and media efforts."

When Nusaybah finished reading his statement, the journalists began asking questions. Nusaybah answered that the company had plans to extend electric service to the villages situated in its concession area. He emphasized that the company will not yield one inch of its concession area, and that it is intent on doing without purchase of electricity from the national company.

9123
CSO: 4802

TEKOAH CALLS FOR IMMEDIATE DECISION ON SEA-TO-SEA CANAL

Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 22 May 80 p 2

[Article by Benny Morris]

[Text]

Ben-Gurion University president Yosef Tekoah on Tuesday called upon the government to reach a decision "without delay" about the Mediterranean-to-Dead Sea canal project.

Speaking at a press conference following the completion of initial cost and feasibility studies of the "two seas" scheme, Tekoah argued that the southern, cross-Negev route was preferable to the "cross-Galilee" or "cross-Judea" alternatives.

Basing himself on Tahal, the water engineering consultants, and the special interdepartmental advisory committee reports on the scheme, Tekoah noted that the expected "negative and positive side-effects" of the scheme made the southern route preferable, despite the projected lower costs of the cross-Judea route.

The reports estimated that the central route canal would cost \$600m-\$600m as compared with \$350m-\$400m for the southern route. They also claimed that the hydroelectric power plants to be constructed along the central route would produce an initial 1,300 million kilowatts of electricity a year as compared with 1,114 million using the southern route.

But the reports noted that the southern canal route could be utilized to cool nuclear and conventional power plants, to construct a tourism-oriented artificial lake and recreation centre, and to develop seawater agriculture in the centre of the Negev.

Tekoah also noted that a northern route canal would destroy "much arable land" and adversely affect the Jordan River, and the central route would be "politically problematic."

Speaking of the projected canal's major purpose, Shabtai Bartov, chairman of the Negev Committee, said that it would "solve the country's problem of electricity production for generations to come." Tekoah added that "various European firms" have already approached him offering to invest in the project.

Tekoah said that it would take about 10 years to complete the Med-Dead Sea canal "once a decision to start is taken."

The reports quoted by Tekoah cited the raising of the level of the Dead Sea, problems for the Dead Sea Works and other local plants, changes to the landscape and ecological effects on the Negev as among the drawbacks of the project.

MAJOR PORTION OF TRADE DEFICIT CAUSED BY OIL IMPORT COST

Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 22 May 80 p 7

[Text]

Outlier oil imports accounted for nearly all the trade deficit in the first four months of the year, according to data released by the Central Bureau of Statistics.

The cost of oil imports rose by \$600m., while total imports increased by \$800m. in January-April 1980, compared with the same period last year. This means that if fuel is excluded, the import bill remained virtually unchanged.

In real terms, after the increase in import prices is taken into account, there has been a decline in imports, both of raw materials, durables and consumer goods.

As a result, the seasonally adjusted data show a declining trend in the trade deficit from the beginning of the year, although the level of the average monthly import surplus is about the same as in the last months of 1979. This trend was arrested in April because exports went down significantly and, in particular, because oil prices went up.

Exports were up by 30 per cent in current values, by comparison with January-April 1979, when exports were low. Nearly half the increase originated in exports of chemicals, rubber and plastics — generally highly petroleum-intensive industries.

In real terms, the Central Bureau of Statistics estimates the increase in exports at 13 per cent, which means that for the entire first third of the year the export level of the last months of 1979 remained unchanged.

ISRAEL

BRIEFS

ILLEGAL BUILDING CURBED--Interior Minister Yosef Burg told the Knesset yesterday that the Jerusalem Municipality and the Judea and Samaria military government were working together to prevent illegal building by Arabs around the Capital. Replying to a parliamentary question by Moshe Katsav (Likud-Herut), Burg said that since 1967 some 700 illegal structures had been built in the area that was joined to West Jerusalem. Burg said that the municipality was devoting "maximum attention and substantial means" to the enforcement of the building and planning laws, and that most violators had been prosecuted. [Text] [Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 14 May 80 p 3]

CSO: 4820

STUDY ON SETTING UP OPEN PALESTINIAN UNIVERSITY EXAMINED

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 31 Mar 80 p 7

[Article by Dr Ibrahim Abu Lughud: "Interesting Education Plan for Palestinians in Arab World; Where Has Idea of Setting Up Open Palestinian University Reached?" Translated From MAJALLAT AL-IDHA'AH AL-TA'LIMIYAH AL-DUWALIYAH (INTERNATIONAL EDUCATIONAL RADIO MAGAZINE)]

[Text] Whereas the world public opinion acknowledges at a broad scale the complexity of the political dimensions of the Palestine issue, the specialists generally disregard the complexities of teaching an entire people subject to the domination of a foreign authority and neglect the requirements of this issue. Consequently, the specialists disregard the task of supervising the education of this people. It is well-known that since losing their homeland in 1947, the education of the Palestinian people's children is controlled by the Israeli occupation authorities. These people also teach their children in the Arab countries.

The dispersal of the Palestinians brings up the educational dimension of the Palestinian problem. Educating the Palestinians is, for all practical purposes, the responsibility of "authorities" and not of the Palestinians themselves. Yet, the Palestinians have achieved high levels of education when compared with what has been accomplished in countries such as Syria, Lebanon and Tunisia. Ninety percent of the Palestinian children get an elementary education, 70 percent get high school education and 13 per 1,000 enroll in higher institutes. These accomplishments are due to two factors: The desire of the Palestinians to overcome their abnormal conditions and the wish of the Arab host countries to open the doors of education to the Palestinians on an equal footing with their own citizens. This is in addition to the efforts of international organizations, such as the UNRWA and its educational system that undertakes the responsibility of teaching one third the students in the elementary and preparatory [junior high] stages. The PLO has undertaken in a special manner, and in cooperation with the Kuwaiti government, the responsibility of the elementary education of the Palestinian students in Kuwait since the 1967 war.

The PLO's Education Department has exerted concerted efforts to solve the educational problems facing various groups of the sons of the Palestinian people. This department has, for example, advanced financial aid to the higher educational institutes in the West Bank and has set up a special fund to have Palestinian youths educated on scholarships in the various countries of the world. The department has also published textbooks, re-trained teachers and examined the curricula followed in the Arab schools and the UNRWA schools. An energetic Education Department is forming within the PLO at present. The concerted efforts exerted to tackle the higher education issues facing the Palestinians must be understood within this framework.

Quantitative and Qualitative Issues

The number of Palestinians registered in higher institutes in various parts of the world is estimated at 70,000 students, most of them studying at the institutes in the occupied territories of Palestine or in the Arab countries. The rest, estimated at 25,000 students, are enrolled in European and U.S. institutes. It is also estimated that as many as three times this number of students are qualified for higher studies but are deprived of them for financial or social reasons. Moreover, the figure conceals a difference in the distribution of higher education over the places of residence. There is a lower percentage among those who reside in the conservative countries of the Arab world and those living in refugee camps inside the area occupied by Israel and inside Israel itself. The higher education opportunities available to these students are less than those available to their colleagues in Jordan, Syria or Kuwait.

There is also the issue of quality. No Palestinian receives his university education from the perspective of the priorities required for a Palestinian society or a Palestinian people. It is noticed that the education of Palestinian youths is acquired in four [kinds of] institutes: Israeli institutes, institutes in the occupied territories, institutes in the Arab countries and institutes in non-Arab countries. It is obvious that Israel, the Arab countries and the non-Arab countries formulate the curricula of their institutes according to the needs of their societies. Therefore, the Palestinians do not study anywhere curricula responding to their goals and do not receive academic training that takes into account the Palestinian concerns and the national identity and heritage of the Palestinian people.

Neither of these problems--quantitative and qualitative--has its easy solution. The institutes of the Arab countries are getting more and more overcrowded with students, the restrictions on the right of education are intensifying and the West Bank schools cannot, under the best of conditions, absorb annually more than 20 percent of the students seeking higher education. There is another phenomenon which the Palestinians share with the third world where the youth population constitutes a high percentage of the population. The next decade will witness an increase in the percentage of youth of university education age and a lack of the facilities required for this education.

Economic Feasibility Study

These two issues--qualitative and quantitative--impose themselves on the PLO that has undertaken to solve the issue of higher education for the Palestinians. The UNESCO responded in 1975 to the Palestinian National Fund's initiative to study the feasibility of the "open-education system" for the Palestinians. An initial study was completed in 1976 through the cooperation of the two organizations and with the support of the Arab Economic and Social Development Fund. The study supported this idea. In implementation of the study's recommendations, the UNESCO concluded a trilateral agreement with the PLO and the Arab Economic and Social Development Fund. One of the provisions of the agreement calls on the fund to advance to the UNESCO a "trust grant" to enable it to conduct the economic feasibility study.

A team of experts, selected from North America, Europe and the Arab world, was formed to carry out the economic feasibility study. The team began its work in April 1979. The team has sought guidance from the instructions of the initial study and has kept in sight the matter of studying the raised issues "beginning with the open system of education suitable for the special needs of 4 million Palestinians dispersed in Palestine and the adjacent areas and ending with the final goal served by this system, such as the values, cultural background and the educational standard required of the applicants and then the means of conveying the lessons to the applicants and the costs of this system." The team has completed one half the task so far.

Before I reach the team's initial conclusions and the results of its investigations, I must point out the steps that the team has followed in carrying out the study.

Studying Existing Systems

Determining the nature of the required system, which is the first task, requires reviewing the many and various types of open-education systems in European and American countries. The team has selected one of these successful systems, namely the "Open University" in the United Kingdom, and one of the team members has undertaken to conduct a detailed on-the-spot study of the systems, facilities and future plans of the Japanese On-The-Air University. Moreover, the team has studied the experience of study by correspondence followed in the Arab world by such institutes as the Educational Institute run by the UNESCO and the UNRWA and the system followed by the Arab University of Beirut.

All these experiences have convinced the team of the complexity of setting up a system of open education for a crowd with distinct characteristics. The Open University in the United Kingdom carries out its activities under superior conditions: A highly educated crowd, state support and a complete independence that enable this university to possess technological facilities,

financial resources and a highly developed substructure insofar as human facilities and manpower are concerned. The situation of the Palestinians is the opposite because most of them live under a hostile occupation. Where there are higher institutes in the West Bank or in the Arab countries, high fees are imposed for their facilities or they are insufficient and inaccessible for the proposed open university. Moreover, the open-education system relies on postal services and such services are not under the disposal of the Palestinians and are inadequate.

Goals and Objectives

There are other problems that require attention and that are connected with the curricula. It is obvious that the Open University in Britain has been designed on the basis of a system that seeks to facilitate the students' social and economic mobility and to enhance the capability of the students to enable them to attain a higher status in their societies. Regardless of the training that graduates get from an open university, this university remains essentially the same as the conventional universities. What is more, an open university does not need to be concerned with the issue of national affiliation and national heritage because it is aware that its students have already passed through numerous academic stages during which they have developed a strong sense of national belonging.

These assumptions which apply to the open university under normal circumstances become meaningless when talking about the Palestinian people. While it is true that there are higher Palestinian institutes, these institutes carry out their work in the face of difficulties created by the foreign occupation. The special goal toward which the higher Palestinian education must proceed is embodied in the special and distinctive experience of a people part of whom lives under occupation while the other part lives in exile and continues the struggle to achieve its national independence. In this case, the type of education and the system that governs this type of education and the type of the economic and social system that the Palestinian open university must prepare its students for are of central importance. All this requires an appreciation of the special circumstances engulfing the life of the Palestinians.

The team of experts entrusted with selecting the right system for the open university has taken into consideration the special and distinctive problems facing the Palestinian people and the aspirations of the members of this people for a higher standard of education while also taking into account the characteristics of the substructure of the area in which they live and the effective use of modern technology. A conviction has prevailed that an open system of education made available to the largest possible sector of the Palestinians qualified for higher education, wherever they live, is possible to achieve and will participate effectively in solving the Palestinian academic problems. Such a system is founded on the basis that all the Palestinian who have completed secondary education, as well as those who have not completed this education but display an ability to

benefit from the system, can enroll in the open-education system. It is an open system because it is based on teaching from afar and on a high degree of cultural interaction based on confrontation [sic].

The foundation of a system of education entailing a large degree of teaching based on confrontation [al-muwajahah] has been proposed as a means to overcome the deep-rooted weakness in the system of teaching from afar [by correspondence]. But what is more important is to overcome the problems of the dispersal of the Palestinian people. In accordance with this system, the students can be brought to attend regular sessions and periodic seminars and this is something desirable for realizing the Palestinian people's cohesion. To overcome the difficulties facing this system, I propose that the open university set up its special networks in all the main areas where Palestinians are present.

These centers [presumably networks] should include all the facilities important for students, such as libraries, film-projection halls and audio-visual aids.

Accordingly, the university will have a main headquarters in which its crew of professors are found and where the study materials are prepared. The various centers of the university will be no less important than the main center because they will disseminate the study materials to the students. Unlike the other universities that depend on the system of correspondence, this university should not rely on sending study materials by mail because it is difficult to rely on a stable postal system in the Arab world. Attention must be paid to all the information media in conveying education to the students. As it will produce its own textbooks, this university must also have its own educational radio and television programs. However, there are numerous reasons for the problems connected with the use of the information media in the Arab world and these reasons have strengthened the need to establish educational centers in the major Palestinian concentration areas to meet the academic needs of the open university students.

University Curricula

Perhaps the most important service that the open university can offer is found in the type of education that it offers its students. In view of the fact that the goal behind the university is to help the Palestinian people, it is important to find out the Palestinian society's present and future needs. The curricula of the proposed universities should reflect these aspirations.

The economic planners have recognized a number of these needs, some of which are connected with training numbers of elementary and secondary school teachers, some with training students on the art of middle-level management and some connected with the health and nutritional requirements of the Palestinians. On the other hand, the Palestinian identity and the Palestinian culture and heritage which constitute a part of this identity have

disappeared from the education that the Palestinians receive these days. Therefore, this aspect must be taken into account when drawing up the educational curricula for the Palestinian open university so as to strengthen the Palestinian affiliation with the soil and the homeland and the Palestinian link with the Arab culture.

There is another important aspect pertaining to the period of study. In view of the fact that the university system will be founded on the principle of teaching from afar and of using the various information media, the university should not cling to a definite period of time for the graduation of students. The university's system should be established on the basis of two distinctive courses: A first course which devotes attention to general knowledge that can be called an intermediate stage of education. Stress in this course should be put on mastering the language and on the ability to reason so that it may qualify the students to occupy middle-level managerial levels in the public service sector, such as hospital administrators and elementary school teachers. In view of the difficulties faced by the sons of the Palestinian people, it will be possible for the student to interrupt his education after attaining this intermediate level of education in order to work while retaining his right to return to the university to complete the second course of education which means specialization in the various fields.

The study on the possibility of establishing an open Palestinian university has covered so far one half the path. It is expected that the outcome of the study will be presented to the people in charge at the end of June of this year. This study will be one of the most organized studies carried out in the Arab world with the aim of assessing the possibility of establishing an open-education system befitting the needs of a specific people. If the study can contribute toward establishing an open university that employs the modern technology and the contemporary educational ideas, then such a university will not only make an important contribution for solving the Palestinian people's educational and cultural problems but will also constitute a significant educational experiment in the entire Arab world.

8494

CSO: 4802

ARAB LABOR ORGANIZATION DISCUSSES ISRAELI VIOLATIONS OF ARAB LABOR LIBERTIES

Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 29 Mar 80 p 3

[Article: "Conference of Arab Labor Organization Discusses Israel's Violations of Unionist Liberties"]

[Text] Amman--The Amman Chamber of Commerce has participated in the meetings of the Arab Labor Organization's conference which was held in Baghdad recently.

'Ali al-Dajani, the chairman of the Amman Chamber of Commerce who took part in these meetings, has said that the most important topic discussed by the conferees was the topic of expanding vocational training in the Arab countries to speed up the implementation of the development operations and to seek to bring back emigrant Arab brains.

Al-Dajani, who was elected conference deputy chairman and chairman of the Plenary Investigation [al-tadqiq] Committee which the conference decided to form, has also said that the most important issues presented by the Jordanian delegation were the issue of Israel's violations of the unionist liberties, the issue of Israel's expropriation of the occupied Arab lands, the issue of its repeated attacks against Arab workers, the issue of Israeli settlement and the issue of following up at the International Labor Organization the Israeli racial discrimination acts and measures against the Arab inhabitants in the occupied territories.

'Ali al-Dajani further added that the Arab Labor Organization is distinguished from the other Arab organizations by the fact that it permanently includes representatives of the ministries of labor, of the business men's organizations and of the labor organizations.

Since its creation, the organization has been calling for Arab integration and cooperation in the various labor, economic and social development sectors and for defending the business men's and labor unions in the occupied Arab territories because of the Israeli authorities' violation of the unionist liberties.

Al-Dajani also said that one of the most important characteristics of this organization is that it gives the ministries of labor, the business men and the workers the right opportunities to review the economic and labor accomplishments, regulations and legislations realized in each Arab country.

Al-Dajani noted that 'Umar al-Nabulsi, the minister of labor, delivered an address to the conference in which he reviewed the Jordanian accomplishments in developing labor economically and socially and the burdens that Jordan shoulders to train skilled labor, to establish labor relations on advanced legislative rules and to issue social security laws.

Al-Dajani also pointed out that the conference focused on the need to draw up for the workers a social security legislation that makes it possible to transfer the social security money collected for any worker in any country where he works to any country that he wishes to go to. The conference also focused on the issue of developing the work environment to make it more conducive to productivity, industrial safety and health protection.

A resolution was adopted by the conference to organize courses for business owners and workers in the Arab countries at the local and regional levels in order to strengthen the industrial relations between the two sides and [to enhance] the means of productivity.

The meetings were attended by delegations representing 20 Arab countries and by 15 observers from regional and international organizations.

8494

CSO: 4802

PREPARATIONS UNDERWAY TO DRAW UP 1981-85 FIVE-YEAR PLAN

Amman AL-BA'Y in Arabic 2 Apr 80 p 3

[Article: "Preparations for Drawing Up Next Five-Year Plan; General Committee, Working Team and Subcommittees"]

[Text] Amman--The preparations necessary to draw up and announce the coming 1981-85 five-year plan have been divided among a general committee, a working team and subcommittees.

The General Plan Committee will undertake the task of studying and reviewing the basic working papers connected with evaluating the accomplishments of the current five-year plan and the expected growth trends. This committee will also undertake the task of studying and reviewing the instructions that help the subcommittees, the Local and Provincial Government and Housing Committee and the Private Sector Committee, and the task of coordinating and linking the sectoral and regional plans and of preparing the coming five-year plan in its final form to present it to the Ministerial Development Committee.

This [Plan] Committee, chaired by Dr Hanna 'Awdah, the head of the National Planning Council, includes: 'Adnan Badran, the president of al-Yarmuk University; Ziyad 'Annab, the general director of the Development Bank; Dr Hashim al-Dabbas, the undersecretary of the Ministry of Industry; Husayn al-Qasin, the deputy governor of the Central Bank; Basil Jardanah, the secretary general of the National Council; Wasif 'Azar, the director general of the Civil Pension Fund; Muhammad al-Saqqaf, the undersecretary of the Ministry of Supply; Dr 'Abdallah al-Nusur, the undersecretary of the Ministry of Finance; Sami Qanna, the director of the Budget Department; Fayiz al-Suhaymat from the Ministry of Education, Tawfiq Batarisah from the Ministry of Industry, Dr Albert Butrus, the director general of the Royal Scientific Academy; Sa'd al-Tall, the general director of the Oil Refinery Company; Bassam al-Sakit from the Scientific Academy, Dr Kamil al-'Ajluni from the Jordanian University, 'Awni al-Misri, the chairman of the Engineers Union; Dr Ahmad Manku from the private sector and Dr Ahmad Shalabi for the commercial bands sector.

Working Team

The working team which includes 36 specialists has been entrusted with the task of evaluating the current five-year development plan, studying the trends necessary to correct the development procession, studying and evaluating the general organizational and administrative framework in the kingdom, proposing the necessary organizational recommendations and measures, reviewing the regional development plans, studying the measures to follow up the implementation of the coming plan and proposing the organization conducive to raising the followup effectiveness.

The working team, led by Basil Jardanah, the secretary general of the National Planning Council, includes the following ladies and gentlemen: Dr Umaymah al-Dahhan from the Jordanian University, Dr Akram Istaytiyah from the Jordanian University, Dr 'Abd-al-Bari al-Durrah from al-Yarmuk University, Dr Nazim Hikmat from the Jordanian University, Dr Hani Abu-Jibarah from the Jordanian University, Dr Haytham Ha-rani from the Jordanian University, Dr Muhyi-al-Din Tawq from the Jordanian University, Dr Khalid Amin from the Jordanian University, Dr Nahid Qumri from the Jordanian University, Dr Dalal Istaytiyah from the Jordanian University, Dr Michel Martu from the banking sector, Dr Muhammad Malallah from the Management Institute, Mu'awiyah al-Khamash from the Ministry of Industry, Ghalib Baqa'in from Amman Municipality, Dr Sufyan al-Tall, the chairman of the Irbid Province Planning Committee; Sa'dallah Sa'dallah from the Ministry of Municipal Affairs, Dr Ahmad Abu-Shaykhah from the Ministry of Development, Dr Nur-al-Din Taqi-al-Din from the Loan Establishment, Burhan al-Sharab from the Loan Establishment, Dr Adib Haddad and Dr Ziyah Fariz from the Central Bank, Dr 'Abdallah al-Maliki from al-'Uthman Establishment, Amin Tuqan from the Prime Minister's Office, Burhan Abu-Huwayj from the Loan Establishment, Nayif Qaqish from the Pension Fund, Musa Abu-Mayzar, Dr Akram Karmul, Dr Yusuf Hayajinah, Dr Muhammad Bani Hani, Yusuf Batahun and Dr Yusuf Sarah from the National Planning Council, Dr Muhammad Bani Hani from the Jordan Valley Authority and Khaldun Abu-Hassan from the private sector.

The Prime Minister's Office has approved the formation of the Local and Provincial Government and Housing Committee under the chairmanship of the undersecretary of the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and the formation of the private sector committee concerned with the agriculture, industry, trade and transport activities under the chairmanship of the und rsecretary of the Ministry of Industry.

The Prime Minister's Office has also approved the [formation of the] sub-committees in each ministry, department or establishment under the chairmanship of the ministry's undersecretary or the department's or establishment's director to complete evaluating the policy, activity, programs and projects of each of the ministries, departments or establishments during the 1976-1980 period, to define the proposed subsidiary goals for the five-year plan and to determine the measures, programs and projects that

realize the goals of the forthcoming plan. These subcommittees will thus define the required organizational measures and policies, including the legislative and departmental measures, and will underline the programs and projects that are under implementation and that will be completed during the 1981-85 period, including the projects listed in the current plan but not completed yet, and will define the new programs and projects proposed to be implemented during the 1981-85 period.

It has also been decided to form sectoral committees from representatives of all the official and private organizations operating within a single sector to study and unify all the sector's subsidiary plans, provided that the National Planning Council submit afterwards a definite and detailed recommendation on the membership and tasks of these committees.

The task of the Ministerial Development Committee will be that of studying and reviewing the draft plan and then of submitting it to the Council of Ministers to examine it prior to its approval.

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CSO: 4802

PRIME MINISTER COMMENTS ON COUNTRY'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 31 Mar 80 p 3

[Interview with Sheik Saad Abdallah Es-Sabbah by special correspondent Ahmed Fattani: "We Are Keeping Vigil Over the Development and Strengthening of Our Cooperation With Algeria"]

[Text] [Question] For some time the attention of observers has been focussed on the sensitive Gulf area. Could you tell us, Your Highness, about the role that Kuwait intends to play at the present political stage?

[Answer] Kuwait will direct all its efforts toward assuming its duty and its effective role, well-known moreover, in cooperation with the countries of the area in the interests of themselves and their stability and in the interests of their people. In this regard, we would like to emphasize the importance of the collective effort that the countries of the area must put in motion, mainly at this time.

[Question] Kuwait is preparing to return to a parliamentary system. How do you glimpse the coming stage and the impact of this decision on the Gulf area?

[Answer] A commission entrusted with amending the constitution was created last month in accordance with the instructions of His Highness the late Emir. The commission has gotten started with its work. We hope that it will fulfill its mission during the allowed time period. Our hope is always to return to a sound parliamentary system, without the missing elements of previous experience. We stress the importance of closeness in our society, of its national unity, of the reinforcement of the spirit of harmony and democracy belonging to our traditions.

This is to say that we must unite the necessary conditions for participation and constructive cooperation for the national benefit, and for the Arab Nation.

As for the impact of this process on the Gulf area, I think that every country--and not only in the Gulf--chooses the system that is suitable for it according to its position, its conditions and its special customs.

[Question] Recently you announced the participation for the first time of the Kuwaiti woman in the elections. Is this a matter of a first initiative promoting the participation of Kuwaiti women in politics?

[Answer] The Kuwaiti woman has always played a special role, and she holds a distinctive place in the social life of our country. We value with good reason the role that she selflessly plays in the service of the country. I have expressed my opinion that it is time that our idea of the Kuwaiti woman's role becomes a reality and that it takes a concrete and effective form. Thus I have suggested examining this subject.

[Question] Kuwait was one of the first Arab countries to ratify the inter-Arab charter proposed by Iraq seeking to find a solution to the worsening of relations between brother nations. For several years Kuwaiti-Iraqi cooperation has become stronger. What is the state of your border dispute with Iraq?

[Answer] We ratified the inter-Arab charter proposed by the president of the Iraqi republic because we are convinced that it is a concrete start toward lifting our Arab Nation out of the present deadlock. It will also make possible the strengthening of Arab solidarity and the mobilization of the Arab capability that our Nation needs today to free its land and to recover its dignity.

As for the marking of borders between Kuwait and Iraq, we are certain that the spirit of brotherhood and cooperation as well as the firm ties existing between our two countries and our two brother peoples will promote a settlement.

[Question] American threats of intervention in the Gulf area are stronger. They are demonstrated by the various military concentrations near the oil fields of the Gulf. What is Kuwait's position in the face of these threats, and is there a collective plan agreed on by the nations of the area to oppose these threats of intervention?

[Answer] Our position regarding security in the Gulf is clear and firm in that it is founded on the principle of refusing any foreign intervention in the Gulf area, no matter what the source of this intervention may be.

We also believe that responsibility for security in the area must be taken by the nations of the area, because this security is vitally important for the world and must remain outside of disputes between the great powers.

[Question] The visits of European officials to Machrek increased and especially to the Gulf, the last visit being that of the French President. Do you think that the nations of the European community are in a position to find a solution to the Palestinian problem?

[Answer] There is no doubt that the nations of the European community can play a larger role in finding a fair and total solution to the Middle East

problem. They called upon to play this role for several reasons. We appreciate the great importance of the special role played by France after General DeGaulle and its clear approach regarding the legitimacy of the Palestinian cause.

However, we are convinced that a definite solution can depend only on the will of the Arabs themselves. This solution is possible only through Arab cooperation and solidarity as well as through the mobilization of their capability for Arab recovery and dignity.

[Question] One speaks increasingly of a Europe-Gulf dialog, while there is already an Arab-European dialog. Could you explain to us, Your Highness, the stakes in the first dialog, and do you not think that it has to do with a new maneuver by the industrialized countries to break the ranks of the Third World countries and to block the North-South dialog?

[Answer] The Gulf-Europe dialog is to our understanding one of the elements of the Arab-European dialog and cannot in any way substitute for the latter.

There cannot be any opposition between them since the Gulf-Europe dialog strengthens the Arab idea of intensifying cooperation with the European countries.

The Gulf-Europe dialog has no authority over our stand from the beginning and our community of interest with the Third World.

[Question] How do you view the development of Algerian-Kuwaiti relations?

[Answer] In Kuwait we have great feelings of friendship and respect for our sister republic Algeria, its president, its government and its people.

We feel deep satisfaction in view of the continual development of the close bilateral relations existing between our two brother countries.

We are keeping vigil over the development and the strengthening of mutual cooperation in various fields in the interests of our two brother peoples and the Arab Nation.

It is well-known that the exchange of visits between officials at various levels is one of the ways of further strengthening this cooperation.

9545

CSO: 4800

PROJECTS FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT DISCUSSED

Beirut L'ORIENT-LE JOUR in French 19 Apr 80 p 11

[Article: "Debs Presents a Series of Projects for the Revival of Industry"]

[Text] The director general for industry, Alfred Debs, yesterday informed interested services of the text of the report that he had presented to the UN Organization for Industrial Development (UNIDO) during a meeting it had held in Vienna from 8-12 April.

The report includes a series of projects for the development of Lebanese industry and it mentions the possibility of UNIDO participation to achieve these projects.

Moreover, here are the main projects appearing in this report:

1. The Project for an Industrial Survey

This project anticipates a thorough survey of the present condition of industry (the factories always in operation, their productivity, the quality and level of their production, the technology they use, problems in production, the problems and cost of energy, worker productivity, etc.).

The accomplishment of this project will have to be done in accordance with the terms of an agreement that will be concluded between a local consulting group and UNIDO. The financing of this work will be partially guaranteed by UNIDO, which will advance nearly 780,000 LL.

2. The Project for Revival and Development of the Institute for Industrial Research

For the requirements of accomplishing this project UNIDO must immediately assign two international experts who will study in the field for 3 months methods of revival and development of this institute. The cost of carrying out this project is estimated at nearly 200,000 LL. The experts' fees will be guaranteed by UNIDO.

3. The Project for an Industrial Information Center

This project anticipates the establishment at the Ministry of Industry and Petroleum of an industrial information center which will make available to Lebanese manufacturers all the references concerning the use of modern technology, as well as mechanization in different fields.

The cost of carrying out this project is estimated at nearly 550,000 LL, which will be covered by UNIDO. It will have to be effected jointly by UNIDO and the Association of Manufacturers with the possible participation of the Industrial Chamber of Commerce.

4. The Project for Development of Industrial Exports

The cost of accomplishing this project, which will have to be effected by the Association of Manufacturers with the participation of the Ministry of Industry and Petroleum, is estimated at nearly 150,000 LL, which will be covered by UNIDO.

5. The Project for Studying the Position of Foreign Industries in Lebanon

This project recommends studying the nature of foreign products, as well as their relation to national production and imports.

Moreover, the director general for industry, Alfred Debs, yesterday received deputy Michel Maalouli with whom he spoke about the project for industrial complexes.

9549

CSO: 4800

BRIEFS

HOUSING PLANS--The Minister of Housing and Pand T, Mr Murr, yesterday reaffirmed, in a television interview by Jean Khoury and Arafat Hijazi on "Al-Malaf" shown at 2100 on TL2, that the state will soon build 20,000 housing units for low income citizens. Murr said a study made by the ECWA had decisively shown the need for the state to build 30,000 units between 1977 and 1982. He said nearly 1/2 million Lebanese pounds are available for financing in liquid money and stocks. "We can start by building 10,000 units and will also use loans from friendly countries for the other 10,000 units. "The project is 70 percent aimed at those whose income is between the minimum wage and 1,500 LL a month, for whom 14,000 units will be reserved. Wage earners whose monthly income is between 1,500 and 3,000 LL will be allotted 6,000 units. Those whose monthly income is above 3,000 LL will be aided by the Housing Bank," Murr said. Work on the project will start in a month if the National Assembly approves it in its session next Thursday. As for P and T problems, Murr mentioned strengthening Beirut's position in communications and added the International Congress now meeting in Paris approved loans to Lebanon to make Beirut's role firm. [Text] [Beirut L'ORIENT-LE JOUR in French 8 Apr 80 p 2] 9545

TRADE WITH ROMANIA--The Romanian ambassador to Lebanon, accompanied by his trade attache, yesterday visited the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Beirut, where he was received by the group's president and vice president, Adnan Kassar and Gabriel Badaro. During this meeting trade relations between Lebanon and Romania were discussed as well as the likely means of reducing Lebanon's trade balance deficit with Romania. Also the question arose of amending the terms of the trade agreement concluded between the two countries in view of the project worked out by interested departments at the Bustros Palace. In this regard it should be noted that Lebanon's trade balance with Romania is clearly in favor of the latter country. In fact, in 1977 Lebanon imported from Romania a total value of 165,165,539,000 LL. The value of Lebanese exports to Romania for the same year was calculated at 454,000 LL only, thus setting the amount of the deficit at 165,085,000 LL. [Text] [Beirut L'ORIENT-LE JOUR in French 20 Apr 80 p 11] 9545

AL-KASM EXPLAINS INTERNAL, FOREIGN ISSUES

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 23 Mar 80 pp 20-22

[Interview With Dr 'Abd-al-Ra'uf al-Kasm, Syria's Prime Minister, by Wadi' al-Hilu: "Our Problem is not With Brotherhood Alone But With More Than One Party and One Side; We Will not Assume Role of Lebanese or of Some of Them; I Have not Heard of Friendship Treaty With Moscow; We Entered Lebanon of Our Own Volition and Will not Leave Except of Our Own Volition; The More Determined We Become in Our Policy the More Intense Onslaught Against Us Becomes"]

[Text] Damascus—The current Syrian concerns can be summed up in two things: Confronting Camp David and strengthening the domestic front so that the citizen's confidence in the government may be bolstered, as the Syrian prime minister has said in the interview he has given AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI.

Dr 'Abd-al-Ra'uf al-Kasm, a native of Damascus and the symbol [al-'unwan] chosen by Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad for the new phase, says that what is taking place in some Syrian cities is "an attempt to destroy the Syrian model in confronting the Camp David parties," adding that those committing the acts of murder and terror "receive their orders from afar."

As for a peaceful solution for the Middle East, Syria has no new proposals other than saying that the Geneva Conference has ended forever, that any possible solution must be under the patronage of the Security Council and of the United Nations and that "therefore, the U.S. influence must be pushed back across the seas."

Following is the text of the interview:

[Question] In the wake of the seventh regional congress of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party, you were first elected to the new leadership and were then entrusted with the post of prime minister by President al-Asad. It is as if this is the symbol ['unwan] of a coming phase that bears within its folds the seeds of the required change.

What, in your opinion, are the main tasks entrusted to the government and what are the features of the change required in this phase?

[Answer] There is no doubt that we are not facing a new government but a new phase.

For the first time, the convocation of the congress was prolonged and this happened because we have made a comprehensive assessment of the previous phase.

The congress came in the wake of a statement by the Progressive National Front's Central Command which dotted the ii's and crossed the tt's insofar as the problems faced by the citizen are concerned. Therefore, the government has been required to make a big change. The change is not in the principles and bases but in the approach and in the selection of the officials in charge of realizing these principles and bases. The change is required in all spheres.

This is why I consider the task very difficult. It is a task that pertains not only to the change of persons and methods but also to changing a psyche that has developed among the officials and the citizens as a result of domestic and external factors. A vacuum has developed in the citizen's psyche--a vacuum between himself and other citizens and between him and the government. Filling this vacuum requires big efforts and constant scientific and sincere work.

The government's fundamental Arab goal remains the same, namely: Steadfastness in confronting the Israeli-U.S.-Sadat alliance and keeping any Arab state from falling in the trench of treason--al-Sadat's trench.

The Palestine issue has been and will continue to be the main axis of our Arab policy. The Camp David accords foil the Arab forces and foil the Palestinian right. To put it briefly, they are accords of capitulation into which al-Sadat has fallen. We are struggling so that no other Arab ruler may fall into them.

Domestically, the first task is to strengthen the people's confidence in themselves and in their state by, primarily, applying the supremacy of the law to all and by making the citizen actually, and not just verbally, feel that he has the same right and shoulders the same duty as the others. The government has actually begun to take a number of measures. But it still faces a lot that has to be done.

Economically, I say that the country could have taken a much greater advantage of the enormous industrial installations and of the development projects that have started since the correction movement. Our task at present is to make use of this enormous economic capability through two means: First, establishing full coordination among the various economic sectors--industry, agriculture, trade and services--and through paying

greater attention to the agricultural issue. These things have not been established in the best manner possible.

The second aspect is the man in charge of operating these economic sectors. There have been large gaps and our task is to put the right man in the right place. Every accomplishment requires two fundamental things: A scientific mind and the human will. This is why our task is a double task.

We must secure all this while we are in a struggle against the ferocious assault about which I have talked.

[Question] It is noticed in the Arab political circles that there has been a retreat in Syria at the level of external political movements: The relations with Jordan are unchanged, the national charter with Iraq has suffered a setback and the decision to assemble the Syrian forces operating in Lebanon gives some people the impression that it is a preparation for complete withdrawal.

Doesn't Syria, in your opinion, seem to be semi-isolated at the Arab and international levels? Or do you have a different visualization of the actual situation?

[Answer] The sons of the Arab Syrian people generally, and the Ba'th Party in particular, have been among the first to advocate Arab unity. Our faith in this unity has not been shaken despite the numerous setbacks suffered by both the federations that were established and those that were started. This is not surprising because we know what the unity of two Arab countries means. We know what benefits it means to our people and what it means to our enemies. It is not surprising for Israel, with the backing of the United States and of all the reactionary forces inside and outside the Arab homeland, to try to smash every union and every unionist plan. Despite this, we are ready, as we have declared repeatedly, to unite or enter into a confederation with any Arab country without requiring of this country any conditions other than its acceptance of unity and its being qualified for it.

This is why there is no retreat policy. There is no doubt that our enemies are trying to isolate us from our Arab brothers. We are exerting efforts to overcome the subsidiary conflicts because we believe that the Arabs face only one conflict, namely the Israeli enemy and world imperialism.

In 1975, the United States thought that it could drag Syria into its game. At that time, all domestic and external assaults were halted. But when the United States became sure that Syria cannot be dragged, the assault started and intensified the more steadfast we became.

Why this onslaught at this time when the spirit of change has begun to take its right course? We don't want to isolate ourselves because this realizes the goals of the United States and Israel. We are struggling to keep

al-Sadat alone in his trench and we are overlooking all the less significant Arab conflicts until this man, who has put himself at the service of the Arab nation's enemies, falls. His downfall is a matter of time because the Arab people of Egypt who foiled the Sidqi-Begin treaty will foil al-Sadat-Begin treaty.

It is now evident to all that the more determined we become in our domestic and national Arab policy and the more determined we are to eliminate the existing negative aspects and to exert efforts to raise the people's economic and social standard under the canopy of the supremacy of the law the more intense the onslaught against us becomes. The masses have been pleased with the large raise in salaries and wages and the citizen started to feel confident when we abolished all the special measures that had prevailed and when we released many detainees. We have instructed all the ministries and departments to implement the judiciary ruling that have become final. The ministers and directors have been given power that had been withheld from them for long years.

We have begun to form ministerial committees that go to the governorates with the power of decision making and of approval in order to get rid of the red tape and to get acquainted with the citizens' problems on the spot. We have created, for the first time in Syria and in the Arab homeland, a ministerial committee to study the relationship between wages and salaries on the one hand and the movement of prices on the other hand in the light of production criteria.

All this has been done in less than 2 months and under the campaigns of distortion and defamation. What for is this onslaught? It is obvious that it wants to absorb this good relationship between the regime and the people. But we will not capitulate and will not back down on our resolution to change and to develop. Those who are behind the killing and the sabotage will realize no goals.

[Question] The recent events in Homs, Hamah and Aleppo give the impression that there is a qualitative change in the confrontation against the Muslim Brotherhood.

What has led to this serious escalation and how will you face it?

[Answer] Our problem is not only with those who call themselves the Muslim Brotherhood. The problem is political. They do not want this country to develop, advance and stand fast. The problem is with Israel and the United States and this is why they are trying to use all their cards and all their allies inside and outside the country. We are countering this alliance with a national unity that includes both those who are in the Progressive National Front and those who are outside it and a national unity that includes all the honorable men who refuse to capitulate to Camp David, refuse to go to the occupied Jerusalem and refuse a good conduct certificate from Washington. This is why we will triumph.

[Question] President al-Asad's recent speech on the occasion of 8 March is considered an ultimatum to the Muslim Brotherhood before the government moves to suppress the existing rebellion.

Is the matter so? Has the government exhausted the means of a "peaceful solution" with the Muslim Brotherhood or will it resort to the "military solution," if we may use the phrase?

[Answer] It is an ultimatum to all saboteurs. It opens, at the same time, the door of dialogue with all the honorable and loyal citizens.

[Question] It was said previously in the wake of the Latakia incidents that individuals or groups of various nationalities and with various political affiliations take part with the Muslim Brotherhood in its war against the government.

In the wake of the investigations that have been carried out, can you define to us the identity of these groups?

[Answer] The investigations carried out prove the presence of groups of various nationalities and of various political inclinations. These groups will be revealed very shortly.

[Question] In the wake of the statements made by a number of Syrian officials and the speeches delivered by President al-Asad, can it be said that Syria has declared war against its enemies at home and abroad and what has Syria prepared for this war?

[Answer] We are in a constant state of war against Israel. It is natural that whoever aligns himself with Israel puts himself in war against us.

We have not declared war against anybody but we will fight whoever fights us, relying on our national unity and on our friends in the nonaligned camp countries and in the countries of the Socialist Camp that has always supported us.

[Question] There is a big question in Lebanon, namely: What comes after the decision to assemble the forces? Will matters stop at the limit of the endeavor for the currently projected national detente--considering that the government initiative for this detente has received a [positive] response from all? How will the Lebanese government succeed in becoming the actual ruler and the nucleus for the strong state when weapons are in the hands of everybody?

[Answer] Our goal is to withdraw all the Syrian forces from Lebanon. But this cannot be done until after the success of the second task for which we entered Lebanon. We entered Lebanon to stop the fighting first and then to provide the opportunity to all the Lebanese to realize detente and to restore the state of the free and single Arab Lebanon.

I believe that the road is now open for the success of the second task. This is the task of the Lebanese. We will hesitate to offer any assistance asked of us but we will not assume the role of the Lebanese or of some of them. As to how the Lebanese will realize this detente, this is up to them. It is the logic of things that weapons be in the hand of the state alone.

[Question] Have you discussed these matters with the Lebanese officials who visited Damascus recently?

[Answer] Of course we discussed these matters with the Lebanese officials and they understood well the reasons that urged us to assemble the forces. But what is regrettable is that we are asked to stay in Lebanon at a time when we still hear talk about the "occupation army."

[Question] After the decision to assemble the forces, a battle took place in northern Lebanon between the Syrian forces and the Phalanges Party. First, is there a connection between the two events? Does this mean that there has been a qualitative change in Syria's policy in Lebanon and in the area and how do you define this qualitative change?

[Answer] An attack was staged against a patrol of the Deterrence Force while performing its duty. Fire was opened on the patrol and several people were killed or wounded. This took place after the assembling decision. Personally, I understand from this attack nothing but the desire of the attackers to say that the assembling and withdrawal of the Syrian forces is the result of their resistance against the Deterrence Forces. I tell them: No, we entered of our own volition and will not leave except of our own volition--with the interest of Lebanon, all of Lebanon, as our target.

[Question] Between Carter's principle on regional cooperation in the Middle East to confront the Soviet danger, the call for concluding a friendship and cooperation treaty with the Soviet Union and the Iraqi call for signing the national charter declared by the Iraqi president, is there a clear Syrian decision or is there a different Syrian position?

[Answer] First, our people rejected the Eisenhower principle and we, the Ba'athists, were part of the opposition. We were a minority but were still able to foil the Eisenhower plan, as we were able to foil the Baghdad pact, and we better foil every new U.S. attempt now because we are in power and we are a majority. If the United States wants security for the Middle East, all it has to do is withdraw behind the seas. Peace and security will be then realized in the Middle East. I believe that peace and security in Europe and in the Middle East cannot be realized finally until the U.S. influence withdraws from Europe and the Middle East.

I have not heard of a friendship and cooperation treaty with the Soviet Union. But if the United States escalates its aggression, we will ask for cooperation from all the friends.

[Question] How true are the reports talking about Syria's readiness to present a new proposal for Middle East peace to the United Nations and what are the main provisions of this proposal?

[Answer] Syria has no new proposal. However, we believe that if a peaceful, not capitulationist, solution is wanted—a solution that leads to the Zionist forces withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem, and to the Palestinian people's self-determination—then this can be achieved only at the United Nations and the Security Council because we will not go to the treason trench and because the Geneva Conference no longer has any meaning now that al-Sadat has departed from the trench of Arab nationalism to the Zionist trench.

[Question] After Camp David, there were first the Baghdad summit and then the Tunis summit. The first summit underlined an Arab position toward the Egyptian-Israeli peace and the second focused on the position vis-a-vis the Lebanese crisis.

At present, the Arab differences seem to have overshadowed the Arab-Israeli conflict instead of letting this conflict take the first priority in the Arab interest. How do you explain this?

[Answer] There are no fundamental Arab differences, meaning differences that are impossible to settle. However, there is no doubt that the U.S. imperialism and Israel are trying to entrench these differences so that they may overshadow the Arab-Israeli conflict. I consider any Arab ruler who permits himself or lets this trick succeed a ruler who has betrayed his country and he raved the Arab nation.

[Question] It is well-known that the Progressive National Front is the regular and partisan framework that helps the Ba'th Party to run the state affairs.

The question is: In the wake of what President al-Asad said in his speech on the 8 March anniversary, is there an idea, an opinion or a plan to permit the rise of a partisan and popular opposition to the government so that criticism and the call for change may be channelled through this opposition?

Moreover, couldn't this lead to curtailing the acts of violence perpetrated by some political factions in Syria under the cover of the Muslim Brotherhood?

[Answer] I have told you that the president's speech is tantamount to an open door for dialogue with all the honorable and loyal citizens. We will not permit anybody whomsoever to stand in the face of our domestic and national policy or in the face of the socialist transformation policy.

However, through the Front's parties and through the popular organizations and constitutional institutions, all the citizens have the right to argue with us and to criticize us if we go wrong. We believe that he who works will make mistakes and we are ready to listen to any correction for our mistakes within our anti-imperialist policy on the one hand and within our socialist line on the other.

More than 60 members discussed the government statement at the People's Assembly and each member focused on a certain point on which he has a special viewpoint. Personally, I considered the words of the People's Assembly members words greatly enriching the government statement. During the People's Assembly discussion of the government statement, the government did actually adopt a number of decisions amending previous decisions proven to have been faulty through constructive discussion and criticism.

I will add that the reasons for the acts of violence and rioting are not the absence of partisan opposition nor the presence of an actual opposition to our foreign or domestic policy. The acts of rioting are in implementation of orders issued from afar to bring about the downfall of the only country that devotes all, and not some, of its capabilities for the fundamental Arab cause: The Palestine issue.

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CSO: 4802

INTERNAL TROUBLES ANALYZED

Paria AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 30 Mar 80 pp 6-7

[Article by Wadi' al-Hilu: "Wave of Violence Has Receded; Verbal Intensification Indicator of Dialogue, not War"]

[Text] Damascus--The incidents that have taken place in Aleppo in particular, and previously in Latakia, seem to be a prelude for something bigger and more dangerous. There is great fear but it is, in all cases, much bigger than what has happened.

The entire chain of violence, such as the individual assassinations, the planting of explosives and mines and the burning of public establishments, is not surprising. The recent intensification in this violence comes as part of what the officials in Damascus call the intensification in the onslaught to which Syria is being subjected. This explains the statement that Dr 'Abd-al-Ra'uf al-Kasm made to AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI last week, namely: "The more diligently we implement our development and military programs, the more assiduously the others confront what we are doing."

This comes from that, as some official Syrian sources have put it. The area lives in the Camp David climate and the climate of Egypt's departure from the Arab arena. What the United States wants primarily is for the Arab states to join the accords signed at Camp David.

However, this is not all. Political observers in the Syrian capital remind of what has happened at the seventh regional congress of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party. This conference has actually been a turning point in the march of both the regime and the party. The discussions that took place in the congress hall underline fundamental points, including the point that a major current of the official partisan bases and leaderships was not content with the regime's course and had the full conviction that the faulty practices have led to the rise of a class of intellectuals and middlemen, according to Iskandar Ahmad, the Syrian minister of information. Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad led this current and has succeeded in ousting a large number of the leaderships. This current has also led to the rise to power by those called by the Syrian man-in-the-street the people with clean hands and people with educational and ethical qualifications.

Official Syrian sources link the promise of change made by the congress and the measures for change begun by Dr al-Kaam's government on the one hand with the escalation witnessed recently by Aleppo, Homs, Hamah and Damascus on the other hand. This gives the impression that the Syrian opposition which has been hiding behind the mask of the Muslim Brotherhood so far wanted to preempt the change in an attempt to drag the regime to a position of reacting to what is taking place, thus resorting to a bloody oppression similar to that of 1964 and 1965, in order to turn the opposition slogans into something important in the Syrian political life. It is obvious so far that the regime in Damascus has expedited the promised change, thus foiling the chance of its opponents. The regime has introduced comprehensive changes affecting the governor of Aleppo and more than 20 general directors of public sector establishments. The regime has also reconsidered the laws that barred the participation of certain intellectual and political sectors in the field of education. Added to this is, of course, what the Syrian president himself is doing by turning directly to the students, professionals, workers and farmers and by receiving delegations of merchants because this direct approach means that the regime in Damascus has initiated a large-scale enlightenment campaign disseminated by al-Asad's almost daily speeches. This bears the proof that the Syrian leadership is speeding up the process of bolstering the domestic situation--a process that has not been completed yet--in preparation for moving to a phase in which Syria seems to be in greater need of its intrinsic forces than ever before.

At the level of the Progressive National Front, informed sources report that there is an inclination to have broader participation by the Front's parties in the intellectual and political guidance campaign by publishing papers speaking in the name of the Front. In this regard, it is said that there are two views: The first calls for publishing a daily newspaper to speak in the Front's name and the second calls for having each of the Front's parties issue a daily newspaper speaking in its name. This issue has not been settled yet. However, the initial decision is there and deciding the issue will not take long.

Mask of "Brotherhood"

This is at the level of the regime. But insofar as the opposition is concerned, the following is obvious so far:

1. This opposition has not formulated any program. Even the statements issued by some people have been void of any practical content, other than levelling accusations at the government.
2. This opposition has not emerged publicly yet. In the "military operations" that it stages, this opposition hides behind the mask of the Muslim Brotherhood. In this regard, some people in Damascus say that the goal behind this [hiding behind the Muslim Brotherhood's mask] is to entrench sectarian conflict in Syria in an exposed attempt to attribute a sectarian color to the regime and to win over sectarian sentiments on this basis.

3. The "military acts" staged so far have not hurt the regime as much as they have hurt the public agencies.

In Aleppo, the demonstrators have burnt consumer establishments, the offices of the Syrian Airlines, the Soviet Company [presumably meaning Aeroflot] and the French Company [Air France]. They have also attacked the office of one of the Palestinian organizations and burnt the flag raised over it.

4. This is why informed sources in Damascus say that what some people are doing in the name of the Brotherhood can be summed up as nothing more than an endeavor to entrench the sectarian conflict so as to deprive the regime of the attribute of being the representative of the Syrian people and to brand it as the representative of a certain sect.

The fact is that the military acts witnessed by some Syrian cities have taken so far the quality of being terrorist acts and have not, consequently, risen to the political level. Rising to this level will not be easy, not to say impossible, at a time when domestic reforms continue and at a time when the government rejects the solutions that do not secure the minimum required for preserving the Syrian and Arab interests.

What does all this mean?

The return of calm to Aleppo, now that the shops have opened their doors and that the citizens have resumed their activities, gives the impression that the wave of violence has receded and that the government has triumphed in the round which the government opponents wanted to make the beginning of other rounds in which the government resorts to the weapon of suppression after having raised the weapon of freedom and democracy. However, the decline of this wave of violence does not mean, in the opinion of a number of Syrian officials, that the government opponents will not try again. The attempts will be repeated but it will be, in the opinion of many, more difficult than the previous ones. The regime's opponents will count up to more than 10 in the wake of the mobilization campaign that the regime has conducted recently. The Syrian government has moved to the field in all the governorates and solving the problems has become more than a routine for it.

In any case, the informed circles say that the new phase about which Dr al-Kasm, the Syrian prime minister, has spoken will not be all roses. The regime, which some people say has been late in removing the thorns from its path, has begun the removal process as a necessary condition for the phase to be truly a new one. Contrary to what some people has said, what the Syrian president has declared in his frequent speeches to the labor unions is much more of a declaration of the new phase that has begun, and from which there is no retreat, than it is a declaration of war. Nobody in Syria wants a domestic war, least of all the man heading the regime. Though some incidents have taken place and though more will take place, no domestic war will break out. The verbal violence is an indicator of the dialogue and not of war.

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

BACKGROUND TO CURRENT FOREIGN POLICY CRISIS SURVEYED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 4 Apr 80 pp 23-25

[Article by Farid al-Khatib: "North Yemen in Danger of Becoming Like Lebanon"]

[Text] Two monuments on the heights of San'a' symbolize Arab and international friendship with North Yemen. The first is the statue of the unknown Egyptian soldier. The second is the memorial to the Chinese engineer who was killed during the construction of the San'a'-Hudaydah road. At the same time, they symbolize the old Arab and international struggle over Yemen, which has been renewed recently, in view of the countries's strategic location in the vicinity of the oil wells and its relatively dense population. These people are strong and live in other parts of the Arabian Peninsula, especially in Saudi Arabia.

This struggle places any president of "blessed Yemen" in a whirlpool which imposes constant changes to ensure a balance unparalleled in any other Arab country. Consequently, outside of Yemen these changes appear as an enigma which is difficult to understand, while within Yemen they appear as self-evident, even if sometimes accompanied by events which surprise the Yemenis themselves.

Hence, since the September 1962 revolution, Yemen has been exposed to several crosscurrents. But these crosscurrents, although in conflict with one another, are elements of the same geographic and political equation. The most important factor in this equation is adjustment and coordination between the regime and its methods.

President "Ali 'Abdallah Salih has been successful since he took office in 1978 in building and developing the state's organization. He expanded the Constituent People's Assembly last year from 99 to 159 members, and the Advisory Council from 14 to 16 members, adding to it officer Husayn al-Dafa'i, from the September 1962 group, and Muhammad Salim Basindwa. He modified the government, expanding representation in it. He included in it Deputy Prime Minister for Domestic Affairs Col Mujahid Abu Shawarib (military leader of the Hashid tribe); Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs Hasan Makki; Minister of Information Yahya al-Arashi; Minister of

Economy Muhammad al-Shuhati; Minister of Agriculture Dr 'Abd al-Wahab 'Abd al-Hamid; and Minister of Municipalities Ahmad al-Mihanni. He removed Foreign Minister 'Abdallah al-Aana and Basindwa. He also re-organized the central national security agency. He removed Minister of the Interior Muhammad Khamis as chief of the agency and entrusted the position to Lt Col Ghali al-Qamish, vice-president of the agency and commander of military police forces. He appointed Lt Col 'Ali al-'Atami as deputy chief of the agency. He also held elections for the municipalities and cooperatives in the rest of the country.

However, the committee which the Constituent People's Assembly formed to prepare the general elections has not yet finished its work. Minister of Information Yahya al-'Arashi told AL-HAWADITH that from 20 to 30 percent of the members of the council will be technocrats by appointment; after the constitution is amended. The Advisory Council could have been more representative. The government is exposed to the winds of change again, so that it may become more representative of the left. The Supreme Reform Board seems to need reform itself, especially since bribery and corruption prevail and some of its senior officials are suspect.

As in all nations of the "Third World," the ruler of San'a are attentive to television. While in 1974 it covered the capital alone, all kinds of programs are now received in the rest of the country. It also reaches other parts of the Arabian Peninsula and Africa, especially Aden; Djibouti, "which learns the Arabic language from our programs to combat illiteracy," according to the minister of information, and Somalia. The strength of the signal will be increased from 200 to 700 kilowatts before the end of the year.

Domestic interest at present is directed at drawing up the "National Charter." It is likely that the committee assigned to this task will be expanded so the new people may be added to it. Then the charter is to be presented to a "Popular Conference," composed primarily of representatives of federations and unions, for approval. After that, it is expected that parliamentary elections will be held to choose the "Popular Assembly" to which the charter will also be presented for ratification. It is not unlikely that the minister of information will call on the people to elect the president of the republic, provided that the "Popular Assembly" recommends the name or names of candidates before they are submitted for direct election. Therefore, the rumors which were circulating abroad about the likelihood that a new government would be formed or that the existing government would be modified "constitute premature press speculation."

Prime Minister 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abd al-Ghani represents a thread of continuity within the regime. He was head of government under the two previous presidents, Ahmad al-Ghashmi and Ibrahim al-Hamdi, who both were assassinated. Observers who look for an explanation of 'Abd-al-Ghani's survival say that he is a man from outside politics and the tribes, represents the technocrats, has no ambitions of his own, and is a "yes-man." It is said that he has represented businessmen for years, and comes from a commercial family. There are even those who say that he is a man

of considerable intelligence who is able to stay in power under different regimes and in the middle of the cold war and the hot war to which Yemen has been and continues to be exposed on both Arab and international fronts!

The head of Yemen's government loves Lebanon. He told AL-HAWADITH that if it were not for Lebanon, the situation in the Arab states would be worse than it is now, and that extinguishing the fire in Lebanon should make way for building a new Lebanon. He said that the Arab readers need the analyses, articles and columns of AL-HAWADITH, but that their rulers love noise and bombast instead.

Government officials say that there are no parties in the country. But the politicians say that "national unity" can only be achieved on the basis of political accord among the parties existing in the country. The president of the republic has held more than one discussion and meeting with the leaders of the "Democratic National Front" who live in 'Aden and sometimes live in the central section of Northern Yemen. The most prominent are Sultan Ahmad 'Umar, secretary-general of the Front, and Yahya al-Shami, member of its General Secretariat and its information official. A few months ago Radio 'Aden broadcast an agreement which the Front concluded with the officials in San'a' calling for announcement of a transitional stage, formation of a coalition government; election of a People's Assembly in a direct, free and secret manner; release of all the political prisoners; an end to armed outbursts in the areas where the Front's organization is present; and adoption of an independent foreign policy concentrating on positive neutrality. Last month, the leaders of the Front arrived in San'a', stayed in the Dar al-Hamad Hotel, and held new meetings with the president of the republic and North Yemeni officials.

The parties and groups which form the Democratic National Front are the Revolutionary Democratic Party; Labor; the Popular Vanguard; the Democratic People's Federation; the Communist Party; the "Septembrists," that is, the September Revolution group; the Nassrites; the Revolutionary Resistance; and the 13 June Front, whose spokesman is Maj Mujahid al-Qahali. The Arab Socialist Ba'th Party loyal to Iraq withdrew from this front in May 1978, protesting the inclusion of the "Revolutionary Resistance" and the Labor Party's support of former president al-Hamadi in his decision to eliminate every party member within the armed forces. The Nassrites turned into listeners within the Front after they were accused of cooperation with Libyan President Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi in a coup attempt against the current president on 15 October 1978. A unit of the army joined it, but the present chief of National Security (former head of the Military Police) infiltrated it and passed information to the president. The result of that attempt was the death of a number of Nassrites and their flight from the army and their jobs to 'Aden and other Arab states.

Opponents of the Front say that the Marxist-Leninist parties in it are rallying under the "Popular Unity" Party, and that decisions have been adopted by a majority and not unanimously, as decisions are made in every normal "National Front."

Former president of the republic al-Chashni negotiated with the "National Coalition" at the beginning of his regime and reached an agreement with it, but this agreement is overshadowed under the current regime by the agreement with the Front. The coalition under the last regime was founded by Muhammad al-Riba'i, currently a member of the Presidential Advisory Council. The coalition includes political, tribal, military and literary personalities, the most prominent of whom are Shaykh 'Abdallah al-Ahmar, Shaykh Mujahid Abu Shawarib, Shaykh Sinan Abu Luhum, member of the People's Assembly Ahmad 'Ali al-Matri, and Yahya al-Adhari. The Arab Socialist Ba'th Party loyal to Iraq also joined it. It is said that some representatives of the Marxist groups also joined it and signed a document in which they asked the state to fulfill some commitments. Among the former members of the coalition was Hamud al al-Sabri, who was assassinated at his home.

Some observers define the identity of Yemeni politicians with reference to the countries in which they lived abroad. For example, Minister of the Economy al-Shuhati lived in Kuwait, and Minister of Communications al-Mihanni lived in the United States. The founder of the "Coalition," al-Riba'i, lived in both Riyadh and Moscow, and Muhammad Salim 'Ali, who founded the newspaper SAWT AL-JUNUBI (which has Ba'thist leanings) in 'Aden in 1955, lived in Cairo. However, this method of political classification, while relatively believable, seems inaccurate.

A question mark is written on the fate of Minister of the Interior Muhammad Khamis, especially after he was relieved as head of National Security. He played a prominent role in foiling the 1978 coup attempt, and was in charge of organizing security measures for Libyan President Col Qadhafi's subsequent visit. Last month, he stayed at home and did not go to his office. It was said that he had been offered an appointment as ambassador to Rome. However, he wondered whether this was intended to make it easier to remove him. But he reappeared during the visit of Iraqi Minister of the Interior Sa'dun Shakir to San'a' as a delegate from President Saddam Husayn to the Yemeni president.

The Chief of General Staff of the Army is Lt Col 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Barati, a graduate of Moscow and a citizen of San'a who does not belong to a tribe. He is described as a "simple" man who sides with the strong and attacks the parties, meaning the Ba'thists in particular. The Marxist influence in the general staff is attributable to his Deputy for Training Affairs Maj Muhammad 'Abd-al-Malik al-'Alafi, a graduate of Moscow, and to his second deputy, Lt Col 'Ali al-Mansur, a "septembrist" officer.

The regime's drift toward the left on the basis of these circumstances has aroused the resentment of businessmen, especially after the Soviet arms deal last summer immediately after the announcement of military constription. They reduced their activities, hid some food and consumer supplies, and smuggled some money abroad. One of their representatives said in a television program: "Events and uniforms in Yemen cast shadows of doubt." He added, in an interview with two sections censored so that they

were seen with the businessman's lips moving but no sound: "Businessmen have transferred some, but not all, of their money." He acknowledged that private capital "participated in the Five-Year Plan, but not as much as it could have." It is known that several private capitalists originally emigrated to the country from the South.

However the businessmen's concern is not shared by the citizens. In North Yemen the citizen has nothing to lose between the right and left except dust. It is true that the people are divided into an overwhelming majority of "dust farmers" and a tiny minority of "non-dust farmers," as Minister of Agriculture Mahmud told an Arab ambassador after he asked him to offer earnest support for development in the country, since if that does not happen then the Soviet Union and the United States will be as one to the Yemeni citizen!

"Qat" is still "the national wealth" and the first "national curse" in the country. Its cultivation and trade have brought in millions, but it uses up the time, money and effort of the people daily from 1500 to 1900 hours. After "storing it up" in that period it is necessary to "tear apart" the strength of the outburst which it generates by whiskey or alcohol in the evening. That costs the middle-class citizen more than 100 Lebanese pounds a day!

Qat parties are the ideal method for meetings and public relations there. Yusuf Shahari, vice-president of the Constituent People's Assembly, said, when I met him at the home of the Governor of Hudaydah 'Ali Abu al-Rajal (with the General Director of the National Bank 'Ali al-Nasif and a group of senior state officials at a qat party): "We inherited it from the past era, when there were no occasions for relaxation. However, it has its positive aspects. It helps socializing, and has enriched the countryside at the expense of the city."

Various kinds of veils still prevail for women in parts of the country, after they were carried to the country from the city and to city families from sophisticated Arab families in olden times, while the man keeps for himself the ornaments and beautiful clothes!

People live in "huts" like the tents of the American Indians on the heights of Hudaydah. These huts and tents look alike inside too, and the "huts" are different on the outside by the presence of some camels at their doors!

Even the rocks in that area look like rocks out of the space age. The visitor in Yemen might think he had landed on Mars and found life!

That is Yemen's position in the middle of the oil region. It tends to produce hatred on the part of the poor people of the area against the rich people, but a Saudi journalist once wrote: "The Yemen which was the graveyard of conquerors has become the graveyard of financial aid in its backward position in that regard." Whatever the truth of that statement, there is no doubt that a strong Yemeni people would upset the current balance of power in the area, something which some fear more than Communism!

San'a's relations with Riyadh were excellent at the beginning of President 'Ali Salih's regime. They supported his election in the Constituent People's Assembly on 17 June 1978, when one member, al-Riba'i, a member of the Advisory Council, refused to vote. However, San'a blamed Riyadh when its army did not intervene in the war between the two Yemens last year! Nevertheless, after that war Riyadh paid more than 350 million dollars as the cost of an American arms deal for San'a'. What happened was that Washington did not deal with the Yemenis directly in delivering the arms, now were the Korean, Malaysian and Nationalist Chinese experts who arrived in the country as part of the deal permitted to deal directly with the Yemenis. That made the Yemenis quite sensitive about Americans!

The important items which San'a' obtained were seven F-5 aircraft. The delivery of five more planes was postponed until Revolution Day last September. Neutral sources say that those planes arrived without rockets, so that one of the ministers made the comment that he suggested "offering those planes to the ministry of agriculture to be used in fighting locusts!" Also, 60 M-60 tanks had no ammunition when they arrived in Yemen, with the exception of about 31 rounds for one tank!

Last summer the president of the republic and Soviet Ambassador Vasili Kornev agreed to conclude an arms deal with the Soviet Union which included 20 to 30 MIG-21 planes, 200 T-55 and T-62 tanks and rockets, to be paid for in long-term installments with other credit facilitations. The Soviet arms began to arrive with winged haste.

San'a's relations with 'Aden went from "blood to tears," as Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Dr Hasan Makki described it, after the war between the two at the end of last year. The committees of unity between the two countries which had been formed under the Cairo Agreement of 1972 were revitalized. Political, economic and military delegations of senior officials traveled between the two countries. However, Yemeni unity on the practical level remains a long-term project. It even seems that their "game" will continue between the two as long as either is unable to impose the responsibility for failure to achieve it on the other side!

Vice-President of the People's Assembly al-Shahari told AL-HAWADITH enthusiastically: "The important thing is that we speak frankly. Spanish [sic] methods are rejected in dealings between us. The important thing is that Yemeni blood does not flow unless it flows for others for the sake of honor and sovereignty. We have become a magazine of weapons from 200-year-old rifles to modern weapons and rockets, but whoever dies in that way is not a nationalist."

There are several joint statements which control the path to unity, the most prominent being the San'a' statement of October 1979 between the president of the Northern republic and Southern head of government 'Ali Nassir Muhammad; the Cairo Agreement between former Northern head of state Muhsin al-'Ayni and the same Southern head of state; and the Algiers Statement of September 1973 between former Northern president al-Iryani and former Southern president Salim Rubayi 'Ali. They also include the Kuwait Statement in March 1979, the Algiers Statement of September 1973, the Tripoli Statement of November 1972 and the Cairo statement of the same year.

North Yemen's relations with the Soviet Union are old, for the port of Hudaydah was built with Soviet aid from 1958 to 1960. It had three piers, a small petroleum anchorage, and a capacity of 50,000 tons a year. However, it was expanded with British and French help between 1977 and 1980 so that it now included four piers and handled more than 2,600,000 tons in 1979. Also, it received more than 30,500 vessels after al-Kathib and al-Mukha harbors were added to it also. I saw dozens of Yemeni sailors on the first pier of the harbor to the left unloading Soviet arms from the dust-colored boats at anchor opposite that pier. Those weapons included military trucks and crates of ammunition. I entered the port of Hudaydah with permission obtained with difficulty. I was forbidden to go to the left of the harbor, but I was permitted to take pictures on the right side where some civilian vessels were anchored, one of them blocking the view of the other side.

There are two versions of the number of Soviet experts in the country. The first says that there are no more than 100 experts after the delivery of the Soviet arms deal. The other diplomatic story, which may not be free of exaggeration, says that their number has risen from 220 to 400. This story also says that there are 180 Yemeni military students in the Soviet Union.

On the economic level, it is well-known that the Soviets have offered factories, the most prominent for cement and textiles, in the past. The Yemeni Government recently signed an agreement with the Soviets to increase the capacity of the cement factory from 600 to 3,000 tons a year, providing that that project would be implemented over 30 months.

In theory President Salih has many choices in Arab and diplomatic relations, but in practice his choices are few. The choice which he has made, positive neutrality, seems the most difficult to achieve, especially after the deterioration of the "accord" situation or "lessening the level of tension" between the giants. Nevertheless, one must recognize that that choice generated popularity for him at home and gave him freedom to mingle with the people and talk with them.

The second choice is for North Yemen to cooperate with the moderate Arab states and the United States.

The third choice is for North Yemen to unite with the South. That means consequently that North Yemen will stand with a "front" of Arab "resistance and opposition," that is, "rejection," and consequently with the Soviet Union.

There remains a fourth choice which may be forced on the country in confronting the dangers of division to which more than one Arab state is exposed, at a stage at which playwright David Laham described Arab conditions in his stage play "Kasik, Ya Watani," as: "Yemen is two Yemens and Lebanon is four--and the rope is on the tractor, ready to pull!"

An informed source told AL-HAWADITH that if South Yemen invaded the North by sea and land (through the central and southwestern regions), their forces might achieve the slogan "from (al-Mahrah), on the borders with Oman, to (Samarah), in the mountains which lie about 20 kilometers from the capital." If this invasion occurs, it would lead to the "Lebanonization" of the situation in the country. It would be partitioned into a republic for the Yazidi Shi'ites in San'a' and its surroundings, a republic for the Sunni Shafi'ites in the central area (which is supported by the South and the Soviet Union), and an emirate for the Hamidin clan, located in the interior. That source said that the port of Ta'izz could become the first republic's outlet to the sea and the port of Hudaydah the second republic's outlet, provided that an outlet is selected for the emirate as well!

One of the ministers did not think it unlikely that the forces of South Yemen would arrive if they invaded the North to a distance of 40 to 50 kilometers from San'a'. He did not think it unlikely that partition would occur as a result of that. Some observers note that just as the word "banadurah [tomatoes]" was used as a password at armed barricades during the "Two-Year War" in Lebanon to distinguish between Lebanese and Palestinians (since they pronounce it differently), so the word "al-qat" was used during the civil war in North Yemen before 1967 to distinguish between Shafi'ites and Yazidis (who pronounce it differently).

As for partition, the bets at present are almost exclusively in favor of the people of Yemen, who have proved through history and in the face of foreign and domestic attack that this is "forbidden land." Yemen, the so-called "weak link" surprised the Arabs in 1962 after the Syrian secession from Egypt, and in 1968, after the June 1967 defeat!

As for President Salih, follower of the announced policy of positive neutrality, he is still pursuing the policy of sending messages to the left and leaning toward the right, and vice versa. Some criticize the regime's directives such as currency restrictions, prohibiting Yemenis from visiting foreign embassy buildings without permission from the Foreign Ministry, and burning 266 crates of grapes imported from abroad. He is also returning to the military uniform, reviving military reviews and maneuvers in the barracks and outside them. He has also accepted an invitation from the Soviet ambassador to visit Moscow, as one of the officials assured me.

On the other hand, President al-Salih is sending messages to the right and moves toward the left. If he sends a message to American President Jimmy Carter and welcomes Saudi and Kuwaiti businessmen, then he circulates news of welcoming the former and then the latter, and remains closer to the left.

That is a policy of nonalignment, described by an informed source as a policy of differing with the two giants while avoiding agreement with either one! Is that the right choice for North Yemen under 'Ali Salih's leadership?!

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